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Abstract
Since its proposal by Regev in 2005 [Reg05], the Learning With Errors (LWE)
problem was used as the underlying problem for a great variety of schemes. Its
applications are many-fold, reaching from basic and highly practical primitives
like key exchange [ADPS16], public-key encryption [LP11, LPR10], and signature
schemes [ABBD15, DDLL13] to very advanced solutions like fully homomorphic
encryption [BV14, BGV11], group signatures [LLLS13], and identity based encryp-
tion [ABV+11].
One of the underlying reasons for this fertility is the flexibility with that LWE can
be instantiated. Unfortunately, this comes at a cost: It makes selecting parameters
for cryptographic applications complicated. When selecting parameters for a new
LWE-based primitive, a researcher has to take the influence of several parameters on
the efficiency of the scheme and the runtime of a variety of attacks into consideration.
In fact, the missing trust in the concrete hardness of LWE is one of the main problems
to overcome to bring LWE-based schemes to practice.
This thesis aims at closing the gap between the theoretical knowledge of the
hardness of LWE, and the concrete problem of selecting parameters for an LWE-
based scheme. To this end, we analyze the existing methods to estimate the hardness
of LWE, and introduce new estimation techniques where necessary. Afterwards, we
show how to transfer this knowledge into instantiations that are at the same time
secure and efficient. We show this process on three examples:
• A highly optimized public-key encryption scheme for embedded devices that
is based on a variant of Ring-LWE.
• A practical signature scheme that served as the foundation of one of the best
lattice-based signature schemes based on standard lattices.
• An advanced public-key encryption scheme that enjoys the unique property
of natural double hardness based on LWE instances similar to those used for
fully homomorphic encryption.
iii

Zusammenfassung
Einer der Grundpfeiler unserer modernen digitalen Gesellschaft sind asymmetrische
Verschlu¨sselungs- und Signaturverfahren. Asymmetrische Verfahren zeichnen sich
dadurch aus, dass es nicht einen geheimen Schlu¨ssel gibt, sondern ein Schlu¨sselpaar
bestehend aus einem geheimen und einem o¨ffentlichen Schlu¨ssel. Der o¨ffentliche
Schlu¨ssel erlaubt etwa das Verschlu¨sseln einer Nachricht oder das verifizieren einer
Signatur, zum Entschlu¨sseln der Nachricht oder erzeugen der Signatur ist hingegen
der geheime Schlu¨ssel notwendig.
Allen diesen Verfahren gemein ist dass ihre Sicherheit auf einem numerisch schwer
zu lo¨senden Problem beruht. In nahezu allen heute in der Praxis benutzen Verfahren
ist dieses Problem entweder das Faktorisieren großer Zahlen, oder das diskrete Loga-
rithmus Problem in verschiedenen Gruppen. Die auf diesen Problemen beruhenden
Verfahren sind effizient und werden fu¨r sicher gehalten, haben jedoch ein großes
Problem: Wie Peter Shor 1994 zeigte, ko¨nnen sie von Quantencomputern in poly-
nomieller Zeit gelo¨st werden. In einer Zukunft, in der Quantencomputer existieren
(was zufolge vieler Experten bereits in 20 Jahren der Fall sein ko¨nnte), sind auf sie
also zum sichern vertraulicher Kommunikation ungeeignet.
Diese Arbeit befasst sich mit der Schwere des Learning With Errors (LWE) Prob-
lems. Auf LWE basierende Verfahren geho¨ren zu den vielversprechendsten Kandi-
daten, um Faktorisierungs- und diskrete Logarithmus basierte Verfahren abzulo¨sen.
Sie sind sehr effizient und ko¨nnen nach dem aktuellen Stand der Forschung nicht von
Quantencomputern angegriffen werden. Die Verfahren sind u¨blicherweise mithilfe
eines Sicherheitsbeweises an LWE gebunden. Dieser besagt dass man eine bestimmte
LWE Instanz lo¨sen muss, um das Verfahren zu brechen.
U¨ber die theoretische Schwere von LWE ist bereits viel bekannt. Wie Regev
bereits 2005 zeigte, sind zufa¨llige Instanzen von LWE (asymptotisch) mindestens
so schwer wie die schwersten Instanzen verschiedener, etablierter Gitterprobleme.
Leider sagen weder Regev’s Resultat u¨ber die asymptotische Schwere von LWE, noch
der Sicherheitsbeweis etwas daru¨ber aus, wie schwer diese LWE Instanz ist. Folglich
ist es von erheblicher Bedeutung fu¨r Theorie und Praxis, die Schwere konkreter LWE
Instanzen zu untersuchen, und aus diesen Erkenntnissen korrekte Parameter fu¨r die
LWE-basierten Verfahren abzuleiten.
Folglich ist diese Arbeit in zwei Abschnitte unterteilt. Der Erste pra¨sentiert neue
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theoretische und experimentelle Ergebnisse u¨ber die Schwere von LWE. Es besteht
aus neuen Resultaten u¨ber die Schwere von LWE Instanzen unter Einschra¨nkungen,
die in der Praxis auftreten (Kapitel 3), eine experimentelle Untersuchung der Pa-
rallelisierbarkeit eines der vielversprechendsten LWE-Lo¨sers (Kapitel 4), ein neuer
Algorithmus zum Lo¨sen von LWE (Kapitel 5), und eine neue Methode zum expe-
rimentellen Vergleich verschiedener LWE-Lo¨ser (Kapitel 6). Der zweite Abschnitt
zeigt anhand dreier Beispiele, wie sich die Erkenntnisse u¨ber die Schwere von LWE
nutzen lassen, um Parameter fu¨r kryptographische Verfahren zu wa¨hlen. Die Ver-
fahren sind ein Signaturverfahren (Kapitel 7), ein Verschlu¨sselungsverfahren (Kapi-
tel 8), und ein Verschlu¨sselungsverfahren mit erweiterten Sicherheitseigenschaften
(Kapitel 9).
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1 Introduction
Public-key cryptography is ubiquitous in our modern IT infrastructure. Nearly all
of today’s digital security solutions are either based on the problem of factoring big
integers, or solving the discrete logarithm problem in certain groups. While those
schemes are widely used and believed to be secure now, they come with an expiration
date: In 1994, Peter Shor [Sho97] showed in a ground-breaking work that quantum
computers can solve the factoring and the discrete logarithm problem in polynomial
time, rendering all schemes based on those problems insecure. While no large-scale
quantum computer exist now, experts agree that they are likely to exist in a not
too distant future. Investigating alternatives that can resist attacks on quantum
computers is therefore not only of theoretical, but also of practical interest.
At this point in time, there are five main research areas aiming to replace today’s
public-key cryptography: Hash-based, code-based, isogeny-based, lattice-based, and
multivariate cryptography. This work is located in the field of lattice-based cryp-
tography. This field gained a lot of interest in the last decade, since it combines
many desirable features: It comes with good (quasilinear) asymptotic key sizes, good
concrete runtimes and key sizes, allows worst-case secure instantiations, and several
advanced cryptographic primitives that where believed to be impossible before. Vir-
tually all modern lattice-based primitives are based on one of two problems: The
Learning With Errors (LWE) problem, or the Short Integer Solution (SIS) problem.
While SIS is the older of the two problems, LWE can be used in more applications.
In a nutshell, SIS allows “minicrypt” (i.e., signature schemes and hash functions),
while LWE can also be used to build “cryptomania” applications (i.e., public key
encryption and more). However, LWE also serves as the security foundation of
recent signature schemes [ABBD15, ABB+16]. Consequently, this thesis focuses
on the hardness of LWE. A short excursion about the hardness of SIS is given in
Chapter 7. Since the introduction of LWE by Regev [Reg05], a big effort was made
by the community to investigate its full potential. Roughly speaking, the literature
can be split into three lines of work:
First, many interesting results show that it is possible to build many different
cryptographic applications based on LWE. This started with the public-key encryp-
tion scheme presented in Regev’a original work, and is still a growing field. Nowa-
days, there is hardly any big cryptographic conference without any new or improved
3
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construction based on LWE.
The second line of work started with Regev’s worst-case to average-case quantum
reduction from LWE to well-established lattice problems (namely the Short Indepen-
dent Vector Problem, SIVP, and the decisional Shortest Vector Problem, GapSVP).
Since then, several researchers gave new and improved worst-case hardness results
for LWE. Just to mention two of them, is is known today that LWE is worst-case
hard under a classical reduction [BLP+13], and with uniform error [MP13]. Those
works establish the theoretical and asymptotic hardness of LWE.
This thesis is part of the third line of work, dealing with the concrete hardness
of LWE. Over the last decade, a variety of attacks on LWE have been proposed,
and many of them are of independent interest. From a constructive point of view,
this work is important since the runtime of the best known attack tells us the con-
crete hardness of LWE (in other words: the hardness of concrete LWE instances).
This knowledge is crucial to instantiate the schemes based on LWE correctly. Un-
fortunately, transferring knowledge of the complexity of LWE attacks into concrete
parameter proposals for a given scheme is not trivial, and one of the obstacles that
prevent LWE-based schemes from a broader propagation.
In this thesis, we address this topic by showing ways to securely instantiate cryp-
tographic primitives that are based on LWE. This includes new runtime estimations
of existing attacks (Chapter 3 and 4), a new attack on an important subproblem
of LWE (Chapter 5), a new way to monitor the current state of practical LWE
solvers (Chapter 6), and several examples of correct instantiations of cryptographic
primitives (Chapter 7, 8, and 9.
The goal of our parameter selection is to construct schemes that are not only
secure, but also efficient. In this case, efficiency is an umbrella term that com-
prises memory consumption (i.e., the sizes of keys, signatures/ciphertexts, and of
the source code), and speed of the algorithms (i.e., the key generation, encryp-
tion/signing, and decryption/verification). Depending on the scenario, one or more
of these aspects may be more important than the others. We explain our efficiency
goal in the individual chapters.
1.1. Organisation
This thesis evaluates the concrete hardness of the Learning with Errors (LWE)
problem and shows how to select parameters for LWE-based schemes to make them
at the same time secure and efficient. To this end, we show how to overcome
problems that appear while solving LWE and thereby obtain methods to estimate
the hardness of LWE instances. Furthermore, we show that LWE with binary error
can be used to obtain very efficient schemes. Finally, we use the results to instantiate
LWE-based schemes.
Chapter 2 introduces the necessary background and notation. This includes back-
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ground about lattices and the most important arithmetic lattice problems: LWE,
the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP), the Closest Vector Problem (CVP), and re-
laxed variants. We focus on LWE and conclude the chapter with an overview of the
best LWE solvers, including known ways to estimate their runtime on a given LWE
instance.
The scientific contributions of this thesis are split in two parts. Part I presents
new theoretic and practical hardness results for the LWE problem. In a nutshell,
we investigate how a limited number of samples influences the hardness of LWE
(Chapter 3), investigate influences of parallel computing (Chapter 4), analyze an
important variant of LWE (Chapter 5), and present first results of a new challenge
on LWE (Chapter 6).
Despite the fact that the estimations presented in Chapter 2 are well-accepted in
the community, they ignore an important issue that influences the runtime signifi-
cantly: there are often not enough LWE samples to run the attack in the optimal
dimension. In Section 3.1, we show that restricting the number of samples influences
the performance of the attacks significantly. This is used to create concrete values
for the hardness of LWE with few samples in Section 3.2.
Furthermore, a short glimpse in the history of established cryptographic prob-
lems (like factoring or discrete logarithms) shows that it is important to evaluate
which algorithms can benefit from parallel computing. For example, records on
RSA factoring challenges achieved with parallel computing contributed a lot to our
understanding of the security of RSA [KAF+10]. Chapter 4 addresses this issue
by presenting a parallel version of the decoding attack [LP11] and discussing the
influence of further improvements in this direction.
In his original paper [Reg05], Regev proposed LWE with an arbitrary error dis-
tribution. However, his famous worst to average-case reduction was only appli-
cable for Gaussian distributed error. On the other hand, replacing a Gaussian
with a simpler distribution (like the uniform distribution on {0, 1}) leads to much
more efficient schemes, (i.e., schemes with smaller memory footprint and faster run
times [BGG+16]). Chapter 5 deals with the hardness assessment of LWE with bi-
nary error. First, Section 5.1 presents a new attack on binary LWE. The rest of
the chapter compares this attack with existing approaches and shows that it out-
performs all other attacks on certain binary LWE instances that are important in
practice.
In the last chapter of Part I, we focus on the experimental performance of LWE
solvers. To this end, we have set up an LWE challenge web page1. This challenge
solves two main purposes: on the one hand, it allows cryptanalytic experts to prove
the efficiency of their attacks by breaking instances provided by the challenge. On
the other hand, it collects information about the successful attacks and presents
them in a easily accessible way. Chapter 6 shows that the instances provided rep-
1https://www.latticechallenge.org/lwe_challenge/challenge.php
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resent instances that are important in practice (Section 6.1), explains the set-up
of the web page (Section 6.2), and gives results extracted from the first successful
submissions (Section 6.3).
Part II focuses on constructing and instantiating concrete schemes. More pre-
cisely, we show how to select parameters for a signature scheme on standard lattices
(Chapter 7), an encryption scheme on a special instance of LWE (Chapter 8), and
an encryption scheme with additional security guarantees (Chapter 9). The hard-
ness estimations used for the instantiation are based on Part I as well as on other
hardness results.
The first scheme is the signature scheme by Bai/Galbraith [BG14b], that is in-
troduced in Section 7.1. In Section 7.2, we revisit the parameters proposed in the
original work [BG14b] and show that the security of this instantiation was massively
overestimated. We address this issue in Section 7.3 by introducing a new parameter
set that leads to an instantiation that is at the same time secure and allows fast
encryption and decryption [DBG+14].
The second scheme is a highly efficient variant of the encryption scheme by Lindner
and Peikert [LP11]. Section 8.1 introduces a framework that covers both, the original
scheme and our high speed variant. Our instantiation is based on ring LWE with
binary errors. Since the hardness of LWE depends massively on the size of the errors,
instantiating LWE with binary errors looks much easier at first glance. However, it
is well known that the hardness of LWE does not depend on the absolute error size
‖e‖, but on the relative error size ‖e‖/q. This means that decreasing the modulus
q increases the hardness of LWE. In practice, however, correctness requirements
for the scheme typically lead to a lower bound for the modulus. As we show in
Section 8.2, using binary errors decrease this bound and allow to decrypt correctly
with a significantly smaller modulus. Finally, Section 8.3 presents a parameter set
that leads to a secure, correct and highly efficient encryption scheme. The main goal
of the instantiation is to minimize the memory footprint, and an implementation by
Buchman et al [BGG+16] shows that it also leads to reasonably fast runtimes.
In Chapter 9, we presents Learning With Errors in the Exponent (LWEE), a
generalization of LWE that combines the hardness of learning with errors with the
hardness of the Representation Problem (RP), a well-studied number theoretical
problem. The necessary background on RP is given in Section 9.1, and the new
assumption is introduced in Section 9.2. Afterwards, in Section 9.3, we present a
new encryption scheme that is based on LWEE and propose concrete parameters.
The security of these concrete instantiations is presented in Section 9.4.
6
2 Background
This chapter introduces the necessary background for the rest of the thesis. We
start with some general properties of lattices (Section 2.1), introduce the computa-
tional problems (Section 2.2), and finally give an overview of existing LWE solvers
(Section 2.3).
2.1. Lattices
For a positive integer n, we define [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. We denote vectors by bold
lower-case letters and matrices by bold upper-case letters. For an integer c ∈ Z, let
[c]2d be the unique integer in the set (−2d−1, 2d−1] such that c ≡ [c]2d mod 2d which
is basically extraction of the least significant bits. For c ∈ Z, let bced = (c− [c]2d)/2d
drop the d least significant bits. Both operators can also be applied to vectors by
applying it coordinate-wise to its coefficients.
2.1.1. Lattices and Bases
A lattice Λ is a discrete subgroup of the euclidian space Rm. Lattices can be defined
as the integer span by linearly independent vectors b1, . . . ,bn ∈ Rm, where n is
called the dimension of the lattice. For the rest of this work we restrict our studies
to lattices in Rm whose dimension is maximal, e.g., m, which are called full-ranked
lattices. Note that a basis B for a lattice Λ is not unique. Indeed, any unimodular
transformation of B results in a different basis for the same lattice Λ. The lattice
Λ(B) is defined by all integer combinations of elements of B, i.e.,
Λ(B) =
{
x ∈ Rm | ∃α1, . . . , αn ∈ Z : x =
n∑
i=1
αibi
}
.
A very important invariant for a lattice is its determinant. The determinant of a
full-ranked lattice Λ(A) is defined as
det(Λ(A)) = | det(A)|.
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It is well known that the determinant of a lattice is well-defined (i.e. does not depend
on the particular basis) and the definition can be generalized for lattices that are
not full-ranked. In this case, the determinant is given by det(Λ(A)) =
√
det(ATA).
Other important invariants of a lattice are the successive minima λi((Λ)). The ith
successive minimum λi(Λ) is defined as the smallest radius r such that there exist i
linearly independent lattice vectors of norm at most r. Throughout this thesis, the
successive minima will always refer to the Euclidian norm. The successive minima
differ from the determinant in one fundamental aspect: While there are efficient
ways to calculate det(Λ) given an arbitrary lattice basis, calculating λi(Λ(B)) for a
given basis B is typically hard (unless B is a high quality basis, see Section 2.1.2).
However, there is an established way to estimate λ1(Λ), given det(Λ). It is called
the Gaussian heuristic and estimates the length of the shortest lattice vector in an
n-dimensional lattice Λ via
λ1(Λ) ≈ Γ(1 + n/2)
1/n
√
pi
det(Λ)1/n.
In this thesis, we are particularly interested in modular integer lattices. These are
also the lattices one considers when solving LWE instances. A modular (or q-ary)
lattice, for a given q ∈ N, is a full-ranked lattice Λ such that qZm ⊆ Λ ⊆ Zm. Such
modular lattices are often given by a matrix A ∈ Zm×nq via
Λq(A) = {x ∈ Zm | ∃y ∈ Zn : x = Ay mod q} (2.1)
or
Λ⊥q (A) = {x ∈ Zm | Ax = 0 mod q} (2.2)
It is important to note that given a matrix A ∈ Zm×nq , it is easy to find a basis of
Λq(A) (see e.g., [AFG13]). With high probability, the determinant of a q-ary lattice
is given by det(Λq(A)) = q
m−n if A ∈ Zm×nq .
An other important concept from linear algebra is the Gram-Schmidt basis. For
a set of column vectors B ∈ Zm×n, we write pispan(B)(t) for the projection of the
vector t onto the span of the vectors of B, i.e., pispan(B)(t) = B(B
TB)−1BT · t.
The Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization B˜ = {b˜1, . . . , b˜n} of a basis B is defined
through b˜i = bi − pispan(b1,...,bi−1)(bi) for i ∈ [n]. Note that the Gram-Schmidt basis
is typically not a basis of the lattice, but nevertheless important for many lattice
algorithms (see Section 2.3.3).
2.1.2. Basis Quality and Basis Reduction
While every at least two-dimensional lattice is generated by infinitely many bases,
some are clearly more favorable than others. The most common measure of the
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quality of a basis is the Hermite factor. We say that a basis {b1, . . . ,bm} of an
m-dimensional lattice Λ with determinant det(Λ) has Hermite factor δ if
‖b1‖ ≈ δm det(Λ)1/m.
At first sight, this does not look like a meaningful definition, since it only depends on
the first vector of the basis. However, we can use this information to get information
about the other basis vectors. The well-established way to do this is the Geometric
Series Assumption (GSA). It predicts the length of the ith Gram-Schmidt basis
vector to be
‖b˜i‖ ≈ αi−1‖b1‖ (2.3)
for a positive constant α < 1. Despite the fact that it is possible to construct bases
that do at all not follow the GSA, it proved to provide a good approximation for
bases appearing in practice [LP11]. Together with Equation 2.4, and the fact that∏m
i=1 ‖b˜i‖ = det(Λ), this leads to
‖b˜i‖ ≈ δ−2(i−1)+m det(Λ)1/m. (2.4)
Throughout this thesis, we refer to a good basis as a basis with a small Hermite
factor. The GSA implies that with increasing basis quality, the lengths of the first
Gram-Schmidt vectors decrease, while the lengths of the last ones increase. This
can be seen as a sign that in a good basis, the basis vectors are “more orthogonal”
to each other than in a bad basis. Current estimations claim that δ = 1.01 can be
reached in practice, while δ = 1.007 is out of reach for a foreseeable future.
It is considered hard to give more precise estimations for the effort necessary to
achieve a given Hermite delta. The reason for this is that there is a significant gap
between what behavior we can prove for basis reduction (for example, what upper
bound we can prove for the vectors returned by a basis reduction algorithm), and
the observed average behavior (for example, the average lengths of the returned
vectors). This gap already shows up for the basic LLL algorithms: According to
Gama et al. [GN08], LLL provably serves as SVP oracle in dimension two only. In
practice, however, it can be used as SVP oracle up to dimension 35.
This behavior also appears in more advanced basis reduction algorithms like BKZ.
When estimating the hardness of LWE instances, this causes big problems: the
provable results can only be used to derive upper bounds on the effort necessary to
break a certain LWE instance. However, we are interested in lower bounds, since
this carries over to lower bounds on the security of our schemes.
To overcome this obstacle, researcher developed different techniques. Most of
them consist of theoretical results about the asymptotic complexity of basis reduc-
tion algorithms, combined with experimental results about basis reduction on lat-
tices in small and moderate dimensions. In the end, they typically merge to a lower
bound on the number of operations necessary to achieve a certain hermite delta. In
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this work, we use the well-established equation introduced by Richard Lindner and
Chris Peikert [LP11]. They estimate the number of operations necessary to achieve
a given hermite delta δ by
opsBKZ(δ) = 2
1.8/ log2(δ)−110 · 2.3 · 109. (2.5)
2.2. Computational Problems
2.2.1. Short Vector Problems (SVP)
The probably oldest and most-studied class of lattice problems are short vector
problem. For all those problems, the task is to find one or more short lattice vectors,
given a bases of a lattice Λ. The most basic problem is the Shortest Vector Problem,
which asks to find a shortest non-zero lattice vector, given a basis of a “random”
lattice. However, this problem plays a minor role for most modern applications.
More important from a practical point of view is a variant called the “unique
Shortest Vector Problem” (uSVP). The difference to SVP is that in uSVP, we know
in advance that λ2(Λ) > αλ1(Λ) for a fixed factor α > 1. In order to make this
factor explicit, we also write α−uSVP. Experiments show that uSVP gets easier
with increasing “gap” α. Since SVP can be seen as 1-uSVP, this implies that uSVP
is easier than SVP.
A detailed analysis of the computational complexity of uSVP is given by Albrecht
et al. [AFG13]. They claimed that the attack succeeds with high probability if
λ2(Λ)
λ1(Λ)
≥ τδm,
where τ ≈ 0.4 is a constant depending on the unique-SVP solver used. Applying
the Gaussian heuristic shows that the attack succeeds if
τδm ≤
Γ(1+n/2)1/m√
pi
det(Λ)1/m
λ1(Λ)
.
This equation can be simplified using Sterling’s approximation. Sterling approxi-
mated the factorial of a natural number x via
x! ≈
√
2pin
(n
e
)n
.
Applying this for Γ(1 +m/2) = (m/2)! leads to
Γ(1 +
m
2
)1/m =
((m
2
)
!
)1/m
=
(√
2pi
m
2
( m
2
e
)m
2
)1/m
=
(√
2pi
m
2
)1/m (m
2e
) 1
2
≈
√
m/(2e).
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Consequently, we assume that an algorithm solves uSVP correctly if
τδm ≤
√
m det(Λ)1/m√
2pieλ1(Λ)
. (2.6)
Sections 2.3.4 and 2.3.5 show how to construct uSVP instances from LWE in-
stances. A detailed analysis of the complexity of those instances is given in Sec-
tions 3.1.3 and 3.1.4.
2.2.2. Short Integer Solution (SIS)
In the last decade, researchers developed many tools that allow easier constructions
of secure lattice-based cryptographic schemes. A major part of this are the interme-
diate problems LWE and SIS. Those problems have been proven to be hard in the
average-case, as long as certain underlying lattice problems are hard in the worst
case. Consequently, a scheme based on the average-case hardness of LWE or SIS
inherits the worst-case hardness.
The Short Integer Solution (SIS) problem is the oldest of the intermediate prob-
lems and is mainly used to build signature schemes. The most prominent example of
such a signature scheme is BLISS [DDLL13]. In this thesis, SIS is mainly important
for the security analysis of the Bai/Galbraith signature scheme (see Chapter 7). For
parameters n,m, q ∈ Z and ν ≥ 0, SISn,m,q,ν is the problem of finding a nonzero
vector u ∈ Zm such that Au ≡ 0 mod q and ‖u‖ ≤ ν. If not stated otherwise, the
norm applied in the definition of the SIS problem is the Euclidean norm.
2.2.3. Learning with Errors (LWE)
The second intermediate problem is LWE. While SIS is mainly used to build sig-
nature schemes, LWE allows the construction of public-key encryption schemes.
Furthermore, several modern signature schemes (e.g., the line of work following
TESLA [ABBD15]) are also based on the hardness of LWE. In some sense, one can
say that LWE is more powerful than SIS.
Definition 1 (LWE Distribution). Let n, q be positive integers, χ be a probability
distribution on Zq, and s ∈ Znq . We denote by L(n)s,χ the probability distribution on
Znq × Zq obtained by choosing a from the uniform distribution on Znq , choosing e
according to χ, and returning (a, 〈a, s〉+ e) ∈ Znq × Zq.
For parameters n,m, q ∈ Z and a probability distribution χ on Zq, Search-LWEn,m,q,χ
is the problem of finding s ∈ Znq given m pairs (ai, ci) ∈ Znq × Zq sampled according
to L
(n)
s,χ for s
$← χn. While LWE is defined for arbitrary distributions χ, there are
few very important special cases. The most common case is to use a discrete or
discretized Gaussian distribution.
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Definition 2. For a positive parameter σ ∈ R, we write Dσ for the discrete Gaus-
sian distribution over the integers. It is defined by
Pr[Dσ = x] ∼ exp
(
− 1
2σ2
)
.
Slightly abusing notation, we also write Dσ for the Gaussian distribution over Zq
which is defined by sampling from Z and taking the result modulo q. To simplify
notation, we write Search-LWEn,m,q,σ for Search-LWEn,m,q,Dσ throughout this pa-
per. A second important case is binary LWE. It is defined by Search-binLWE =
Search-LWEn,m,q,U{0,1} , where U{0,1} denotes the uniform distribution on {0, 1}.
LWE plays a major role in lattice-based cryptography, since it allows the construc-
tion of all sorts of cryptographic algorithms. The arguably most important prim-
itives in asymmetric cryptography are signature schemes and encryption schemes,
and LWE allows efficient constructions of both of them. In this thesis, we discuss
parameter selection for a signature scheme (Chapter 7) and two encryption schemes
(Chapter 8 and 9).
In fact, there is a third important line of work, namely key exchange protocols.
All LWE-based key exchange protocols follow basically the original construction by
Jintai Ding [Din12]. LWE instances used for practical instantiations are very similar
to instances used for encryption schemes. Consequently, the techniques introduced
in this work can also be used for good instantiations of Ding-like key exchange
protocols, including new constructions like Peikert’s key exchange [Pei14] and the
new hope protocol [ADPS16]. We want to point out that this is in contrast to
signature schemes, that typically require significantly different parameters (e.g., a
substantially bigger modulus) and are therefore addressed independently.
2.3. Algorithms for LWE
This section gives an overview of the best known algorithms to solve LWE. Sec-
tion 2.3.1 treats the BKW algorithm by Blum, Kalai, and Wassermann [BKW03], a
very direct way to solve LWE. An alternative is to interpretate LWE as an instance
of the Bounded Distance Decoding (BDD) problem, see Section 2.3.3. There are also
indirect ways to solve LWE. Those are to either reduce it to the unique Shortest Vec-
tor Problem (uSVP) (see Section 2.3.4), or to reduce it first to the inhomogeneous
Short Integer Solution (iSIS) problem and then to uSVP (see Section 2.3.5).
The above attacks can be split into two different areas. On the one hand are the
more algebraic attacks, namely BKW and the attack by Arora and Ge [AG11]. An
important characterization of these attacks is that they do not use basis reduction as
subroutine. This is a desirable feature, since basis reduction algorithms are hard to
analyze (see Section 2.1.2). Consequently, theory can predict the behavior of those
attacks very well, and the theoretic analysis give very good runtime estimations.
12
2.3. Algorithms for LWE
On the other hand, we have lattice-based attacks. They can be characterized as
the attacks that utilize basis reduction. Consequently, the gap between theory and
practice for basis reduction algorithms carries over to lattice-based LWE attacks.
We deal with this problem by using the well-established extrapolation methods to
give lower bounds on the capabilities of basis reduction algorithms introduced in
Section 2.1.2. Consequently, the analysis of those attacks are of theoretical nature,
but extended with extrapolations of experimental data.
It is important to note that all runtime estimates presented in this work are valid
for classical computers. While LWE is believed to be hard, this does not mean
that quantum computers can not provide any speed-up to known algorithms. This
statement only implies that there is no efficient (i.e., polynomial-time) quantum
algorithm known for LWE. So far, the existence of such an algorithm is considered
to be unlikely.
In fact, the only known way to speed up solvers for post-quantum hard problems
is to apply Grover’s algorithm. Grover’s algorithm is an quantum algorithm for
finding elements in an unstructured search space. It’s advantage is that it can find
a wanted element in runtime roughly O(√n), while classical algorithms require at
least O(n). While this speedup is by far not enough to break LWE-based crypto
completely, it is still too big to be ignored.
Grover’s algorithm can speed up certain subroutines of classical LWE attacks,
potentially resulting in an quantum attack that outperforms classical approaches.
Identifying the attacks that can benefit from this speed-up is content of current re-
search. However, this research requires detailed knowledge of the classical algorithm.
Due to the modular nature of the approaches presented in this work, new results
about quantum speed-ups can be easily included by replacing runtime estimates of
the affected subroutines by the estimations of their quantum counterparts. Promis-
ing research directions considering quantum speed-ups are given in the conclusion
(Chapter 10).
In many scenarios, Grover can be used to speed up a brute-force subroutine. Some
recent developments show that in fact, several lattice solvers (mainly those using
some sieving subroutine) can benefit from this speed-up. However, the impact on
the concrete hardness of LWE seems to be limited until know, and is not considered
in this work.
2.3.1. The Blum Kalai Wasserman Algorithm
In 2003, Blum, Kalai and Wasserman [BKW03] published a new attack on the
Learning with Parity Noise (LPN) problem, a predecessor of LWE. The attack was
generalized and applied to LWE by Albrecht et al. in 2013 [ACF+15]. Improvements
for LWE with particularly small secret [AFFP14] and by applying multidimensional
Fourier transforms [DTV15] followed.
The main drawback of BKW at the moment is that it requires too many samples
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a b log2(samples)
1 256 3221
2 128 1611
4 64 805
8 32 403
16 16 201
32 8 81026
64 4 347965698915015
Table 2.1.: Number of samples required to break an LWE instance with n = 256,
q = 4093, σ = 8.35/
√
2pi
to be applied to real-world LWE instances. Consequently, BKW only plays a minor
role throughout this thesis. This section introduces the main idea of BKW, and aims
at giving an intuitive understanding of why BKW is not practical in its current state.
For details, we refer to the recent research papers [AFFP14, DTV15].
BKW is an algebraic attack on LWE. We do not give a formal explanation of
BKW here, interested readers are referred to [ACF+15, DTV15]. In the most recent
work on BKW, Duc et al. [DTV15] also show how to apply BKW on LWE instances
with “few samples”. They claim that a successful attack requires at least
max
(
8 · b log(aq)
(
1− 2pi
2σ2
q2
)−2a
,
3
2
qb
)
(2.7)
samples, where a, b are attack parameters satisfying a · b = n. Obviously, the choice
of a and b can be used to tune the trade-off between the two terms. The key
observation is that the second term is exponential in b, while the second term is
super exponential in a. Consequently, the whole formula is at least exponential
in
√
n.
Besides this theoretical (asymptotic) argument, inserting concrete values into
Equation 2.7 supports the assumption that BKW requires too many samples to
be practical. Table 2.1 shows the necessary number of samples for an LWE instance
proposed by Lindner and Peikert [LP11] for LWE-based encryption. Keep in mind
that this numbers take the new technique that allows to run BKW on few samples
(at the cost of additional memory requirements) into account.
2.3.2. The Distinguishing Attack
One of the oldest attacks on LWE is the so-called “distinguishing attack”. It is easy
to understand, shows a direct relation between LWE and aSVP in certain lattices, is
easy to anlyse, and can be used in combination with any aSVP algorithm. Despite
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Lindner and Peikert’s claim that it is outperformed by the decoding attack [LP11],
recent improvements on lattice sieving algorithms lead to runtime estimations that
show that it could actually be the most promising approach on certain instances.
Those arguments are somewhat debatable (since they ignore memory consumption),
but still show that one must not ignore the distinguishing attack.
The goal is to distinguish whether the vector b comes from an LWE distribution
or was sampled uniformly random in Zmq , given A and b. In order to do this, the
algorithm creates a small vector in the dual lattice
Λq(A)
⊥ = {v ∈ Zm | Av = 0 mod q}. (2.8)
Afterwards, it checks whether | 〈v,b〉 | is small or not. To see why, assume b was
sampled uniformly random. In this case, 〈v,b〉 is uniformly random in Zq and in
general not small. Now, assume b comes from an LWE distribution. This leads to
〈v,b〉 = 〈e,b〉, which is small if v is small enough.
The common instantiation of this attack is to represent the inner product as an
integer between −q/2 and q/2 and output “LWE” if the absolute value is smaller
than q/4, and “uniform” otherwise. The effort necessary to compute a vector of
a certain length can be estimated with Equation 2.5 or similar results. Lindner
and Peikert [LP11] gave an analysis for the attack on LWE with Gaussian error, an
analysis for LWE with binary error is given in Chapter 5.
2.3.3. The Decoding Attack
A very natural way to attack LWE is based on viewing it as a special instance of
CVP. To this end, consider the lattice Λq(A) as defined in Section 2.1.1. Since
b = As + e mod q, we know that there is an integer vector x ∈ Zm such that
b = As + e + qb. It is easy to verify that As ∈ Λq(A) and qx ∈ Λq(A). Since
a lattice is an additive subgroup, also As + qx ∈ Λq(A), and consequently b lies
within distance ‖e‖ from a lattice point. Since e is typically very small, solving the
CVP problem in the lattice Λq(A) with target vector b returns the target vector
As+ qx, from which s can be recovered easily.
The standard approach to solve CVP (and its variants) is to use basis reduction
followed by a decoding algorithm. Since basis reduction algorithms have been intro-
duced before, we focus on the second step here. The classical decoding algorithm
is the nearest-plane algorithm introduced by Babai [Bab86]. A generalization was
presented by Lindner and Peikert in 2011 [LP11]. On a lattice basis B and a target
vector t as input, it returns a lattice vector that is somewhat close to t.
To understand the exact output guarantees, it is necessary to introduce the fun-
damental parallelepiped. For a basis B ∈ Zm×n, the fundamental parallelepiped is
defined as
P(B) =
{
v =
m∑
i=1
αibi | ∀i ∈ [m] : 0 ≤ αi < 1
}
,
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Algorithm 1: Nearest Plane
Input : B = {b1, . . . ,bm} ⊂ Rm, // the lattice basis
B˜ =
{
b˜1, . . . , b˜m
}
, // Gram-Schmidt basis of B
k ∈ Z, // current subdimension satisfying k ≤ m
t ∈ Rm // the target vector
Output: A lattice vector v such that t− v ∈ P1/2({b˜1, . . . , b˜k−1})
1 begin
2 if k = 0 then
3 return 0
4 end
5 else
6 t← pispan({b1,...,bk})(t) // optional step
7 Let c be the integer closest to 〈b˜k,t〉〈b˜k,b˜k〉 ;
8 return
(
c · bk + NearestPlanes(B, B˜, k − 1, t− c · bk)
)
9 end
10 end
and the shifted fundamental parallelepiped as
P1/2(B) =
{
v =
m∑
i=1
αibi | ∀i ∈ [m] : −1
2
≤ αi < 1
2
}
.
This notation is used for lattice bases as well as for Gram-Schmidt bases. Note that
the orthogonality of Gram-Schmidt vectors implies that the corresponding funda-
mental parallelepipeds are m-dimensional rectangles.
For a vector space U , let piU(t) be the orthogonal projection of t on U . When
called on target vector t ∈ Rm and a lattice basis B ∈ Zm×m, the (polynomial-time)
algorithm nearest plane (see Algorithm 1) returns the unique lattice point v such
that t − v lies in the shifted Gram-Schmidt fundamental parallelepiped P1/2(B˜).
Consequently, when called on an LWE instance b = As + e with a basis B of
Λq(A), nearest plane returns the desired vector v ∈ Zm such that v = As if (and
only if) e ∈ P1/2(B˜). This shows that the success probability of nearest plane
heavily depends on the quality of the input basis: a bad input basis comes with
a “long and skinny” Gram-Schmidt fundamental parallelepiped and consequently
with a small success probability.
Consequently, already the basic decoding attack (basis reduction on Λq(A), fol-
lowed by nearest plane) comes with a trade-off between runtime and success proba-
bility: increasing the time spend on basis reduction increases the success probability,
while decreasing it leads to a smaller success probability.
In 2011, Lindner and Peikert [LP11] presented nearest planes, a generalisation of
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Algorithm 2: NearestPlanes
Input : B = {b1, . . . ,bm} ⊂ Rm, // the lattice basis
B˜ =
{
b˜1, . . . , b˜m
}
, // Gram-Schmidt basis of B
k ∈ Z, // current subdimension satisfying k ≤ m
d ∈ (Z+)m, // recursive branching vector
t ∈ Rm // the target vector
Output: A lattice vector v such that t− v ∈ Pd1/2({b˜1, . . . , b˜k−1})
1 begin
2 if k = 0 then
3 return 0
4 end
5 else
6 t← pispan({b1,...,bk})(t) // optional step
7 Let {c1, . . . , cdk} ∈ Zdk be the distinct integers closest to 〈b˜k,t〉〈b˜k,b˜k〉 ;
8 return
⋃
i∈[dk]
(
ci · bk + NearestPlanes(B, B˜, k − 1,d, t− ci · bk)
)
9 end
10 end
nearest plane that provides the attacker with additional power. Instead of calculat-
ing one coefficient c in every iteration, nearest planes (see Algorithm 2) calculates
several ci and recurses on all of them. The attacker can choose the number of
coefficients for every step by an additional attack parameter d ∈ (Z+)m.
The output guarantee of nearest planes can easily be formulated with the following
generalization of the shifted Gram-Schmidt rectangle: for a basis B ∈ Zm×n and a
vector d ∈ (Z+)m, the generalized fundamental parallelepiped is defined as
Pd1/2(B) =
{
v =
m∑
i=1
αibi | ∀i ∈ [m] : −di
2
≤ αi < di
2
}
.
The output guarantee of nearest planes is as follows:
Theorem 1. Let b = As + e mod q be an LWE instance. Furthermore, let B ∈
Zm×m be a basis of Λq(A) with Gram-Schmidt basis B˜ and d ∈ (Z+)m be a vector.
On input B, B˜,m,d and b, nearest planes returns a vector v ∈ Zm such that v = As
mod q if and only if e ∈ Pd1/2(B˜).
The advanced decoding attack (basis reduction followed by nearest planes) allows
two trade-offs: The parameter d can be used to tune the trade-off between the time
spend on basis reduction and on nearest planes, while the hermite delta δ determines
the trade-off between runtime and success probability.
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Lindner and Peikert estimate the success probability of the overall attack via
psucc =
∏
i∈[m]
erf
(
di‖b˜i‖
√
pi
2σ
)
(2.9)
More details about the optimal choice of the attack parameters are given in Sec-
tion 3.1.2.
2.3.4. Kannan’s Reduction to unique SVP
An other purely lattice-based approach is to reduce the LWE instance to an instance
of the unique shortest vector problem (uSVP). In a nutshell, the idea of the attack
is to add the vector b to the lattice
Λq(A) = {v ∈ Zm | ∃x ∈ Zn : Ax = v mod q}.
Since As and b are lattice vectors, e is a very short lattice vector, and one can apply
a solver for unique-SVP to recover e (the typical solver is BKZ2.0).
2.3.5. Reduction to Inhomogeneous SIS
A different embedding approach is to see LWE as an instance of the Inhomogeneous
Short Integer Solution (ISIS) problem. In order to do this, consider the equation
b =
(
A Im
)
(s, e)T mod q.
Consequently, the vector (s, e) is a solution to ISIS with matrix
(
A Im
)
and target
vector b.
A established way to solve ISIS (and the reason for the title of this subsection) is
to reduce it to an SVP problem by considering the equation(
A Im b
)
(s, e,−1)T = 0 mod q.
Since s and e are small, (s, e,−1)T is a small vector in the lattice Λ⊥q (
(
A Im b
)
)
(see Equation (2.2) for the definition), so the remaining problem is to solve an
uSVP instance in dimension m+ n+ 1 with determinant qm (with high probability,
see [BBD09]).
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3 LWE Instances with Few Samples
In the original definition of LWE, a solver has access to arbitrary many samples.
However, this is typically not true in real world applications. Concrete cryptographic
schemes like the encryption scheme by Lindner and Peikert [LP11] or the signature
scheme by Ducas et al. [DDLL13] only provide a bounded number of samples. A
natural research question is therefore: how does a restricted number of samples
influence the hardness of LWE?
In this chapter, we address this question by evaluating how a restricted number
of samples influences the complexity of LWE solvers. Some attacks, like the Arora
and Ge algorithm [AG11], are unsuitable in this setting. Other attacks can still be
applied, but perform much worse. We show that some attacks depend more on the
optimal attack dimension than others, and that this changes the picture of which
attacks perform best on what instances completely.
Organisation Section 3.1 shows how to estimate the runtime of existing LWE
solvers on LWE with few samples. Afterwards, Section 3.2 gives an overview of the
estimated runtime of solvers for concrete instances with few samples.
3.1. Known Solvers
In this section, we focus on attacks than can be applied on LWE instances with few
samples. Attacks requiring many samples like BKW or Arora-Ge are excluded.
3.1.1. Distinguishing Attack
As mentioned in the introduction, the distinguishing attack is one of the easiest
attacks on LWE. Lindner and Peikert [LP11] claim that a short vector v in Λ⊥q (A)
is enough to distinguish an LWE instance from a uniformly random sample with ad-
vantage close to exp(−pi(‖v‖σ/q)2) Obviously, this advantage grows with decreasing
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size of v. Consequently, the optimal dimension is the dimension that allows to find
the shortest vector v.
Arbitrary many samples Micciancio and Regev [MR09] show that a basis reduc-
tion algorithm that is capable to find a vector of hermite delta δ finds the smallest
vector if run in dimension
√
n log(q)/ log(δ). Using the equation det(Λ⊥q ) = q
n
(which is true withhigh probability [BBD09]) leads to
‖v‖ ≈ δm · qn/m = δ
√
n log(q)/ log(δ)q
n
√
log(q)√
n log(n) = 22
√
n log2(q) log2(δ) (3.1)
for the best achievable vector.
It is often better to amplify a small advantage by repeating the attack than
running an attack with high advantage in the first place. Following the proposal
by Albrecht et al. [ACF+15], we assume that it takes ε2 repetitions of an attack
with advantage ε to solve the problem with sufficiently high probability. Following
Equation 3.1, the advantage for a given hermite delta δ is given by
εδ = exp(−pi(22
√
n log2(q) log2(δ)σ/q)2).
The only thing remaining is to (numerically) find the hermite delta δ that mini-
mizes opsBKZ(δ)
εδ
, where opsBKZ(δ) is the runtime estimation of basis reduction (see
Equation 2.5).
Bounded number of samples If there are not enough samples available to run the
attack in the best dimension, it is commonly known [MR09] that the best strategy
is to use all available samples. In this case, the norm of the best achievable vector
is estimated by
‖v‖ ≈ qn/mδm. (3.2)
As in the “arbitrary many samples”-case, we repeat an attack with advantage ε
ε2 many times. In our case, the optimal hermite delta δ is the one that minimizes
opsBKZ(δ)
εδ
, with
εδ = exp(−pi(qn/mδmσ/q)2).
3.1.2. Decoding Attack
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the decoding attack [LP11] is one of the most
important attacks in practice. One of the problems when running it in practice is
that selecting good attack parameters is non-trivial. Recall that the attacker can
control the following parameters:
• d, the number of recursive nearest-planes calls per level
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• δ, the quality of the basis after basis reduction
• m, the number of samples
We discuss the optimal choice of those parameters in the following.
Since the runtime of nearest planes is nearly linear in D =
∏
i di, the value D is
a natural attack parameter. Lindner and Peikert claim that it is optimal to choose
d such that mini∈[m]{di · b˜i} is maximized, so selecting D is in fact equivalent to
selecting d.
Finding the optimal value for δ is also not easy. However, an easy calculation
shows that selecting δ such that the runtimes of basis reduction and nearest planes
is about equal is at least close to optimal (up to a factor of two). Finding such a
value for δ can be done easily using binary search.
Arbitrary many samples The last choice concerns m. Using arguments similar to
those from the distinguishing-attack (see Section 3.1.1), Lindner and Peikert claim
that it is at least close to optimal to use
m =
√
n log(q)/ log(δ).
The expected runtime is then given by
opsBKZ(δ) + opsnearest planes(δ,d)
psucc(δ,d,m)
(3.3)
for m =
√
n log(q)/ log(δ) with opsnearest planes(δ,d) = 2
15
∏
i di (see [LP11]) and
psucc as in Equation 2.9.
Bounded number of samples When there are not enough samples to use the
optimal attack dimension, Lindner and Peikert claim that one should always use
all samples available. They do not give a formal proof of this statement, but it
is intuitive and confirmed by all experiments so far. With this assumption, the
expected runtime of the attack is given by Equation 3.3, but with m as the given
number of samples. We want to point out at this point that the minor-looking
difference has a huge impact, since the choice of m influences the choice of d as well
as the values of b˜i.
3.1.3. Kannan’s Embedding Attack
Following Equation (2.6), we assume that the attack succeeds of (and only if)
τδm ≤
√
m det(Λq(A))
1/m
√
2pie‖e‖ .
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With high probability (see [MR09]), the determinant of the q-ary lattice is given by
qm−n. Additionally, we assume that the error norm is given by ‖e‖ ≈ √m · c for a
constant c that is independent of n,m, and q. This is true for all uniform errors, but
also for Gaussian errors. With this assumptions, the attack is therefore successful if
q1−n/m√
2epicτδm
≥ 1. (3.4)
Arbitrary many samples Standard arguments show that the left-hand side of
Inequality (3.4) is maximized for m =
√
n log(q)/ log(δ) [MR09]. In that case,
δ = exp(n log(q)/m2) = qn/m
2
, which leads to
q1−n/m√
2epicτδm
=
q1−n/m√
2epicτ
q−n/m =
q1−2n/m√
2epicτ
.
The next step is to simplify Inequality (3.4) for the optimal value of m:
q1−2n/m√
2epicτ
≥ 1⇔ q1−2n/m ≥
√
2epicτ
⇔ (1− 2n/m) log(q) ≥ log(
√
2epicτ)
⇔ 2n log(q) ≤ m
(
log(q)− log(
√
2epicτ)
)
After inserting m =
√
n log(q)/ log(δ), we have:
q1−2n/m√
2epicτ
≥ 1⇔ 2n log(q) ≤
√
n log(q)
log(δ)
(
log(q)− log(
√
2epicτ)
)
⇔ 2
√
n log(q)
√
log(δ) ≤ log(q)− log(
√
2epicτ)
⇔
√
log(δ) ≤ log(q)− log(
√
2epicτ)
2
√
n log(q)
⇔ log(δ) ≤
(
log(q)− log(√2epicτ))2
4n log(q)
Bounded number of samples If the LWE instance does not provide sufficiently
many samples to run the attack in the optimal dimension, using all samples available
is the best choice. In that case, Equation (3.4) is equivalent to
δ ≤ m
√
q1−n/m√
2piecτ
. (3.5)
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3.1.4. Reduction to uSVP via ISIS
As introduced in the background (see Section (2.3)), there is a second technique to
reduce LWE to uSVP: via ISIS. It requires to solve a uSVP problem in dimension
m + n + 1 with determinant qm. Following Equation (2.6) again, we assume that
the attack is successful if
√
2pieλ1(Λ)τδ
m+n+1 ≤ √m+ n+ 1 det(Λ)1/(m+n+1).
Inserting the determinant and the norm ‖(s, e,−1)T‖ ≈ c√m+ n+ 1 leads to
√
2piec
√
m+ n+ 1τδm+n+1 ≤ √m+ n+ 1q mm+n+1 ,
which is equivalent to
q
m
m+n+1√
2piecτδm+n+1
≥ 1. (3.6)
Arbitrary many samples The remaining task is to identify the smallest δ, such
that there is an m > 0 that fulfills this inequality. In order to do this, we first
identify m such that the function
f(m) =
q
m
m+n+1
δm+n+1
is maximized. The first derivative is given by
f ′(m) = δ−n−m−1qm/(n+m+1)
(
(n+ 1) log(q)
(n+m+ 1)2
− log(δ)
)
.
An easy calculation shows that this is only zero for m = ±
√
(n+1) log(q)
log(δ)
−n−1. Since
we are only interested in positive values for m, the only candidate is
m =
√
(n+ 1) log(q)
log(δ)
− n− 1. (3.7)
Standard analytic techniques show that this is indeed the maximum for positive
values of m (see Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1 plots the left hand side of Inequality (3.6) for n = 256, q = 256, c = 1√
2
.
Obviously, δ = 1.005 should be enough to break the instance, while δ = 1.006 would
not suffice. In order to find the minimal δ in a more systematic way, we insert the
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Figure 3.1.: Left hand side of Inequality (3.6) for n = 256, q = 256, c = 1√
2
optimal m from Equation (3.7) into Inequality (3.6) and have:
q
m
m+n+1√
2piecτδm+n+1
≥ 1⇔ q mm+n+1 ≥
√
2piecτδm+n+1
⇔ q
√
(n+1) log(q)
log(δ)
−n−1√
(n+1) log(q)
log(δ) ≥
√
2piecτδ
√
(n+1) log(q)
log(δ)
⇔ log(q)
√
(n+1) log(q)
log(δ)
− n− 1√
(n+1) log(q)
log(δ)
≥ log(
√
2piecτ) + log(δ)
√
(n+ 1) log(q)
log(δ)
⇔ log(q)
(
1− (n+ 1)
√
log(δ)√
(n+ 1) log(q)
)
≥ log(
√
2piecτ) +
√
(n+ 1) log(q) log(δ)
⇔ log(q)−
√
(n+ 1) log(q) log(δ) ≥ log(
√
2piecτ) +
√
(n+ 1) log(q) log(δ)
⇔ 2
√
(n+ 1) log(q) log(δ) ≤ log(
√
2piecτ)− log(q)
⇔ log(δ) ≤
(
log(
√
2piecτ)− log(q))2
4(n+ 1) log(q)
It is interesting to note that the embedding attack via ISIS requires nearly, but
not exactly the same hermite delta as the direct embedding approach (it is slightly
bigger). On the other hand, it solves uSVP in a lattice of a smaller dimension, and
therefore my be still favorable in practice.
Bounded number of samples If the attacker does not have access to enough
samples, Figure 3.1 indicates that it is optimal to use all samples. In that case,
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Inequality (3.6) is equivalent to
δ ≤ m+n+1
√
q
m
m+n+1√
2piecτ
.
3.2. Concrete Complexity of LWE with Few Samples
We modified the BKZ simulator by Albrecht et al. [APS15] to predict the runtime
of LWE with a bounded number of samples. In order to compare the attack, it was
also necessary to add the reduction via ISIS to the simulator1.
Figure 3.2 shows the runtime of the different attacks for different number of sam-
ples. We want to emphasize that in order to illustrate the influence of the number
of samples, m is the number of used, and not the number of available samples. A
real attacker could of course ignore additional samples and attack the problem in
the optimal dimension, if he has enough samples available. The graph a follows a
similar pattern for all attacks. However, the optimal number of samples is different
for every attack.
A particularly interesting attack is the reduction to uSVP via ISIS. For the in-
stance considered, it is not the best attack if enough samples are available. However,
for a limited number of samples, the picture changes: If less than 650 samples (which
is about 2.5 times n) samples are available, the attack via ISIS has the best per-
formance. This is much more than a theoretical result, since several cryptographic
primitives (like the encryption scheme by Lindner and Peikert [LP11]) only provide
2n samples.
Of course, Figure 3.2 is only valid for a specific LWE instance. However, for
nearly all instances observed, the best attack changes depending on how many sam-
ples are available (additional examples are given in Section 7.2). Considering this
when selecting parameters for a cryptographic application can lead to an improved
performance (see Chapter 7).
1The changes will be included to the simulator soon
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Figure 3.2.: Hardness of LWE instances with dimension of secret n = 256, modulus
q = 65537, and error parameter σ = 0.0009765625 · √2piq, depending
on the number of available samples m
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meration
In order to be able to select optimal and secure parameters for LWE-based schemes,
it is crucial to understand the complexity of the existing attack algorithms on real-
world environments. In particular, it is important to investigate how they perform on
modern, highly parallel computing architectures. This leaves us with two important
questions: can LWE solvers benefit from parallelization? And (if yes), how does this
influence the parameter selection for cryptographic schemes?
This section addresses those questions with respect to the nearest planes algo-
rithm [LP11], which is part of the decoding attack (see Section 2.3.3). It shows that
parallel computing architectures can be used to decrease the runtime significantly.
We compare our results with existing estimated lower bounds for the achievable
runtime and show that those bounds (despite being considered conservative) can
actually be reached and even outperformed in practice. Furthermore, we show ways
to further improve the parallel implementations. This shows that care must be taken
not to underestimate the power of modern highly parallel computing devices.
To investigate the impact of a parallel nearest planes algorithm, we combine our
results with existing methods that estimate the runtime of basis reduction (the
second part of the decoding attack). We show that even a massive speed-up for the
nearest planes algorithm does not lead to a significant improvement of the complete
decoding attack. Consequently, further research should focus on developing parallel
versions of basis reduction algorithms, rather than improving the nearest planes
step.
Organisation Section 4.1 presents a parallel implementation of nearest planes on
a shared-memory device that outperforms the efficiency bound proposed by Lindner
and Peikert [LP11]. Section 4.2 gives hints how to further improve the efficiency of
the implementation. To this end, we discuss alternative ways to traverse the search
tree build in nearest planes. However, we do not give such an implementation, for
reasons given in Section 4.3. In this section, we simulate the impact an additional
speed-up for nearest planes or basis reduction would have on the overall running
time of the decoding attack. We show that even a tremendous improvement of the
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former only leads to a modest speedup for the overall attack, while speed ups of the
latter lead to improvements nearly linearly.
The parallel implementation of nearest planes and the discussions of further im-
provements was published at BalkanCryptSec 2014 [BBD+14], the simulation of
different speed-ups is original in this thesis.
4.1. Parallel Version of Enumeration
4.1.1. On the Necessity of the Projection
Two versions of nearest planes appeared in the wild. Some papers have line 6 of
Algorithm 2, some skip this step ([LP11]). Interestingly, both variants lead to the
same result. We give a prove for nearest plane here, the result for nearest planes
follows similarly. Let ti be the target vector in the ith recursive call of nearest plane
(i.e. the call for k = m − i) as given in Algorithm 1, and t˜i be the corresponding
target vector in a nearest plane version without line 6.
Theorem 2. Let B, B˜,m,d, and t be a correct input for Algorithm 1. Let tk
be the target vector in the recursive call of nearest plane with input k as given in
Algorithm 1, and t′k be the corresponding target vector in a nearest plane version
without line 6. For all k ∈ [m],
pispan({b1,...,bk})(tk) = pispan({b1,...,bk})(t
′
k).
Proof. We proof the statement by recursion over k. It is obviously true for k = m
and k = m− 1. Assume
pispan({b1,...,bk})(tk) = pispan({b1,...,bk})(t
′
k)
for a fixed k. Let t∗k be the value of t after line 6 in the recursive call with input
k, i.e., t∗k = pispan({b1,...,bk})(tk). The next step is to investigate the inner product
calculated in line 7. Note that
〈b˜k, t∗k〉 = 〈b˜k, pispan({b1,...,bk})(tk)〉 = 〈b˜k, pispan({b1,...,bk})(t′k)〉 = 〈b˜k, t′k〉,
and consequently the value of the coefficient c is the same in both nearest plane
versions. The next target values are given by tk−1 = t∗k − cbk and t′k−1 = t′k − cbk.
The rest follows, since
pispan({b1,...,bk−1})(tk−1) = pispan({b1,...,bk−1})(t
∗
k − cbk)
= pispan({b1,...,bk−1})(tk − cbk)
= pispan({b1,...,bk−1})(tk)− pispan({b1,...,bk−1})(−cbk)
= pispan({b1,...,bk−1})(t
′
k)− pispan({b1,...,bk−1})(−cbk)
= pispan({b1,...,bk−1})(t
′
k − cbk)
= pispan({b1,...,bk−1})(t
′
k−1).
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Theorem 2 shows that both variants of nearest plane lead to the same result.
Consequently, we ignore the projection-step in the following.
4.1.2. Returning the Error Vector
Despite the fact that knowing the secret s is equivalent to knowing the error e, LWE
typically asks for s. Likewise, CVP typically asks to recover the close lattice vector,
and not the error vector e. In the original definition, nearest plane was formulated to
satisfy this requirement. So far, we followed this tradition (see Algorithms 1 and 2 in
order to make this work more accessable to readers familiar with existing literature.
Asking for the error comes with several advantages. For one thing, it is more natural
for some attacks to recover e (see also Chapter 5). For another thing, recovering e
leads to some advantages when implementing some of the attacks, including nearest
planes.
To see why, recall that Algorithm 2 recovers a close lattice vector. This is done
by calling nearest planes recursively many times, which can be seen traversing a
tree in a depth-first manner, as depicted in Figure 4.1. Every node stands for one
nearest plane call, the level in the tree corresponds to the parameter k of the call.
While going down the tree, every node stands for calculating the values of ci and the
new target vectors for the next recursive call. Assume a leaf is reached. In theory,
every leaf stands for one lattice vector that is somewhat close to the original target
vector. Unfortunately, calculating this candidate solutions requires information from
all nodes between the leaf and the root of the tree. Therefore, it is necessary to climb
back up the tree and collect this information, which is an unpleasant overhead.
In our implementation, we followed a different approach. In order to explain this,
we investigate what happens to the target vector t in nearest plane without the
optional projection step. In every recursive call, nearest planes subtracts a basis
vector of t. Consequently, the target vector for the last call (where k = 0) is given
by t−∑mk=1 cki bk, where cki bk is the lattice vector that gets calculated by Algorithm 2.
Of course, this means that e = t −∑mk=1 cki bk is the error vector corresponding to
this target vector. Therefore, the last call of nearest plane may be lacking the
information to calculate the lattice vector, but it has immediate access to the error
vector.
So far, we saw that every leaf node has the information necessary to calculate one
error vector. The next step is to make this local information globally accessible.
Unfortunately, this can not be done easily in the recursive version of nearest planes.
The problem is that the nodes do not know about their position in the tree, so they
do not know the correct place to store their result. This could be solved with a global
counter, but this solution could lead to additional problems in the parallel version,
since several threads would read and write this counter. Our solution is to abandon
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the recursive structure and create an iterative version of nearest plane instead. The
result is given in Algorithm 3. Besides the recursive structure, there is an additional
difference: instead traversing the tree in a depth-first fashion, Algorithm 3 follows
a breadth-first approach. The difference is depicted in Figure 4.1. This leads to a
simpler program, but comes with some problems that are discussed in Section 4.2.
4.1.3. Parallelization
The search tree created by the nearest plane algorithm comes with two properties
that lead to an efficient parallelization: the tree is entirely symmetric, and the size
of the tree and every subtree is known in advance. A natural approach is to traverse
the tree sequentially, until we reached a level that contains enough subtrees to keep
the desired number of sub processes busy (called the adequate level). Afterwards,
every process processes one of the subtrees, and writes all collected error vectors in
a global array. Every process gets an id, which allows him to write the collected
information to the right position in the array. This approach ensures that we do not
create any data races that could potentially break the workflow of the algorithm.
The whole algorithm is given in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 3: Sequential, Recursive Nearest Planes
Input : B = {b1, . . . ,bm} ⊂ Rm, // the lattice basis
d ∈ (Z+)m, // recursive branching vector
t ∈ Rm // the target vector
Output: All error vectors e ∈ Pd1/2({b˜1, . . . , b˜m}) such that
t− e ∈ Λ({b1, . . . ,bm})
1 begin
2 calculate Gram-Schmidt basis B˜ =
{
b˜1, . . . , b˜m
}
;
3 len = 1;
4 for k = n; k ≥ 1; k = k − 1 do
5 for i = 0; i < len; i = i+ 1 do
6 Let {c1, . . . , cdk} ∈ Zdk be the distinct integers closest to 〈b˜k,t〉〈b˜k,b˜k〉 ;
7 for j = 1; j ≤ dk; j = j + 1 do
8 t∗i·dk+j = ti − cj · bk;
9 end
10 end
11 t = t∗;
12 len = len · dk;
13 end
14 return t;
15 end
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Figure 4.1.: Workflow of Algorithm 2 (arrows) and Algorithm 3 (node numbers)
In fact, the implementation of Algorithm 4 presented by Bischof et al. [BBD+14]
scales very well on a multi-core architecture. For completeness, the results are given
in Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1.
4.2. Further Possible Improvements
Despite its good scalability, our implementation is not optimal yet. From an im-
plementation point of view, the main bottleneck seems to be the memory consump-
tion. The main reason for this is that the breadth-first approach requires to store all
nodes, while a depth-first algorithm can be implemented with a significantly smaller
memory footprint.
A second improvement could be achieved by applying recent theoretic improve-
ments presented by Liu and Nguyen [LN13].
They show that nearest planes can be viewed as an instance of enumeration (more
commonly studied with regard to solving the exact shortest vector problem) and ap-
ply known improved variants of enumeration to nearest planes to obtain theoretical
and practical improvements over [LP11]. In particular, those improvements are ran-
domization and pruning. The idea of randomization is to apply the attack many
times with parameters that provide only a small success probability with random
bases. Applying this approach with a parallel implementation of nearest plane is
easily possible. The idea of pruning is to cut off parts of the search trees that con-
tribute significantly to the running time but only slightly to the success probability.
This leads to unbalanced search trees and makes parallelization more difficult, but
not impossible as the parallel implementation of the pruned enumeration by Kuo et
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Figure 4.2.: Performance of our implementation executing the nearest planes algo-
rithm on random lattices, for dimensions 404, 517, 597 and 667, with
#enum = 212 in (a), #enum = 215 in (b) and #enum = 215 in (c).
Runtime in seconds (less is better).
al. [KSD+11] shows (see also [DS10, HSB+10]).
4.3. Bounds on the Speedup
Before working on a parallel implementation of a lattice attack, it is important to
answer two questions:
1. Is the algorithm suitable for parallelization?
2. What impact will a parallel implementation have?
Concerning enumeration as subroutine of the decoding attack, the first question was
answered in the last section. The second question is important for very pragmatic
reasons. Consider a computer scientist with a limited amount of time that wants to
improve the decoding attack. The decoding attack consists of two subroutines (basis
reduction and enumeration), but he can (due to time restrictions) only improve one
of them. Which one should he choose?
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A different way of looking at the problem is from the perspective of a researcher
that wants to select parameter for an LWE-based scheme. Since the parameters have
to withstand attacks in a foreseeable future, he wants to take possible improvements
into considerations. How would an improvement by a factor of 2x for the enumeration
attack influence the hardness of his LWE instance? And how about an improvement
for basis reduction?
In order to answer the second question, we perform the following thought ex-
periment: Assume there is a parallel version of enumeration that scales perfectly
on arbitrary many cores, and fix an LWE instance. How does the runtime of the
decoding attack on 2x cores depend on x?
The reason that answering this question is not trivial is that the decoding attack
consists of two steps: Basis reduction followed by enumeration. Consequently, it is
unclear how a speedup of a part of the attack (in this case: enumeration) carries
over to a speedup to the complete attack.
The answer for this question is given in Figure 4.3. It gives hardness estimations
for an LWE instance provided by Linder and Peikert [LP11], given different speed-
ups for basis reduction and enumerations. The hardness estimations have been
created using a modified version of the LWE hardness estimator by Albrecht et
al. [APS15]. As the figure shows, the hardness of the instance is predicted to be 145
bits. Of course, speeding up both parts on the decoding attack by ten bits would
drop the hardness to 135 bits, so the values on the diagonal are not surprising. The
more interesting conclusion can be taken from the values on the lowest row and the
first column. They show for example that speeding up enumeration by a factor of
210 would drop the hardness by only two bits, while the same improvement of basis
reduction leads to a significantly bigger speedup of 27. In other terms: to achieve
the same hardness drop one can get from speeding up basis reduction by a factor of
210, one would have to improve enumeration by more than 230.
Following Figure 4.3, we conclude that further improvements of the enumeration
step is not of high priority. Consequently, we did not spend time to develop a more
optimized parallel implementation of enumeration.
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Figure 4.3.: Runtime of the decoding attack depending on speedups for enumeration
and basis reduction for LWE with n = 256, q = 4093, σ = 3.33
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Algorithm 4: Nearest Planes
Input : B = {b1, . . . ,bm} ⊂ Rm, // the lattice basis
d ∈ (Z+)m, // recursive branching vector
t ∈ Rm // the target vector
al ∈ N // the adequate level
Output: All error vectors e ∈ Pd1/2({b˜1, . . . , b˜m}) such that
t− e ∈ Λ({b1, . . . ,bm})
1 begin
2 calculate Gram-Schmidt basis B˜ =
{
b˜1, . . . , b˜m
}
;
3 OpenMP parallel region
4 OpenMP single region
5 len = 1;
6 for k = n; k ≥ n− al; k = k − 1 do
7 for i = 0; i < len; i = i+ 1 do
8 Let {c1, . . . , cdk} ∈ Zdk be the distinct integers closest to
〈b˜k,t〉
〈b˜k,b˜k〉 ;
9 for j = 1; j ≤ dk; j = j + 1 do
10 t∗i·dk+j = ti − cj · bk;
11 end
12 end
13 t = t∗;
14 len = len · dk;
15 end
16 for node = 0; node ≤∏ni=n−al i; node = node+ 1 do
17 create task
18 len = 1;
19 for k = n− al − 1; k ≥ 1; k = k − 1 do
20 for i = 0; i < len; i = i+ 1 do
21 Let {c1, . . . , cdk} ∈ Zdk be the distinct integers closest
to 〈b˜k,t〉〈b˜k,b˜k〉 ;
22 for j = 1; j ≤ dk; j = j + 1 do
23 t∗nodei·dk+j = ti − cj · bk;
24 end
25 end
26 t = t∗;
27 len = len · dk;
28 end
29 end
30 end
31 end
32 end
33 return t;
34 end
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m = 404 m = 517
number of enumerations
212 215 218 212 215 218
Threads R S R S R S R S R S R S
1 7.04 1.00 56.03 1.00 446.93 1.00 11.65 1.00 92.63 1.00 736.19 1.00
2 3.61 1.95 28.54 1.96 227.43 1.97 5.93 1.96 47.14 1.96 373.78 1.97
4 1.87 3.77 14.88 3.77 117.18 3.81 3.06 3.81 24.19 3.83 192.71 3.82
8 1.01 6.99 8.04 6.97 63.81 7.00 1.65 7.07 13.16 7.04 104.20 7.06
16 0.66 10.71 5.36 10.45 42.01 10.64 1.08 10.75 8.64 10.72 67.93 10.84
m = 597 m = 667
number of enumerations
212 215 218 212 215 218
Threads R S R S R S R S R S R S
1 15.54 1.00 124.31 1.00 979.78 1.00 19.36 1.00 156.34 1.00 1229.38 1.00
2 7.88 1.97 63.03 1.97 499.26 1.96 9.91 1.95 78.20 2.00 624.76 1.97
4 4.07 3.82 32.37 3.84 257.64 3.80 5.07 3.82 40.36 3.87 321.76 3.82
8 2.21 7.05 17.45 7.12 140.85 6.96 2.75 7.04 21.83 7.16 173.44 7.09
16 1.43 10.86 11.46 10.85 92.28 10.62 1.79 10.80 14.22 10.99 112.54 10.92
Table 4.1.: Runtime in seconds (R) and speed-up (S) for our implementation for
LWE instances proposed in [LP11]
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5 LWE with Binary Error
In his original work [Reg05], Regev defined LWE with an arbitrary error distribu-
tion. However, he gave a worst-case reduction for Gaussian errors only, and most
subsequently proposed schemes also use Gaussian error. In this chapter, we discuss
the hardness of LWE with binary error by presenting a new attack and comparing
its efficiency with existing approaches.
In 2013, Micciancio and Peikert [MP13] showed the worst-case hardness of LWE
with different distributions including binary error. In a related line of work, sev-
eral proposals replaced the Gaussian error with a distribution that can be sampled
easier [CGW14, GLP12]. This typically leads to more efficient schemes, since sam-
pling from a Gaussian distribution is rather complicated, time-consuming, often re-
quires big lookup tables, and may even insert side-channel vulnerabilities [BCG+13,
BHLY16].
On the other hand, history shows that using special instances of a problem to
boost performance often leads to weaker schemes. This is particularly true for
LWE, where a growing line of work identified easy or at least easier-than-expected
instances [EHL14, ELOS15, CLS15, LL15]. It is therefore crucial for the trustwor-
thyness of LWE-based cryptography to carefully analyze special instances that can
be used for schemes.
This chapter investigates the hardness of LWE with binary error (binLWE1).
Binary errors can be sampled extremely easily and efficiently, and in addition often
allow to use a smaller modulus, which typically leads to smaller key sizes [BGG+16].
However, we show that binLWE is easier than expected. To this end, we propose a
new attack that can outperform all existing methods for typical parameter choices.
Since the performance of most attacks on binLWE was never investigated before,
we give a careful analysis for this schemes. Finally, we explain how to estimate the
hardness of binLWE, which allows to select instances that withstand all nowaday
known attacks.
Organisation Section 5.1 presents the new attack and analysis its performance.
Section 5.2 compares the new attack with existing approaches. To this end, we
1Note that other definitions of binLWE appeared before in the literature (e.g., [BG14c])
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give the first comprehensive study on the performance of existing LWE solvers on
binLWE. We show that the new attack outperforms all existing approaches for most
realistic parameter sets. Consequently, the techniques presented before can be used
to estimate the hardness of binLWE.
This chapter is based on a publication that appeared in Africacrypt 2016 [BGPW16].
5.1. The Hybrid Lattice-Reduction and
Meet-in-the-Middle Attack
In this section we present and analyze the hybrid attack on LWE with binary error.
The attack is described in Algorithm 5 of Section 5.1.1, where NPB(t) stands for
the nearest plane, called on input basis B and target vector t. In Theorem 3 of
Section 5.1.2 we analyze the expected runtime of the hybrid attack. Section 5.1.3
shows how to optimize the attack parameters and perform a trade-off between pre-
computation and the actual attack in order to minimize the runtime of the attack.
5.1.1. The Hybrid Attack
In the following we describe the hybrid attack on LWE with binary error. The attack
is presented in Algorithm 5.
Let m,n, q ∈ N and let
(A,b = As˜+ e mod q) (5.1)
with A ∈ Zm×nq ,b ∈ Zmq , s˜ ∈ {0, 1}n and e ∈ {0, 1}m be an LWE instance with
binary error e and binary secret s˜. In order to obtain a smaller error vector we can
subtract the vector (1/2) · 1 consisting of all 1/2 entries from Equation (5.1). This
yields a new LWE instance (A,b′ = As˜+ e′ mod q), where b′ = b− (1/2) · 1 and
e′ = e − (1/2) · 1. The new error vector e′ now has norm √m/4 instead of the
expected norm
√
m/2 of the original error vector e. For r ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, we can
split the secret s˜ =
(
v
s
)
and the matrix A = (A1|A2) into two parts and rewrite
this LWE instance as
b′ = (A1|A2)
(
v
s
)
+ e′ = A1v +A2s+ e′ mod q, (5.2)
where v ∈ {0, 1}r, s ∈ {0, 1}n−r,A1 ∈ Zm×rq ,A2 ∈ Zm×(n−r)q ,b′ = b−(1/2) ·1 ∈ Qm,
and e′ = e− (1/2) · 1 ∈ {−1/2, 1/2}m.
The main idea of the attack is to guess v and solve the remaining LWE in-
stance (A2, b˜ = b
′ −A1v = A2s + e′ mod q), which has binary secret s and error
e′ ∈ {−1/2, 1/2}m. The new LWE instance obtained in this way turns out to be
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considerably easier to solve, since the determinant det(Λq(A2)) = q
m−n+r of the new
lattice is significantly bigger than the determinant det(Λq(A)) = q
m−n of the original
lattice (see Section 6.1 of [BG14c]). The newly obtained LWE instance is solved by
solving a close vector problem in the lattice Λq(A2). In more detail, b˜ = A2s+qw+e
′
for some vector w ∈ Zm is close to the lattice vector A2s + qw ∈ Λq(A2) since e′
is small. Hence one can hope to find e′ by running the nearest plane algorithm in
combination with a sufficient basis reduction as a precomputation (see [LP11]).
The guessing of v is sped up by a Meet-in-the-Middle approach, i.e., guessing
binary vectors v1 ∈ {0, 1}r and v2 ∈ {0, 1}r such that v = v1 + v2. In order to
recognize matching guesses v1 and v2 that sum up to v, one searches for collisions
in (hash) boxes. The addresses of these boxes are determined in the following way.
Definition 3. Let m ∈ N. For a vector x ∈ Rm the set A(m)x ⊂ {0, 1}m is defined
as
A(m)x =
{
z ∈ {0, 1}m
∣∣∣∣ (z)i = 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} with (x)i > −1/2, and(z)i = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} with (x)i < −1/2
}
.
Intuitively, for x2 obtained during Algorithm 5, the set A(m)x2 captures all the
possible sign vectors of x2 added up with a vector in {−1/2, 1/2}m (where 1 repre-
sents a non-negative and 0 a negative sign). For x1 obtained during Algorithm 5,
the set A(m)x1 consists only of the sign vector of x1. This is due to the fact that
x2 ∈ Zm + {1/2}m, whereas x1 ∈ Zm. This leads to the desired collisions, as can be
seen in the upcoming Lemma 2.
5.1.2. Runtime Analysis
In this section we analyze the runtime and success probability of the attack presented
in Algorithm 5. We start by presenting our main result.
Theorem 3. Let n,m, q, c ∈ N, and 1 ≤ δ ∈ R be fixed. Consider the following
input distribution of (q, r,A,b,B) for Algorithm 5. The modulus q and the attack
parameter r = 4c are fixed, A = (A1|A2), where A1 $← Zm×rq , A2 $← Zm×(n−r)q ,
b = A
(
v
s
)
+ e mod q, where v
$← {0, 1}r, s $← {0, 1}n−r, e $← {0, 1}m, and B
is some lattice basis of Λq(A2) with Hermite delta δ. Let all notations be as in the
above description of the input distribution. Assume that the approximations given in
Heuristic 1, Heuristic 2 and Heuristic 4 are in fact equations.Then, if Algorithm 5
terminates, it finds a valid binary error vector of the LWE with binary error instance
(A,b). The probability that Algorithm 5 terminates is
p0 = 2
−r
(
r
2c
) m∏
i=1
(
1− 2
B(m−1
2
, 1
2
)
∫ max(−ri,−1)
−1
(1− t2)m−32 dt
)
,
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Algorithm 5: The Hybrid Attack
Input: q, r ∈ Z
A = (A1|A2), where A1 ∈ Zm×rq ,A2 ∈ Zm×(n−r)q
b ∈ Zmq
B, a lattice basis of Λq(A2)
1 calculate c = br/4e;
2 calculate b′ = b− (1/2) · 1;
3 while true do
4 guess a binary vector v1 ∈ {0, 1}r with c ones ;
5 calculate x1 = −NPB(−A1v1) ∈ Rm ;
6 calculate x2 = NPB(b
′ −A1v1) ∈ Rm ;
7 store v1 in all the boxes addressed by A(r)x1 ∪ A(r)x2 ;
8 for all v2 6= v1 in all the boxes addressed by A(r)x1 ∪ A(r)x2 do
9 Set v = v1 + v2 and calculate x = (1/2) · 1+ NPB(b′ −A1v) ∈ Rm;
10 if x ∈ {0, 1}m and ∃s˜ ∈ {0, 1}n : b = As˜+ x mod q then
11 return x;
12 end
13 end
14 end
where B(·, ·) denotes the Euler beta function (see [Olv10]) and
ri =
δ−2(i−1)+mq
m−n+r
m
2
√
m/4
.
In case that Algorithm 5 terminates, the expected number of operations is
216
(
r
c
)(
p
(
2c
c
))−1/2
,
where
p =
m∏
i=1
(
1− 1
riB(
m−1
2
, 1
2
)
J(ri,m)
)
,
and
J(ri,m) =

∫ ri−1
−ri−1
∫ z+ri
−1 (1− y2)
m−3
2 dydz
+
∫ −ri
ri−1
∫ z+ri
z−ri (1− y2)
m−3
2 dydz for ri <
1
2∫ −ri
−ri−1
∫ z+ri
−1 (1− y2)
m−3
2 dydz for ri ≥ 12 ,
Proof. By definition, every output of Algorithm 5 is a valid binary error vector of the
given LWE with binary error instance. The rest follows directly from the upcoming
Lemma 3, Heuristic 2, and Heuristic 4.
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Remark 1. Algorithm 5 gets some basis B as input. This basis has a certain quality,
given by the Hermite delta δ. In practice, we can improve the attack by providing a
basis with better, i.e., smaller, Hermite delta. We achieve this by running a basis
reduction (e.g., BKZ) on B in a precomputation step. More details about the time
necessary to achieve a certain Hermite delta and the trade-off between the runtime
of the precomputation and the hybrid attack is given in Section 5.1.3.
We postpone the proof of Theorem 3 to the end of this subsection, since we first
need to develop some necessary tools. We start by giving the following definition,
which is crucial to our analysis as the notion will be used frequently throughout this
section.
Definition 4. Let m ∈ N. A vector x ∈ Zm is called y-admissible for some vector
y ∈ Zm if NP(x) = NP(x− y) + y.
Intuitively, x being y-admissible means that running the nearest plane algorithm
on x and running it on x − y yields the same lattice vector, since then we have
x− NP(x) = (x− y)− NP(x− y).
We provide the following useful result about Definition 4.
Lemma 1. Let t1 ∈ Rm, t2 ∈ Rm be two arbitrary target vectors. Then the following
are equivalent.
1. NP(t1) + NP(t2) = NP(t1 + t2).
2. t1 is NP(t1 + t2)-admissible.
3. t2 is NP(t1 + t2)-admissible.
Proof. Let t = t1 + t2 and y = NP(t). By symmetry it suffices to show
NP(t1) + NP(t2) = y ⇔ NP(t1) = NP(t1 − y) + y.
By definition, t − y is a lattice vector and therefore NP(x − (t − y)) = NP(x) for
all x ∈ Rm. This leads to
NP(t1 − y) = NP(t1 − y − (t− y)) = NP(t1 − t) = NP(−t2) = −NP(t2).
Using this, one direction of the equivalence follows from
NP(t1) + NP(t2) = NP(t1 − y) + y + NP(t2) = −NP(t2) + y + NP(t2) = y,
and the other from
NP(t1) = y − NP(t2) = y + NP(t1 − y).
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As we will see in our analysis, the expected runtime heavily depends on the
following probability. Let all notations be as in Theorem 3 and e′ = e − (1/2) · 1.
For
W = {w ∈ {0, 1}r : exactly c entries of w are 1} (5.3)
we define
p :=
{
Pr
v1←W
[−A1v1is e′-admissible|v − v1 ∈ W ] if Pr
v1←W
[v − v1 ∈ W ] > 0
0 else.
(5.4)
Note that the analysis of the original attack on the NTRU encryption proposed
by Howgrave-Graham [How07] also requires to calculate the probability p. In the
original work, this is done experimentally. Replacing this probability estimation
with the analytic methodology presented in the following removes the dependency
on experimental support in the analysis of the hybrid attack. A first mathematical
calculation of the probability p has already been presented by Hirschhorn et al. in
[HHHW09]. However, their analysis requires an additional assumption that we no
longer need.
Success Probability
In this subsection we determine the probability that Algorithm 5 terminates. We
start by giving a sufficient condition for this event.
Lemma 2. Let all notations be as in Theorem 3 and let b′ = b − (1/2) · 1 and
e′ = e−(1/2)·1. Assume that v1 and v2 are guessed in separate loops of Algorithm 5
and satisfy v1 + v2 = v. Also let t1 = −A1v1 and t2 = b′ − A1v2 and assume
NP(t1) + NP(t2) = NP(t1 + t2) = e
′ holds. Then v1 and v2 collide in at least one
box chosen during Algorithm 5 and the algorithm outputs the error vector e of the
given LWE instance.
Proof. According to the notation used in Algorithm 5, let x1 = −NP(t1) correspond
to v1 and x2 = NP(t2) correspond to v2. By assumption we have x1 = x2 − e′.
Using the definition it is easy to verify that x1 and x2 share at least one common
address, since e′ ∈ {−1/2, 1/2}m. Therefore v1 and v2 collide in at least one box.
Again by assumption, we obtain x = NP(b′ −A1v) = NP(t1 + t2) = e′. Hence the
algorithm outputs the error vector e.
In the following lemma we give a lower bound on the probability that Algorithm 5
terminates in case NP(b′−A1v) = e′. This condition is necessary for the algorithm
to terminate. We then determine the probability that this condition is fulfilled and
combine both probabilities to the overall success probability.
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Lemma 3. Let all notations be as in Theorem 3 and let b′ = b − (1/2) · 1 and
e′ = e− (1/2) · 1. Assume that if v has exactly 2c one-entries, then p > 0, where p
is as defined in Equation (5.4). If NP(b′−A1v) = e′, then Algorithm 5 terminates
with probability at least
p˜0 = 2
−r
(
r
2c
)
.
Proof. We show that Algorithm 5 terminates if v consists of exactly 2c one-entries.
The probability of this happening is exactly p˜0, since there are 2
r binary vectors of
length r, and
(
r
2c
)
of them have exactly 2c one-entries. Assume that v consists
of exactly 2c one-entries. The claim follows directly from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
Since p > 0 there exist binary vectors v1,v2 ∈ {0, 1}r, each containing exactly
c one-entries, such that v1 + v2 = v and −A1v1 is e′-admissible. These vectors
will eventually be guessed during Algorithm 5 if it does not terminate before. By
Lemma 1 they satisfy
NP(−A1v1) + NP(b′ −A1v2) = NP(b′ −A1v) = e′.
Lemmas 2 now guarantees that Algorithm 5 then outputs the error vector e.
It remains to calculate the probability that in fact it holds that NP(b′−A1v) = e′,
which is equivalent to e′ ∈ P1/2(B). The probability that this is the case is calculated
later, see Equation 5.6. Using Equation 5.6 and assuming independence we obtain
the following estimate.
Heuristic 1. Let all notations be as in Theorem 3. The probability that Algorithm 5
terminates is approximately
p0 ≈ 2−r
(
r
2c
) m∏
i=1
(
1− 2
B(m−1
2
, 1
2
)
∫ max(−ri,−1)
−1
(1− t2)m−32 dt
)
.
Estimating the Number of Loops
The next step is to estimate the number of loops until the attack terminates.
Heuristic 2. Let all notations be as in Theorem 3 and let b′ = b − (1/2) · 1 and
e′ = e − (1/2) · 1. Assume that NP(b′ −A1v) = e′, and that v consists of exactly
2c one-entries. Then the expected number of loops of Algorithm 5 is
L ≈
(
r
c
)(
p
(
2c
c
))−1/2
,
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and the probability p, as given in Equation (5.4), is
p ≈
m∏
i=1
(
1− 1
riB(
m−1
2
, 1
2
)
J(ri,m)
)
,
with B(·, ·), J(·, ·), and ri defined as in Theorem 3.
In the following, we justify the heuristic. Assume that v consists of exactly 2c
one-entries. In addition to W (see Equation (5.3)), define the set
V = {v1 ∈ W : v − v1 ∈ W and −A1v1 is e′-admissible}.
Note that W is the set from which Algorithm 5 samples the vectors v1. Lemma 2
shows that the attack succeeds if two vectors v1,v2 ∈ V satisfying v1 + v2 = v are
sampled in different loops of Algorithm 5. Since otherwise the probability of success
is close to zero, for simplicity we assume that the attack is only successful in this
case. Therefore we need to estimate the necessary number of loops in Algorithm 5
until some v1,v2 ∈ V with v1 +v2 = v are found. Note that by Lemma 1 if v1 ∈ V ,
then also v2 = v − v1 ∈ V .
We start by calculating the probability that a vector sampled during Algorithm 5
lies in V . By definition of p, this probability is given by
Pr
v1
$←W
[v1 ∈ V ] = p1p, where p1 := Pr
v1
$←W
[v − v1 ∈ W ].
Therefore we expect to sample a vector v1 ∈ V every 1p1p loops in Algorithm 5. The
above equation also implies p1p =
|V |
|W | , which gives us
|V | = p1p|W | = p1p
(
r
c
)
.
The probability p1 is given by p1 =
(
2c
c
)
/
(
r
c
)
as can be seen in the following
lemma.
Lemma 4. Let all notations be as in Theorem 3. Let v ∈ {0, 1}r be binary with
exactly 2c one-entries and W be defined as in Equation (5.3). Then
p1 := Pr
v1
$←W
[v − v1 ∈ W ] =
(
2c
c
)
/
(
r
c
)
.
Proof. There are exactly
(
r
c
)
binary vectors of length r containing exactly c ones.
For such a vector v1, the vector v2 = v− v1 is binary and has exactly c one entries
if and only if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , r} satisfying (v1)i = 1, we also have (v)i = 1. In
other terms, the index set of one-entries of v1 has to be a subset of the index set of
one-entries of v, and there are exactly
(
2c
c
)
such subsets.
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Therefore by the birthday paradox, the expected number of loops in Algorithm 5
until some v1,v2 ∈ V with v1 + v2 = v are found can be estimated by
L ≈ 1
p1p
√
|V | =
√(
r
c
)
√
p1p
=
(
r
c
)(
p
(
2c
c
))−1/2
.
It remains to approximate the probability p which we do in the following. Let
v1 ∈ {0, 1}r and B be some basis of Λq(A2). By Lemma 1 there exist unique u1,u2 ∈
Λq(A2) such that NPB(−A1v1) = −A1v1 − u1 ∈ P1/2(B) and NPB(−A1v1 − e′) +
e′ = −A1v1 − u2 ∈ e′ + P1/2(B). Without loss of generality, in the following we
assume u1 = 0, or equivalently −A1v1 ∈ P1/2(B). Now −A1v1 is e′-admissible if
and only if u2 = u1 = 0, which is equivalent to e
′ + A1v1 ∈ P1/2(B). Therefore
p is equal to the probability that e′ + A1v1 ∈ P1/2(B), which we determine in the
following.
There exists some orthonormal transformation that aligns P1/2(B) along the stan-
dard axes of Rm. By applying this transformation, we may therefore assume that
P1/2(B) is aligned along the standard axes of Rm and that in consequence e′ is a uni-
formly random vector of length
√
m/4. Because A1 is uniformly random in Zm×rq we
may further assume that A1v1 is uniformly random in P1/2(B), since without loss
of generality we assume A1v1 ∈ P1/2(B). This gives rise to the following heuristic.
Heuristic 3. The probability p as defined in Equation 5.4 (with respect to a reduced
basis with Hermite delta δ) is
p ≈ Pr
t
$←R, e′ $←Sm(
√
m/4)
[t+ e′ ∈ R],
where
Sm(
√
m/4) = {x ∈ Rm | ‖x‖ =
√
m/4}
is the surface of a sphere with radius
√
m/4 centered around the origin and
R = {x ∈ Rm | ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} : −Ri/2 ≤ xi < Ri/2}
is the search rectangle with edge lengths
Ri = δ
−2(i−1)+mq
m−n+r
m .
In the heuristic, the edge lengths are implied by the Geometric Series Assumption.
We continue calculating the approximation of p given in Heuristic 3. Let R and Ri
be as defined in Heuristic 3. We can rewrite the approximation given in Heuristic 3
as
p ≈ Pr
ti
$←[−Ri/2,Ri/2],e′ $←Sm(
√
m/4)
[∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} : ti + e′i ∈ [−Ri/2, Ri/2]].
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Figure 5.1.: Two-dimensional hyperspherical cap
Rescaling everything by a factor of 1/
√
m/4 leads to
p ≈ Pr
ti
$←[−ri,ri],e′ $←Sm(1)
[∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} : ti + e′i ∈ [−ri, ri]],
where
ri =
Ri
2
√
m/4
=
δ−2(i−1)+mq
m−n+r
m
2
√
m/4
. (5.5)
Unfortunately, the distributions of the coordinates of e are not independent, which
makes calculating p extremely complicated. In practice, however, the probability
that ei ∈ [−Ri/2, Ri/2] is big for all but the last few indices i. This is due to the
fact that by the Geometric Series Assumption typically only the last values Ri are
small. Consequently, we expect the dependence of the remaining entries not to be
strong. This assumption was already established by Howgrave-Graham [How07] and
appears to hold for all values of Ri appearing in practice.
It is therefore reasonable to assume that
p ≈
m∏
i=1
Pr
ti
$←[−ri,ri],e′i
$←Dm
[ti + e
′
i ∈ [−ri, ri]],
were Dm denotes the distribution on the interval [−1, 1] obtained by the following
experiment: sample a vector w uniformly at random on the unit sphere and then
output the first (equivalently, any arbitrary but fixed) coordinate of w.
Next we explore the density function of Dm. The probability that e
′
i ≤ x for
some −1 < x < 0, where e′i $← Dm, is given by the ratio of the surface area of a
hyperspherical cap of the unit sphere in Rm with height h = 1 + x and the surface
area of the unit sphere. This is illustrated in Figure 5.1 for m = 2. The surface area
of a hyperspherical cap of the unit sphere in Rm with height h < 1 is given by (see
[Li11])
Am(h) =
1
2
AmI2h−h2
(
m− 1
2
,
1
2
)
,
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where Am = 2pi
m/2/Γ(m/2) is the surface area of the unit sphere and
Ix(a, b) =
∫ x
0
ta−1(1− t)b−1dt
B(a, b)
is the regularized incomplete beta function (see [Olv10]) and B(a, b) is the Euler
beta function.
Consequently, for −1 < x < 0, we have
Pr
e′i
$←Dm
[e′i ≤ x] =
Am(1 + x)
Am
=
1
2
I2(1+x)−(1+x)2
(
m− 1
2
,
1
2
)
=
1
2
I1−x2
(
m− 1
2
,
1
2
)
=
1
2B(m−1
2
, 1
2
)
∫ 1−x2
0
t
m−3
2 (1− t)−1/2dt
=
1
2B(m−1
2
, 1
2
)
∫ x
−1
(1− t2)m−32 (1− (1− t2))−1/2(−2t)dt
= − 1
B(m−1
2
, 1
2
)
∫ x
−1
(1− t2)m−32 |t|−1tdt
=
1
B(m−1
2
, 1
2
)
∫ x
−1
(1− t2)m−32 dt. (5.6)
Together with
Pr
ti
$←[−ri,ri]
[ti ≤ x] =
∫ x
−ri
1
2ri
dy,
we can use a convolution to obtain
Pr
ti
$←[−ri,ri],e′i
$←Dm
[ti + e
′
i ≤ x] =
1
2riB(
k−1
2
, 1
2
)
∫ x
−ri−1
∫ min(1,z+ri)
max(−1,z−ri)
(1− y2)m−32 dydz.
Since
Pr
ti
$←[−ri,ri],e′i
$←Dm
[ti + e
′
i ∈ [−ri, ri]] = 1− 2
(
Pr
ti
$←[−ri,ri],e′i
$←Dm
[ti + e
′
i < −ri]
)
,
it suffices to calculate the integral
J(ri,m) =
∫ −ri
−ri−1
∫ z+ri
max(−1,z−ri)
(1− y2)m−32 dydz (5.7)
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in order to calculate p, which we do in the following. For the lower end of the inner
integral, we have to distinguish two cases. If ri < 1/2, we can split it into
J(ri,m) =
∫ ri−1
−ri−1
∫ z+ri
−1
(1− y2)m−32 dydz +
∫ −ri
ri−1
∫ z+ri
z−ri
(1− y2)m−32 dydz,
while in the simpler case ri > 1/2 we have
J(ri,m) =
∫ −ri
−ri−1
∫ z+ri
−1
(1− y2)m−32 dydz.
This concludes our calculation of the probability p. All integrals can be calculated
symbolically using sage [S+14], which allows an efficient calculation of p.
Time Spend per Loop cycle
With the estimation of the number of loops given, the remaining task is to estimate
the time spend per loop cycle. Each cycle consists of four steps:
1. Guessing a binary vector.
2. Running the nearest plane algorithm (twice).
3. Calculating A(r)x1 ∪ A(r)x′1 .
4. Dealing with collisions in the boxes.
We assume that the runtime of one inner loop of Algorithm 5 is dominated by the
runtime of the nearest plane algorithm, as argued in the following. It is well known
that sampling a binary vector is extremely fast. Furthermore, note that only very
few of the 2n addresses contain a vector, since filling a significant proportional would
take exponential time. Consequently, collisions are extremely rare, and lines 8-11 of
Algorithm 5 do not contribute much to the overall runtime.
An estimation by Howgrave-Graham [How07] shows that for typical instances,
the runtime of the nearest plane algorithm exceeds the time spent for storing the
collision. We therefore omit the latter from our considerations.
Lindner and Peikert [LP11] estimated the time necessary to run the nearest plane
algorithm to be about 2−16 seconds, which amounts to about 215 bit operations on
their machine. This leads to the following heuristic for the runtime of the attack.
Heuristic 4. The average number of operations per inner loop in Algorithm 5 is
N ≈ 216.
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Total Runtime
We are now able to prove our main theorem.
Proof (Theorem 3): By definition, every output of Algorithm 5 is a valid binary
error vector of the given LWE with binary error instance. The rest follows directly
from Heuristic 1, Heuristic 2, and Heuristic 4. 
5.1.3. Minimizing the Expected Runtime
As previously mentioned in Remark 1, we can perform a basis reduction to obtain a
lattice basis with smaller Hermite delta δ before running the actual attack in order
to speed up the attack.
The Hermite delta δ determines the trade-off between the runtime of the pre-
computation and the actual attack. More precisely, choosing a smaller value for δ
increases the runtime of the basis reduction, but at the same time decreases the
runtime of the actual attack, since it increases the success probability and probabil-
ity that a vector is e′-admissible. From the attacker’s perspective it is necessary to
optimise the choice of δ and r, the Meet-in-the-Middle dimension.
The Meet-in-the-Middle dimension r balances the trade-off between the Meet-
in-the-Middle and the lattice part of the attack. On the one hand, increasing r
increases the complexity of Meet-in-the-Middle part, since more entries of the secret
have to be guessed. On the other hand, it also increases the determinant of the
lattice, making CVP easier and thereby increasing the probability that vectors are
e′-admissible. Finding the optimal values for r and δ is therefore, at first sight, non-
trivial. We perform this task in the following way. For each r we find the optimal δ
that minimizes the runtime. We then take the optimal r and the corresponding δ to
determine the overall minimal runtime. Since there are only finitely many possible
values for r, this can be performed numerically. Figure 5.2 shows the expected
runtime for the attack depending on the Meet-in-the-Middle dimension r.
5.2. Performance of Known Attacks
In this section we consider other approaches to solve LWE with binary error and
compare these algorithms to Algorithm 5. In particular we give upper bounds for the
runtimes of the algorithms. A comparison of the most practical attacks, including
the hybrid attack, is given in Table 5.1.
Much of the analyzes below are in a similar spirit to that given in the survey
[APS15] for methods of solving standard LWE. However it is often necessary to
specifically adapt the analysis for the binary error case. Note that to solve LWE
with binary error, in addition to algorithms for standard LWE, one may also be able
51
5. LWE with Binary Error
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
100
110
120
130
140
150
r (attack parameter)
b
it
-h
ar
d
n
es
s
Figure 5.2.: Hardness of LWE instances with dimension of secret n = 256, number
of samples m = 512 and modulus q = 256 for different values of r
to apply algorithms for the related Inhomogeneous Short Integer Solution problem.
A discussion of these algorithms is given in [BGLS14].
5.2.1. Number of Samples
Some algorithms require a large number of LWE samples to be available in order
to run. However it is well known (see, e.g., [DM13, MP13]) that if one has at least
m = O(n2) samples, the algorithm of Arora and Ge [AG11] solves LWE with binary
error in polynomial time. Recall also that for reducing LWE with binary error
to worst-case problems on lattices, one must restrict the number of samples to be
m = n (1 + Ω(1/ log n)) [MP13, Theorem 1.2]. On the other hand, with slightly more
than linear samples, such as m = O(n log log n), the algorithm given in [ACF+14]
is subexponential. Therefore if a scheme bases its security on the hardness of LWE
with binary error, it is reasonable to expect that one has only access to at most
linearly many samples. In the analysis below, we assume we the available number
of samples is m, where m is linear in n. For concreteness, we fix m = 2n.
5.2.2. Algorithms for solving LWE
There are several approaches one could use to solve LWE or its variants (see the
survey [APS15]). One may employ combinatorial algorithms such as the BKW
[BKW03, ACF+15] algorithm and its variants [AFFP14, DTV15, GJS15, KF15].
However, all these algorithms require far more samples than are available in the
binary error case, and are therefore ruled out. In the comparison we also omit a
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Meet-in-the-Middle attack [APS15] or attacks based on the algorithm of Arora and
Ge [AG11, ACF+14], as they will be slower than other methods, but nevertheless
discuss them for completeness.
Distinguishing attack
We determine how small v must be for a successful distinguishing attack (see Sec-
tion 2.3.2) as follows. Recall that our errors are chosen uniformly at random from
{0, 1}. So they follow a Bernoulli distribution with parameter 1/2, and have expec-
tation 1/2 and variance 1/4. Consider the distribution of 〈v, e〉. Since the errors ei
are chosen independently, its expectation is 1
2
∑m
i=1 vi and its variance is
1
4
∑m
i=1 v
2
i .
Since 〈v, e〉 is the sum of many independent random variables, asymptotically it fol-
lows a normal distribution with those parameters. Since the distinguishing attack
success is determined by the variance and not the mean, and we can account for the
mean, we assume it is zero. Then we can use the result of [LP11] to say that we can
distinguish a Gaussian from uniform with advantage close to exp(−pi(‖v‖ · s/q)2),
where s is the width parameter of the Gaussian. In our case s2 = 2pi · 1
4
so we can
distinguish with advantage close to  = exp(−pi2‖v‖2/2q2). Therefore to distinguish
with advantage  we require a vector v of length ‖v‖ = q ·
√
2 ln (1/)
pi
.
We calculate a basis of the scaled dual lattice Λ and find a short vector v ∈ Λ
by lattice basis reduction. With high probability the lattice Λ has rank m and
volume qn [MR09, APS15]. By definition of the Hermite delta we therefore have
‖v‖ = δmqn/m. So the Hermite delta we require to achieve for the attack to succeed
with advantage  is given by δmqn/m = q ·
√
2 ln (1/)
pi
. Assuming that the number of
samples m is large enough to use the ‘optimal subdimension’ m =
√
n log(q)/ log(δ)
[MR09], we rearrange to obtain
log δ =
(
log (q) + log
(√
2 ln (1/)
pi
))2
4n log (q)
.
To establish the estimates for the runtime of this attack given in Table 5.1, we
assume one has to run the algorithm about 1/ times to succeed, and consider δ as a
function of . The overall running time is then given by 1/ multiplied the estimated
time, according to Lindner and Peikert [LP11], to achieve δ(). We pick the optimal
 such that this overall running time is minimized.
It is possible that we do not have enough samples to use the ‘optimal subdimen-
sion’. We firstly calculate δ assuming we have as many samples as we need for the
‘optimal subdimension’, then check that the m this corresponds to is indeed less
than or equal to 2n. If so, we use the runtime estimate for that δ. If not, we take
m = 2n and derive a Hermite delta using δ2nqn/2n = q ·
√
2 ln (1/)
pi
.
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The number of operation necessary to achieve this Hermite delta is estimated
using Equation (2.5).
Reducing to uSVP
Applying Kannan’s reduction to attack our LWE instances is promising, since we
have a very short error vector e, which leads to a big gap λ1(Λq(A))‖e‖ . Since the error
vector follows a binary distribution, we assume that its euclidian norm is given by
‖e‖ = √m/√2. For all instances considered, the optimal number of samples exceeds
2n, so we assume that the attack is successful if
δ ≤ m
√
q1−n/m√
pieτ
,
see Inequality (3.5) in Section 3.1.3.
Decoding
Recall (see also Section 2.3.3) that the decoding attack requires about 215 ·∏mi=1 di
operations. However, the analysis of the success probability on LWE with binary
error is more complicated. By definition of the search parallelepiped, the attack
succeeds if (and only if) the error e lies in the search rectangle Pd1/2(B). Under the
same assumption as in Section 5.1.2 (and using the same error transformation), this
probability can be estimated via
pdecoding ≈
m∏
i=1
(
Pr
ei
$←Dm
[ei ∈ [−ri, ri]]
)
where
ri = di
δ−2(i−1)+mq
m−n
m
2
√
m/4
.
Together with Equation (5.6), this leads to
pdecoding ≈
m∏
i=1
(
1− 2
B(m−1
2
, 1
2
)
∫ max(−ri,−1)
−1
(1− t2)m−32 dt
)
.
A standard way to increase the runtime of the attack is to use basis reduction
(like BKZ2.0) as precomputation. Predicting the runtime of BKZ2.0 according to
Equation (2.5) leads to the runtime estimation
Tdecoding ≈ 2
1.8/ log2(δ)−110 · 2.3 · 109 + 215∏mi=1 di
pdecoding
.
Using the same numeric optimization techniques as presented above to minimize the
expected runtime leads to the complexity estimates given in Table 5.1.
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Meet-in-the-Middle Attack
We adapt the analysis in [APS15] to determine an upper bound on the complexity of
a Meet-in-the-Middle attack on LWE with binary error. The proof follows [APS15]
entirely analogously.
Theorem 4. [APS15, Theorem 2] Let n, q parametrise an LWE instance with binary
error. If there are m samples satisfying m/q < 1/C for some constant C > 1 and
(2/q)m · 2n/2 = poly(n), then there is Meet-in-the-Middle algorithm which solves
search LWE with binary error with non-negligible probability which runs in time
O (2n/2 (n
2
(5m+ 1) + (m+ 1) logm
))
and requires memory m · 2n/2.
Proof. Given m samples (ak, 〈ak, s〉 + ek) split ak = alk||ark in half and for each
possibility sli of the first half of s compute inner product of the first half of ak and s
l
i.
Let the output of guess sli for each of them samples be usli = (
〈
a1, s
l
1
〉
, . . . ,
〈
am, s
l
m
〉
).
Store a table T whose entries map vectors usli to s
l
i. Generating this table costs
m·2n·2n/2 operations since there are 2n/2 candidate secrets and for each we calculate
m inner products. Sort the table into lexicographical ordering component-wise,
which costs O (m · 2n/2 log (m · 2n/2)) operations. Now for each candidate srj for
the second half of the secret, and for each sample, compute ck −
〈
ark, s
r
j
〉
, to form
the vector vsrj = (c1 −
〈
ar1, s
r
j
〉
, . . . , cm −
〈
arm, s
r
j
〉
). Sort vsrj into T , which costs
log |T | = log (m · 2n/2) = logm + n/2 operations. Since there are 2n/2 possible
second srj the total cost of this step is 2
n/2 (logm+ n/2). When srj is sorted into the
list, check which usli it is between. If vs
r
j
and usli have a binary difference, return
sli and treat s
l
i||srj as a candidate secret, and check if it is correct. This procedure
would then identify the correct secret, so long as there is not a wrap around mod q,
since if sli′||srj′ is the correct secret then vsrj′ − uvecsli′ = (e1, . . . , em) mod q which is
a binary vector. Let bk = 〈ak, s〉 mod q, then a wrap around error will not occur
as long as bk 6= q − 1. The probability that one component has bk = q − 1 is 1/q so
by the union bound the probability that at least one component has bk = q − 1 is
≤ m/q. We want to bound m so that this event happens only with probability at
most 1/C for some constant C, i.e., m/q < 1/C. It remains to consider the chance
of a false positive, that is, an incorrect candidate secret sli being suggested for some
srj . Since ak is uniformly random, for any s
l
i, the vector usli is also random with each
component taking one of q values. A wrong srj will produce a vsrj that matches to
usli only if its difference is 0 or 1 on every component. Therefore the chance of a
false positive is (2/q)m. There are 2n/2− 1 wrong choices for sli, so we expect to test
(2/q)m · 2n/2 candidates per srj . Hence we require (2/q)m · 2n/2 = poly(n).
Theorem 4 gives an upper bound on the complexity of a Meet-in-the-Middle at-
tack, but note that it also takes at least m · 2n · 2n/2 operations just to generate the
table, excluding the costs of the other steps, e.g., sorting. Hence, we do not include
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Instance n q log2(THybrid) log2(TDecoding) log2(TuSVP) log2(TDisting.)
I 128 256 41 67 82 37
II 160 256 55 77 122 62
III 192 256 71 88 162 85
IV 224 256 87 102 165 109
V 256 256 103 117 203 132
VI 288 256 120 136 254 154
VII 320 256 136 158 327 176
VIII 352 256 153 185 443 198
Table 5.1.: Comparison of attacks on LWE with binary error using at most m = 2n
samples. log2(Tattack) denotes the bit operations required to perform the
algorithm described in ‘attack’ [MR09].
estimates for the runtime of this approach in Table 5.1, as there is always a faster
choice.
Arora-Ge algorithm
The basic idea of the Arora-Ge algorithm [AG11] is setting up a system of nonlinear
equations of which the secret is a root, and then solving the system. Solving may
be via linearisation (as in [AG11]) or by Gro¨bner basis methods (as in [ACF+14]).
The authors of [ACF+14] consider the complexity of their algorithm for solving
LWE with binary error for various numbers of samples (see [ACF+14, Theorem
7]. In particular, if m = 2n their algorithm solves LWE with binary error in time
O(n2 · 20.43ωn) where 2 ≤ ω < 3 is the linear algebra constant. Although this is an
upper bound, it is significantly more than the cost of the other attacks. Therefore
we do not expect that the actual runtime is smaller than for the other possible
approaches, so we omit this algorithm from consideration in Table 5.1.
5.2.3. Comparison
Table 5.1 shows the runtime of the hybrid attack compared with some of the possible
attacks described above on at most m = 2n samples of LWE with binary error. For
algorithms requiring lattice reduction, we choose whichever is the fewer of m = 2n
or the ‘optimal subdimension’ m =
√
n log(q)/ log(δ) [MR09].
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The results and runtimes of solvers for lattice problem in practice are often much
better than predicted by the proven bounds. This gap already appears in the basic
LLL algorithm [LLL82], and carries over to other basis reduction algorithms and
solvers for other lattice problems, especially for LWE. In this light, it is surprising
that there was no exhaustive evaluation of the behavior of existing LWE solvers in
practice so far. This makes comparing those attacks a very complicated task even
for experts in the area.
In order to close this gap, we present the LWE challenge. It provides standardized
LWE instances experts can use to prove the feasibility of their attacks. The instances
have been created in a new fashion using a multi-party protocol that guarantees that
none of the parties involved in the creation process has any advantage over other
researchers.
The parameters have been chosen carefully such that the instances are at the same
time representative for instances proposed for real-world cryptographic applications,
and at the border between barely solvable and unsolvable instances. New solutions
can be submitted directly to the challenge and are shown in a hall of fame. This will
motivate researchers to compare their results to existing approaches in a realistic
setting, revealing strengths and weaknesses of the attacks. At the same time, the
comparison in the hall of fame serves as an easily accessable overview for non-experts.
In addition to the presentation of the LWE challenge, we give an overview and an
interpretation of the first results.
Organisation Section 6.1 explains the parameter selection for the LWE instances
provided by the challenge. The presentation of those instances is explained in Sec-
tion 6.2. We investigated the submissions to the LWE challenge and present the
first results in Section 6.3.
The LWE challenge was presented at AsiaPKC 2016 [BBG+16], the interpretation
of the first results is original in this thesis.
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6.1. Instances Provided by the LWE Challenge
In order to allow meaningful conclusions about the hardness of LWE, the parameter
choice for the provided problem instances is crucial. On the one hand, if the provided
instances are too easy, the attacks that are easier to implement would dominate the
hall of fame, and not the attacks with the best runtime. On the other hand, if the
instances are too hard, none of them would get broken. In both cases, the challenge
would fail to provide useful information about the practical hardness of LWE.
In this section, we first explain how we chose the parameters of the instances, i.e.,
n,m, q, and α. Then, we show that every instance has (with high probability) a
unique solution.
6.1.1. Choice of Parameters
LWE is parametrized by several different parameters. On the one hand, this is
a big advantage: it allows to generate instances that are crafted specifically for a
certain application, which leads to more efficient schemes. An example for this are
the different moduli used in signature schemes: while there are examples of secure
schemes with a modulus length of about 14 bits (see [DDLL13]), other techniques
require the modulus to be about 30 bits long or even longer (see [BG14b]). On
the other hand, the flexibility of LWE makes estimating its hardness much more
complicated, since there is not one best algorithm for all instances [APS15]. This
makes the selection of the right instances provided by the challenge a non-trivial
task.
Fortunately, both theoretical and experimental results show that the hardness
of LWE mainly depends on the secret dimension n, and the error parameter α
(see [Reg05, BG14c, BLP+13, APS15]). The number of samples m and the modulus
q appear to play a minor role. In the following, we explain our parameter choices in
detail.
Known attacks on LWE (See Section2.3) can be roughly divided in two classes:
lattice-based attacks (like the decoding attack [Bab86, LP11, LN13], the distinguish-
ing attack [LP11], or the embedding approach [AFG13]) work with few samples,
while other approaches (like BKW [ACF+15] or the Arora-Ge algorithm [AG11]) of-
ten require subexponentially many (or even more). In theory, this is not a big issue,
since an attacker has access to arbitrarily many samples in the original definition of
LWE. However, nearly all practical applications only provide a limited number of
samples (e.g.,[LP11, DDLL13, BG14b]). Consequently, we consider modifying the
latter attacks to run with less samples an important challenge. In fact, progress in
this direction by lowering the required number of samples [DTV15] or generating
new samples [Lyu05] shows that it may be possible to overcome this problem.
To motivate further progress, the LWE challenge provides only m = n2 samples
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per instance. This is enough to run all sample-efficient solvers, but should exclude
the sample-consuming ones. Besides motivating further research for sample-efficient
(and therefore realistic) attacks, this is leads to a more realistic picture about the
limitations of current attacks in practice.
While being important for the correctness and the efficiency of many schemes,
the modulus q appears to play a minor role for the hardness of LWE. Following
the original proposal by Regev [Reg05], the LWE challenge is restricted to instances
with q being the smallest prime that is bigger than n2. Prime numbers are the
most frequently choice in practical schemes (e.g., [Reg05, LP11, DDLL13, BG14b]).
Fortunately, it is not necessary to include other values for q (like powers of 2). The
reason for this is a technique introduced by Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [BV14]
called modulus switching. It allows an attacker to transfer an LWE instance with
modulus q to an LWE instance with an arbitrary different modulus q′ with the same
secret s.
The next choice concerns the size of the error. In the literature, the standard
deviation of the gaussian error is either given by the standard deviation σ, or by the
relative error size α = σ/q. Following Regev’s original proposal, we select α as error
size parameter instead of σ. This choice is supported by modulus switching: When
switching the modulus q to q′, the relative error rate α remains constant except for
a small factor, which shows that the hardness of LWE depends on α rather than
on σ.
The last choice concerns concrete values for n and α. In the first cryptographic
application of LWE [Reg05], Oded Regev proposed to to choose α = o( 1√
n log(n)
). For
the instances provided by the challenge, the lattice dimension n ranges from 40 to
120, and the relative error size α ranges from 0.005 to 0.070. They are chosen such
that they capture the proportion of n and α proposed by Regev (see Figure 6.1).
At the same time, the hardness of the instances lies in a reasonable range, i.e.,
the easiest instances can be solved fairly easy using standard techniques, while the
hardest challenges are likely to remain unsolved for at least several years. The hard-
ness estimates are based on the simulator by Albrecht et al. [APS15], that estimates
the runtime of the known attacks on a given LWE instance. On the one hand,
the applicability of this simulator should be taken with a grain of salt, since it was
crafted for LWE instances with higher hardness levels (like the instances proposed
for cryptographic applications). On the other hand, it should at least give an idea
of the hardness of the instances, and comparing the performance of the attacks in
practice to the values predicted by theory is an interesting future work made possible
by the challenge. Additionally, we ran attacks on LWE instances with the easiest
parameter sets to confirm that they are breakable within a reasonable time. The
challenge was build such that more instances can be included once our estimations
prove wrong or better algorithms which significantly decrease the hardness of LWE
are developed.
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Figure 6.1.: Values for the error rate α and the dimension n as proposed by Regev
(solid line) and provided by the LWE challenge (small circles)
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6.1.2. Uniqueness and Correctness of Solutions
LWE is typically instantiated such that the solution is unique. This sounds surpris-
ing at first glance because for every s ∈ Znq , there is an error vector e ∈ Zmq such
that As + e = b. Since there is no bound for values sampled according to a Gaus-
sian distribution, each s could be the secret. However, for a typical instantiation of
LWE, there is only one vector s that leads to a reasonable error e, by which we mean
that all other errors are much bigger and therefore only sampled with a negligible
probability.
For the LWE challenge, uniqueness is a little bit easier to define. The challenge
accepts a submission s if (and only if) the corresponding error e = b−As satisfies
‖e‖ ≤ 2√mσ with σ = αq. This is justified by the fact that Lemma 2.2 in [DDLL13]
by Ducas et al. bounds the size of a Gaussian distributed vector as
Pr[‖e‖ > 2√mσ; e $← DZm,σ] < 2 (2 exp(−3/2))m < 2−m+1. (6.1)
Note that this probability is extremely small for our values of m ranging from 1600 to
14400. Consequently, correct solutions get accepted with overwhelming probability.
In the following, we show that all challenges have (with high probability) one
unique solution. For an arbitrary lattice Λ ⊂ Zm, let λ1(Λ) be the norm of the
shortest non-zero vector in Λ. To see why the solutions are unique, imagine two
secret-error tuples satisfying
As1 + e1 = b = As2 + e2 mod q
and ‖ei‖ ≤ 2
√
mσ. The triangle inequality immediately leads to
‖A(s1 − s2)‖ ≤ 4
√
mσ,
which shows that the lattice
Λq(A) = {v ∈ Zm | ∃w ∈ Zn : Aw = v mod q}
contains two points v1,v2 satisfying ‖v1−v2‖ ≤ 4
√
mσ. Consequently, the existence
of two LWE solutions would imply
λ1(Λq(A)) ≤ 4
√
mσ. (6.2)
The following Lemma bounds the probability that such an extraordinary short
lattice vector exists.
Lemma 5. Let A ∈ Zm×nq be a uniformly random matrix. If q1−
n
m ≥ 1250 then
Pr
[
λ1(Λq(A)) ≤ 1
5
√
mq1−
n
m
]
≤ 0.9−m + qn−m.
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Figure 6.2.: The LWE challenge table. The lattice dimension n is shown on the x-
axis, the relative error size α is shown on the y-axis. Green points stand
for unsolved instances, while red points indicate that the respective
instance has already been solved. By clicking on one of the points, the
respective challenge can be downloaded. By clicking on a green point,
additionally a solution to the challenge can be submitted.
Proof. The idea of the proof is to consider the probability of a random integer
vector being in the lattice and take a union bound over all short vectors. Assume
we have det(Λq(A)) = q
m−n (which happens with probability at least 1 − qn−m).
The probability of a random integer vector to be in the lattice is qn−m. The tricky
part is to bound the number of integer vectors inside the ball of radius 1/5
√
mq1−
n
m .
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Note that using cubes of edge length 1 centered at each integer vector, one can tile
the entire space. However, not all cubes centered at integer points inside the ball
are completely enclosed by the ball. So we consider a second ball with radius larger
than the first one by an addititive factor of 1
2
√
m to ensure that all cubes centered
inside the original ball are entirely enclosed in the second ball. This allows us to
bound the number of integer points inside the first ball by the volume of the second
ball. Note that we can obtain the necessary extension of the radius by multiplying
the radius of the first ball with 1.002 due to the condition in the lemma. So by the
union bound and Stirling approximation of the Gamma function we have
Pr
[
λ1(Λq(A)) ≤ 1
5
√
mq1−
n
m | det(Λq(A)) = qm−n
]
≤ pi
m/2
Γ(m
2
+ 1)
(
0.2004
√
mq
m−n
m
)m
qn−m
≤ Γ
(m
2
+ 1
)−1 (
0.20042pim
)m/2
≤
(
0.20042pim
m/2 + 1
)m/2
≤ (
√
2pie0.2004)m
≤ 0.9m.
Corollary 1. Let A ∈ Zm×nq ,b ∈ Zmq be an LWE instance with parameters n, q, α,
and m. If m = n2, q1−
n
m ≥ 1250, and
α n
√
q < 1/20, (6.3)
the probability that two different vectors s1 ∈ Znq , s2 ∈ Znq satisfy
‖b−Asi‖ ≤
√
mαq
is bounded by 0.9−n
2
+ qn−n
2
.
Proof. Follows directly from Equation (6.2), Lemma 5, and the easy calculation
4
√
mσ < 1/5
√
m · q1−n/m
⇔ 20αq < q1−1/n
⇔ α n√q < 1/20.
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While all proposed instances meet the condition in Lemma 5, not all satisfy Equa-
tion (6.3). However, this does not mean that the solutions of the other challenges
are not unique. To the contrary, the Gaussian heuristic strongly indicates that all
solutions are unique: it estimates the length of the shortest non-zero vector in the
above lattice to be
λ1(Λq(A)) ≈ Γ(1 +m/2)
1/m
√
pi
q1−n/m.
Consequently, for all our instances, two valid solutions would imply a lattice vector
shorter than 0.7 times the Gaussian heuristic. However, the existence of such a short
vector is very unlikely. This is, among others, confirmed by the results of the SVP
challenge: despite big efforts by many researchers, no one was able to find a lattice
vector shorter than 0.8 times the prediction of the Gaussian heuristic so far.
6.2. The Challenge Web Page
In this section, we explain the challenge web page in more detail and show how one
can participate in the LWE challenge.
6.2.1. How to Download Challenges
The LWE challenge website provides a challenge table that is shown in Figure 6.2.
This table contains all available instances, ordered by lattice dimension n and rel-
ative error rate α. The green points of the challenge table stand for unsolved in-
stances. By clicking on a green point, the respective instance can be downloaded.
On the day of the release of the LWE challenge website, all points of the challenge
table will be green. Once an instance is solved, i.e., the correct solution has been
submitted, the respective point turns red. Hence, while the challenge table provides
the challenge instances, it also serves as a visual representation of the development
of the LWE challenge and hence, of the LWE problem.
In addition to using the challenge table, LWE instances can also be downloaded
directly in the download section (right column). After selecting n and α, a click on
the download button leads directly to the file containing the corresponding challenge.
The LWE challenge website also provides some smaller instances at the download
section. These toy challenges could for example be used to test the correctness of
an LWE solver implementation.
Format of the Challenges The LWE challenges are provided in the following
format: in the first three rows, the integers n, m, and q are listed. In the fourth
row, the real α is found. It is written in US notation, i.e., with a period as decimal
point. In the fifth row the vector b - which actually is a column vector - is given
and finally in the sixth row, the matrix A starts. It consists of m rows which n
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entries each. A description of the format of the instances can also be found at the
download section on the LWE challenge website.
6.2.2. How to Submit Solutions
The LWE challenge accepts a submitted solution s for a challenge A,b with param-
eters n,m, α, and q if (and only if) ‖b−As‖ ≤ 2√mαq. Equation (6.1) shows that
such an s gets accepted with overwhelming probability if b was actually created as
As + e mod q. On the other hand, as mentioned in Section 6.1, with very high
probability all instances have a unique solution.
Analogous to downloading instances, there are two possibilities for submitting a
solution: first, the solution can be submitted by clicking on the respective green point
in the challenge table on the website. This will lead to a submission form where
the lattice dimension and the Gaussian parameter are already entered. Second,
the solution can be submitted by following the submission link on the right side
of the start page of the LWE challenge website. This link leads to a submission
form where both the lattice dimension and the Gaussian parameter can be selected
independently.
Note that for the solved instances, i.e., those represented with a red point in the
challenge table, no solution can be submitted. Solutions for the toy instances can
not be submitted either.
Hall of Fame At the bottom of the LWE challenge website’s start page, we show
the latest five successful submissions. We also provide a list with all successful
submissions, i.e., a hall of fame. It can be found by clicking on a link below the
latest submissions. Here, all correct solutions are listed in a chronological order,
together with some meta information.
Once an instance is broken, there is no way to find a better solution. Therefore, old
results will not be suppressed and hence, these early contributions will stay visible.
This will prevent a picture similar to the one on the original lattice challenge, where
only few names dominate the hall of fame since as long as the shortest vector is not
found, better submissions can replace older solutions.
6.3. First Results of the LWE Challenge
About one month after publication, eight instances of LWE have been broken. All
solutions come from the same group, and have been produced using the embedding
technique.
This picture follows the expected pattern. Also for other lattice challenges, the
first result came from the easiest to implement algorithms, rather than the algo-
rithms with the best expected performance. Those algorithms showed up a few
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0.015 4749 / 52
0.010 220 / 2.4 1614 / 3.8
0.005 2 / 0.2 5 / 0.24 48 / 0.27 2201 / 0.31 1382690 / 30
α / n 40 45 50 55 60
Table 6.1.: Overview of successful attacks times / attack time predictions (both in
seconds)
months later, followed by new developments. We expect the same to happen for the
LWE challenge.
A second interesting aspect is the runtime of the attacks. Since the authors
gave details about the running time, we can compare their concrete runtimes with
predictions stemming from the LWE estimator by Albrecht et al. [APS15]. This
comparison is given in Table 6.1. It shows that there is a significant gap between
the predicted hardness of the instances, and the concrete hardness is practice. It is
necessary to point out that this is probably mainly due to the fact that the main
purpose of the tool by Albrecht et al. is to predict the hardness of instances used in
cryptography, which are way harder than the instances considered in the challenge.
Consequently, we expect the gap between the runtime estimations and experimental
runtimes to shrink for harder instances. If this is not the case, it may question the
accuracy of the existing hardness estimations and lead to interesting new results.
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7 Signature Scheme by Bai/Galbraith
Selecting parameters for LWE-based cryptographic schemes is often a complicated
and error-prone process. Even for experts in the field, it is easy to overestimate the
security of the scheme, or to miss opportunities to optimize the parameter choice.
In this chapter, we discuss this issue for the parameter selection for the signature
scheme by Bai and Galbraith [BG14b].
In the original paper, the authors give concrete parameters aiming for 128 bits of
security. However, due to an error in the analysis of the attacks, they underestimate
its runtime, which leads directly to an overestimation of the security. We address this
problem by giving a corrected security analysis based on state-of-the-art estimations
of attack performances [LP11, AFG13, BG14b, APS15].
In addition, we show that careful parameter selection can lead to an instantiation
that is at the same time more secure and more efficient than the one given by Bai
and Galbraith. The cause of this improvement is two-fold: the first relies on the
fact that the hardness of the scheme is not only build on LWE, but also on SIS. We
show that the original parameter set does not balance the hardness of both problems
perfectly, and doing so leads to an improved performance. Second, as mentioned in
Chapter 3, the number of samples provided significantly influences the hardness of
the LWE instance. This fact was used before to exclude certain attacks [LP11]. We
show that in addition to that, a careful quantitative analysis of the remaining attacks
leads to more realistic hardness estimations, which allows to select parameters that
lead to more efficient implementations.
Organisation Section 7.1 introduces the scheme given by Bai and Galbraith [BG14b]
and the slightly modified variant considered in the rest of this chapter. An updated
analysis of the old parameter set is given in Section 7.2, together with a comparison
to the old analysis. Finally, Section 7.3 presents our improved methodology to select
parameters and the new parameter sets.
This chapter is based on a publication at Latincrypt 2014 [DBG+14].
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7.1. The Scheme
The Bai-Galbraith digital signature scheme [BG14b] (BG signature) is based on the
Fiat-Shamir paradigm which transforms an identification scheme into a signature
scheme [FS87] and closely follows previous proposals by Lyubashevsky et al. [Lyu12,
GLP12, DDLL13, Lyu09]. The hardness of breaking the BG signature scheme, in
the random oracle model, is reduced to the hardness of solving standard worst-
case computational assumptions on lattices. The explicit design goal of Bai and
Galbraith is having short signatures.
7.1.1. Description of the BG Signature Scheme
For easy reference, the key generation, signing, and the verification algorithm of
the BG signature scheme are given in Figure 7.1. Our proposed parameter set
is summarized in Table 7.3. An analysis of the original parameter sets is given in
Section 7.2. However, the algorithms have been simplified and redundant definitions
have been removed (e.g., we just use σ as standard deviation and do not differentiate
between σE, σS and set n = k, folllowing the proposal by Bai and Galbraith in both
cases).
During key generation two secret matrices S ∈ Zn×n,E ∈ Zm×n are sampled from
a discrete Gaussian distribution Dn×nσ and D
m×n
σ , respectively. A rejection condition
Check E enforces certain constraints on E, which are necessary for correctness and
short signatures (see Section 7.1.2). Finally, the public key T = AS+ E and the
secret key matrices S,E are returned where AS is the only matrix-matrix multipli-
cation necessary in the scheme. As we choose A ∈ Zm×n as a global constant, it
does not have to be sampled during key generation and is also not included in the
public key and secret key.
For signing, the global constant A as well as secret keys S,E are required (no usage
of T in this variant). The vector y is sampled uniformly random from [−B,B]n.
For the instantiation of the random oracle H (using a hash function) only the higher
order bits of Ay are taken into account and hashed together with the message µ.
The algorithm F (c) takes the binary output of the hash c and produces a vector c
of weight ω (see [DDLL13] for a definition of F (c)). In a different way than [BG14b]
w is computed following an idea that has also been applied in [GLP12]. Instead
of computing w = Az − Tc (mod q) we calculate w = v − Ec (mod q), where
v = Ay (mod q). This is also the reason why E has to be included into the secret
key sk = (S,E) ∈ Zn×n × Zm×n. Thus, the large public key T ∈ Zm×n is not
needed anymore for signing and the operations become simpler. The test whether
|[wi]2d | > 2d−1−LBG (LBG = 7ωσ in [BG14b]) ensures that the signature verification
will not fail on a generated signature (w is never released) and the last line ensures
that the signature is uniformly distributed within the allowed range [−B+U,B−U ]n
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Algorithm KeyGen Algorithm Sign Algorithm Verify
INPUT: INPUT: INPUT:
A, n,m, q, σ µ,A,S,E, B, U, d, w, σ µ, z, c,A,T, B, U, d
OUTPUT: sk= (S,E), pk= (T) OUTPUT: (z, c) OUTPUT: Accept/Reject
1. S
$←Dn×nσ 1. y $← [−B,B]n 1. c=F (c)
2. E
$←Dm×nσ 2. v=Ay (mod q) 2. w=Az−Tc (mod q)
3. if check E(E) = 0 3. c=H(bved, µ) 3. c′=H(bwed, µ)
thenRestart 4. c=F (c) 4. if c′= c and ‖z‖∞≤B−U
4. T=AS+E (mod q) 5. z=y+Sc thenreturn1
5. return sk= (S,E), pk= (T) 6. w=v−Ec (mod q) 5. return0
7. if |[wi]2d |>2d−1−L
thenRestart
8. return (z, c)
if ‖z‖∞≤B−U
Figure 7.1.: The BG signature scheme [BG14b]; see Section 7.1.2 for implementa-
tions of check E.
for U = 14 · σ√ω.
For verification the higher order bits of w = Az−Tc = Ay−Ec are hashed and
a valid signature (z, c) is accepted if and only if z is small, i.e., ‖z‖∞ ≤ B −U , and
c = c′ for c′ := H(bwed, µ). For the security proof and standard attacks we refer to
the original work [BG14b].
7.1.2. Optimizing Rejection Sampling
In the original signature scheme [BG14b] Check EBG restarts the key generation
if |Ei,j| > 7σ for any (i, j) and the rejection condition in Line 7 of Sign is |[wi]2d | >
2d−1 − LBG for LBG = 7wσ. This ensures that it always holds that bAyed =
bAy − Eced and thus verification works even for the short signature. However,
in practice the acceptance probability of (1 − 14ωσ/2d)m has a serious impact on
performance and leaves much room for improvement. On first sight it would seem
most efficient to test during signing whether bAyed = bAy − Eced and just reject
signatures that would not be verifiable. However, in this case the proof structure
given in the full version of [BG14b] does not work anymore. In Game 1, sign queries
are replaced by a simulation (in the random oracle model) which is not allowed to
use the secret key and later on has to produce valid signatures even for an invalidly
chosen public key (Game 2).
The authors of [DBG+14] propose an optimization (similar to [DDLL13]) that
rejects E during key generation only if the error generated by Ec in bAyed =
bAy − Eced for the worst-case c is larger than a threshold L. Thus, theCheck Enew
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Table 7.1.: Parameter sets proposed by Bai and Galbraith [BG14b]
Parameter Sets by Bai/Galbraith
Parameter Instance I Instance II Instance III Instance IV Instance V
n 640 576 512 512 400
m 1137 969 945 1014 790
σ 58 68 66 224 70
ω 18 18 19 19 20
d 24 24 24 26 24
B 2201370 2322422 2058115 6985118 1748695
q 234.34 233.10 230.84 232.66 228.71
U 3446 4039 4028 13670 4383
algorithm works the following: Using maxk(·) which returns the k-th largest value
of a vector we compute thresholds th =
∑ω
k=1 maxk(|Eh|),∀h ∈ [0,m] where Eh is
the h-th row of E and reject if one or more th are larger than L. Thus the rejection
probability for the close-to-uniform w is independent of c and E and does not leak
any information. When L is chosen such that only a small percentage of secret keys
are rejected the LWE instances generated by the public key are still hard due to
the same argument on the bounded number of samples as in [BG14b, DDLL13].
The acceptance probability of w in Line 7 of Sign is (1− 2L/2d)m. Table 7.3 shows
concrete values for our choice of Lnew and the original LBG.
7.2. Revisiting the Old Parameter Sets
In the original definition of LWE, an attacker has access to arbitrary many LWE
samples (i.e. he can choose the value of m). Most hardness analyzes ignore the upper
bound on the number of samples (if there is one), which leads to a conservative
security estimation. As we showed in Chapter 3, taking this upper bound into
consideration, however, has some interesting impacts. We predicted the runtime of
the attacks on LWE with and without this bound on m. As can be seen in Table 7.2,
the decoding attack is the fastest attack on all instances (see Table 7.1) if we look
at the original definition of LWE with arbitrary big m, followed by the standard
embedding approach and the embedding approach in [COT14].
However, considering the bound on m changes this picture completely. The de-
coding attack is suddenly the slowest approach, and the previously slowest attack
becomes the fastest way to break most of the instances. This is due to the fact
that m is big enough to run the embedding approach from [COT14] in the optimal
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Security Level
Instance I Instance II Instance III Instance IV
Attack Dim. Sec. Dim. Sec. Dim. Sec. Dim. Bit Sec.
LWE with optimal m
Decoding 1432 86 1305 80 1176 76 1238 83
Embedding 1511 101 1381 94 1244 90 1314 100
Embedding 945 122 876 114 801 114 875 123
LWE with given m
Decoding 1137 168 969 216 945 129 1014 130
Kannan 1137 126 969 138 945 111 1014 119
ISIS 945 122 876 114 801 114 875 123
SIS
Lattice reduction 301 225 192 206
Table 7.2.: Runtime of attacks on the LWE instances from [BG14b] with arbitrary
many and a bounded number of samples for the decoding attack [LP11],
Kannans embedding [AFG13] and the embedding via ISIS [BG14b].
dimension (in fact, only 945 out of the 1137 samples are needed for an optimized
attack on Instance I). Running the decoding attack on the same instance, on the
other hand, would require nearly 300 samples more than provided by the scheme.
Interestingly, the standard embedding approach would ideally make use of even more
samples, but suffers less from the restriction.
A second issue with the old parameter sets is that the hardness of LWE and SIS
is very unbalanced. Attacking the underlying SIS instance is always several orders
of magnitude harder than attacking the LWE instance. Since breaking one of the
assumptions suffice to break the scheme, this wastes a lot of potential. Consequently,
balancing the hardness of SIS and LWE is one major goal for the new parameter
set.
The biggest issue with the old parameter sets, however, is the error in the security
analysis. When estimating the hardness of the embedding attack (following the
approach presented in Section 2.3.5), Bai and Galbraith did not take the heuristic
constant τ into consideration. This may look like a minor problem, but has an
huge impact on the security estimates: Analyzing Instance I in Table 7.1 with the
techniques introduced in Section 3.1.4 for arbitrary many samples leads to δ ≈
1.0061. Bai and Galbraith, however, estimated the necessary hermit delta by δ ≈
1.0056. Converting this to bit security estimations shows that the original work
overestimates the hardness of Instance I by nearly 20 bits.
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7.3. Security Analysis and Parameter Selection
In the original work [BG14b], Bai and Galbraith proposed five different parameter
sets (see Table 7.2) to instantiate their signature scheme. In this section we revisit
their security analysis and propose a new instantiation that is optimized for software
implementations on modern server and desktop computers (Intel/AMD) and also
mobile processors (ARM). The security analysis has been refined due to the following
reasons: First, as mentioned before, a small negligence in the assessment of the
underlying LWE instances leads to a slightly wrong hardness estimation, which
was acknowledged by the authors after publication [BG14a]. Second, an important
attack, namely the decoding attack, was not considered in [BG14b]. We justify that
indeed the decoding attack is less efficient than the one considered if one takes into
account the limited number of samples m given to the attack algorithms.
Third, the hardness of the two underlying problems (namely SIS and LWE) is
unbalanced for the original parameter sets. Table 7.2 shows that the hardness of
the underlying SIS always significantly exceeds the hardness of the corresponding
LWE instance. Even when considering the upper bound on the number of samples,
this gap reaches up to 179 bits for the first parameter sets. Since the security of
the scheme corresponds to the hardness of the easier problem, this is a suboptimal
situation.
In Table 7.3 we propose a parameter set for an instantiation of the signature
scheme from Section 7.1 with 128 bits of security, for which we provide evidence in
the next section. The hardness of the LWE instances obtained from the parameters
proposed in the original work [BG14b] is analyzed in Section 7.2.
7.3.1. Hardness of LWE
We estimated the hardness of the LWE instances by considering the decoding at-
tack, Kannan’s embedding approach, and the reduction via ISIS, while taking into
consideration the bounded number of samples. Those sample restriction are also
the reason we did not consider other attacks like BKW or Arora-Ge. Using the
techniques introduced before (see Chapter 2 and 3), we come to the estimation
δ ≤ m+n+1
√
q
m
m+n+1√
2pieστ
.
Together with the runtime estimation of BKZ taken from Albrecht et al. [AFG13],
this leads to the results presented in Table 7.4.
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7.3.2. Hardness of SIS
Instead of recovering the secret key, which corresponds to solving an instance of
LWE, an attacker could also try to forge a signature directly and thus solve an SIS
instance. We predict the hardness of SIS for the well-known lattice-reduction attack
(see for example [BBD09]) like it was done in [BG14b]. This attack views SIS as
a variant of the (approximate) shortest-vector problem and finds the short vector
by applying a basis reduction. As stated by Bai and Galbraith, forging a signature
through this attack requires to find a reduced basis with Hermite factor
δ = (D/qm/(m+n))1/(n+m+1), (7.1)
with D = (max(2B, 2d−1) + 2E ′ω) for E ′ satisfying (2E ′)m+n ≥ qm2132. Applying
Equation (2.5), we estimate that a successful forger requires to perform about 2159
operations (see Table 7.4).
7.3.3. An Instantiation for Software Efficiency
Choosing optimal parameters for the scheme is a non-trivial multi-dimensional op-
timization problem and our final parameter set is given in Table 7.3. Since the
probability that the encoding function F maps two random elements to the same
value must be negligible (i.e. smaller than 2−128), we choose ω such that
2ω
(
n
ω
)
≥ 2128. (7.2)
Since Sc is distributed according to a Gaussian distribution with parameter
σSc =
√
ωσ (7.3)
we can bound its entries by
U = 14σSc . (7.4)
Following the proposal by Bai and Galbraith, we set
B = n · U (7.5)
Consequently, B − U is lower bounded by 14√ωσ(n− 1), such that the acceptance
probability of a signature Pacc (Line 8 in Figure 7.1) is at least
Pacc =
(
2(B − U) + 1
2B
)m
=
(
2 · 14√ωσ(n− 1) + 1
2 · 14√ωσn+ 1
)m
≈
(
1− 1
n
)m
.
Experimental results show that choosing
L = 3ωσ (7.6)
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leads to an success probability of line 3 in KeyGen of about 99%. The next important
choice to be made is the value for the parameter d. It has a determining influence
on the trade-off between runtime and key sizes: The success probability in the
signing algorithm (Line 7 in Figure 7.1) is given by (1− 2L/2d)m, which means that
large values for d lead to a high success probability, and thereby to fewer rejections
implying better running times. Bounding this success probability by 1/3 leads to
the restriction
(1− 2L/2d)m ≥ 1/3, (7.7)
which can be used to determine the smallest possible value for d.
On the other hand, the security proof requires
(2B)nqm−n ≥ 2(d+1)m+κ (7.8)
to be satisfied, which means that increasing d implies larger values for q, hence,
worsening runtime and key sizes. With this, we collected all conditions necessary
to conclude all parameters from n, σ, and m. An overview on the dependencies is
given in Figure 7.2.
Our goal is to come up with a parameter set that ensures at least 128 bits of
security. Furthermore, dimensions n resp. m are multiples of four to support four
parallel operations in vector registers, and multiples of seven for additional platform-
dependent optimization of the implementation. The secret dimension n is the main
security parameter: one the one hand, increasing it increases the hardness of both
SIS and LWE. One the other hand, n also has the biggest influence on key and
signature sizes, and also on the runtime of the scheme. Consequently, keeping n as
small as possible is the main design goal.
The important second parameter influencing the hardness of SIS is the dimension
m. However, increasing m also means providing more samples to attack LWE,
therefore decreasing the hardness of LWE. This property can be used to fine-tune
the hardness of LWE and SIS. Figure 7.3 shows the lower bound on q depending on
the choice of m and σ. In order to support small key sizes and efficient operations,
we want q to be as small as possible, so the natural candidates for σ are the values
right before the lower bound on q performs a jump. We can see that tempering
m moves this jumps and influences the natural choices for σ and q. We found
n = 532,m = 840, and σ = 43 to be the best choice, since it balances the hardness
of LWE and SIS pretty well (see Table 7.4), and at the same time permits to use the
modulus q = 229 − 3, which leads to very efficient modulo operations. The choice
n = 532 leads to ω = 18, which results in the lower bound log2(B) ≥ 20.4 that
allows our choice B = 221 − 1.
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Figure 7.2.: Dependencies of the parameters
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Figure 7.3.: Lower bound on q for n = 532 and various values of m
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Table 7.3.: The parameter set we use for 128 bits of security. Note that signature
and key sizes refer to fully compressed signature and keys. Our software
uses slightly a larger (padded) signature and keys to support faster loads
and stores aligned to byte boundaries.
Parameter Selection
Parameter Bound Value
n 532
m 840
σ 43
ω 2ω
(
n
ω
) ≥ 2128 18
d d is s.t. (1− 2L/2d)m ≥ 1/3 23
σSc
√
ωσ 182.43
B close to power of two ≥ 14√ωσ(n− 1) 221 − 1
q ≥ (2(d+1)m+κ/(2B)n)1/(m−n) 229 − 3
U
14 · σ√ω
(Prob. of acceptance Line 8 of Sign: 0.51)
2554.1
LBG
7wσ
5418(Prob. of acceptance Line 3 of KeyGen: ≈ 1)
(Prob. of acceptance Line 7 of Sign: 0.337)
Lnew
3wσ
2322(Prob. of acceptance Line 3 of KeyGen:
0.99)
(Prob. of acceptance Line 7 of Sign: 0.628)
public-key size m · n · dlog2(q)e 1.54 MiB
secret-key size (n2 + n ·m) dlog2(14 · σ)e 0.87 MiB
signature size n · dlog2(2B)e+ 256 11960 bits
Table 7.4.: Security of our parameter set
Security Level
Problem Attack Bit Security
LWE
Decoding [LP11] 271
Embedding [AFG13] 192
Embedding [BG14b] 130
SIS Lattice reduction [BG14b] 159
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tion Scheme
Many cryptographic schemes are not based in standard LWE, but on variants
like ring-LWE [LP11], or LWE with modified secret [DDLL13] or error distribu-
tion [BGG+16, CGW14]. The reason for this is that the additional structure often
allows to increase the efficiency of the scheme in many regards (e.g., key sizes, mes-
sage/signature sizes, runtimes). It can even allow to construct new primitives, with
Gentry’s fully homomorphic encryption being the most prominent example. In this
chapter, we show that using variants of LWE can also help to transfer existing
solutions to new environments.
To this end, we present a variant of the well-known Lindner/Peikert encryption
scheme [LP11] that is based on binary LWE as introduced in Chapter 5. Using
the hardness estimations from Chapter 5, we select parameters that lead to a se-
cure instantiation, that is at the same time suitable for usage on microcontrollers.
Based on this results, Buchmann et al. [BGG+16] showed that a microcontroller
implementation in fact leads to an extremely practical solution outperforming even
established approaches like elliptic-curve cryptography or RSA.
Organisation Section 8.1 introduces the new scheme, which is a variant of encryp-
tion scheme proposed by Lindner and Peikert [LP11]. Our variant requires a new
correctness proof that is given in Section 8.2. Finally, Section 8.3 proposes a con-
crete instantiation based on the hardness results for binLWE from Chapter 5 and
the correctness results from Section 8.2. For completeness, it also contains a com-
parison of the implementation given by Buchmann et al. [BGG+16] with established
alternatives.
This chapter is based in a paper that appeared AsiaPKC@AsiaCCS 2016. This
paper also contains the microcontroller implementation by Gu¨neysu, Oder, and
Po¨ppelmann.
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Gen(a): Choose r1, r2 uniformly at random among the poly-
nomials in Rq with binary entries and let p =
r1 − ar2 ∈ Rq. The public key is p and the se-
cret key is r2.
Enc(a,p,m ∈ {0, 1}n): Choose e1, e2, e3 uniformly at random among the
polynomials in Rq with binary entries. Let m¯ =
encode(m) ∈ Rq, and compute the ciphertext
[c1 = ae1 + e2, c2 = pe1 + e3 + m¯] ∈ R2q.
Dec(c = [c1, c2], r2): Output decode(c1r2 + c2) ∈ {0, 1}n.
Figure 8.1.: The Scheme R-BinLWEEnc
8.1. Ring-LWE Based Public Key Encryption Scheme
In this section we introduce the required notation, describe our public key encryption
scheme, show the probability analysis for decoding failures, and provide parameters.
8.1.1. Preliminaries
Since its introduction by Regev [Reg05], the learning with error problem (LWE)
served as a fundamental building block for an astonishing variety of cryptographic
schemes. To set up an LWE-distribution for integers n, q, and an error distribution
ψ over Zq, one samples a secret s ∈ Znq according to ψn. To create an LWE-sample,
one samples a vector a ∈ Znq uniformly at random, an error e ∈ Zq according to ψ,
and outputs the tuple (a, b) with b = aT s + e. The LWE-samples can be collected
to get b = As+ e for an m× n matrix A, the secret vector s ∈ Znq and two vectors
e,b ∈ Zmq . Note that LWE can also be defined with different distributions for error
s and secret e, but it is known that any LWE instance can be transformed into an
LWE instance with secrets distributed according to the error distribution.
The most efficient lattice-based schemes are based on a more structured variant
of LWE, called Ring-LWE [LPR10]. While certain properties can be established for
various rings, we define R as the ring Z[x]/〈xn + 1〉 and Rq as Zq[x]/〈xn + 1〉 for
an integer q, Zq = Z/(qZ), and a power of two n. We write elements p ∈ Rq with
maximum degree n− 1 as p = ∑n−1i=0 [p]ixi with [p]i ∈ (−bq/2c+ 1, bq/2c) being the
i-th coefficient.
To setup a Ring-LWE-distribution for integers n, q, and an error distribution
ψ over Rq, one samples a secret s ∈ Rq according to ψ. To create a Ring-LWE-
sample, one samples a polynomial a ∈ Rq uniformly at random, and an error e ∈ Rq
according to ψ, and outputs the tuple (a,b) with b = as+ e.
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The search variant of the (Ring-)LWE problem is to find s, given arbitrary many
(Ring-)LWE-samples. The decision variant is to distinguish between arbitrary many
(Ring-)LWE-samples and the same number of samples with uniform a and b (re-
spectively a and b).
Typical choices for ψ are discrete (or discretized) Gaussian distributions or uni-
form distributions over a small set. Complementary to Ring-LWE, we define the
Ring-BLWE problem as the instance of Ring-LWE, where ψ is the uniform distri-
bution on the polynomials in Rq with binary coefficients (i.e., coefficients in {0, 1}).
8.1.2. The Scheme
In [LP11, LPR10] a semantically secure public key encryption scheme (from now
referred to as R-LWEEnc) is described whose security is based on the hardness
of the Ring-LWE problem. While it has been shown that high-performance imple-
mentations are possible [GFS+12, RVM+14, dCRVV15], the scheme still has the
disadvantage of large ciphertexts and requires complex sampling of discrete Gaus-
sian noise. However, its simple structure can be used as starting point to derive
a variant which is much better suited for practice. The main difference is that we
now use binary errors and secrets instead of errors or secrets chosen from a Gaus-
sian distribution. While just using binary noise in the R-LWEEnc scheme seems
straightforward, the choice of the encoding and decoding functions and the decryp-
tion error analysis is not. The scheme (from now referred to as R-BinLWEEnc) is
defined in Figure 8.1. It is parameterized by integers n and q and uses a uniformly
random chosen global constant polynomial a ∈ Rq. Furthermore, it requires a pair
of error-tolerating encoding and decoding functions. Our instantiations of these
functions are given in Equations (8.1) and (8.2), the justification for this choices in
Section 8.2.
As we replace Gaussian by binary noise our scheme is now based on the Ring-
BLWE problem whose hardness is assessed in Section 8.2.2. Following [LP11], we
can conclude that the scheme remains semantically secure as long as decisional Ring-
BLWE in dimension n with modulus q is hard. We note that in R-BinLWEEnc, r1
in Gen is noise and hence not needed anymore after key generation. The scheme
uses the error-tolerant encoding and decoding functions
encode: {0, 1}n → Rq,
(m0, . . . ,mn−1) 7→
n−1∑
i=0
mi · (q/2)xi (8.1)
and decode : Rq → {0, 1}n as given in Equation (8.2). Note that decode
differs from the decoding function by Lindner and Peikert. This is due to the
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fact that the binary distribution is (unlike the Gaussian distribution) typically not
centered around zero and this asymmetry of the error leads to an asymmetry of the
coefficients. In the next section, we discuss the implications of the different decoding
function on the correctness of the scheme.
8.2. Correctness and Security of R-BinLWEEnc
Similar to the correctness result of [LP11], the message is decrypted correctly if (and
only if)
decode(encode(m) + e1r1 + e2r2 + e3) = m.
Note that for all i ∈ {1, 2} and k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}
[eiri]k =
k∑
j=0
[ei]j[ri]k−j −
n−1∑
j=k+1
[ei]j[ri]n+k−j,
and the coefficients [ei]j, [ri]j are statistically independent and binary. Consequently,
the coefficients [eiri]k are approximately distributed according to a Gaussian distri-
bution modulo q (this is basically a random walk). Therefore, the distribution
of the coefficients of the noise polynomial n = e1r1 + e2r2 + e3 is likewise close to
a Gaussian distribution. The natural choice for the decoding function is there-
fore to determine the expected values E([n]k) and decode all coefficients closer to
encode(0)+E([n]k) to zero and the elements closer to encode(1)+E([n]k) to one.
Since
E([eiri]k) = E(
k∑
j=0
[ei]j[ri]k−j −
n−1∑
j=k+1
[ei]j[ri]n+k−j)
= (−n+ 2k + 2)/4,
the desired expected value is
E([n]k) = E([e1r1]k) + E([e2r2]k) + E([e3]k)
= k − n/2 + 3/2.
Therefore, we choose the decoding function
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decode: Rq → {0, 1}n,
n−1∑
k=0
αkx
k 7→ (m0, . . . ,mn−1) (8.2)
with
mk =
{
0 if |αk − k − bn−32 e| ≤ q4
1 else.
Please note that since all the above probability distribution have finite support,
it is possible to calculate the probability of decoding errors exactly. In fact, we used
Sage [S+14], a computer algebra program, to calculate the probabilities in Table 8.1.
8.2.1. Parameter Selection
In Table 8.1 we provide three parameter sets for R-BinLWEEnc based on the se-
curity analysis (see Section 8.2.2). For comparison, we also include selected NTRU
[HHHW09] and Ring-LWE Encryption (R-LWEEnc) [LP11] parameter sets. Note
that it is also possible to use a q between 128 and 512 to balance security and error
probability between the different parameter sets given in Table 8.1. While even a
small failure probability like 2−32 is clearly undesirable in practice, some applica-
tions are able to deal well with such a small probability (e.g., interactive applications
already have to account for data corruption during transmission). It can further be
seen that our proposal leads to smaller key and ciphertext sizes than R-LWEEnc
and is comparable to NTRU. Only the size optimized (but computationally more
complex) parameter set NTRU (df = 113) allows a slightly smaller ciphertext. For
a more detailed comparison of different lattice-based encryption schemes we refer
to [CWB14]. Additionally, we would like to note that the ciphertext size could
presumably be reduced in future work by removing redundant information in the
ciphertext [PG13] or by techniques presented by Peikert [Pei14].
8.2.2. Hardness Assessment of Binary LWE
In this section, we discuss the theoretical and concrete hardness of Ring-BLWE.
Theoretical Hardness of Ring-BLWE
When Regev [Reg05] introduced LWE, he provided a quantum reduction that showed
its worst-case hardness if at least one of two well-known lattice problems (namely
gapSVP, the decisional variant of the shortest vector problem SVP, and SIVP, the
shortest independent vector problem) is hard in the average case. Nowadays, there
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Set/Scheme n q
Bit Failure Size [bits]
Sec. Probability Message Secret Key Public Key Ciphertext
R-BinLWEEnc-I 256 128 94 2−10 256 256 1,792 3,584
R-BinLWEEnc-II 256 256 84 2−32 256 256 2,048 4,096
R-BinLWEEnc-III 512 256 190 2−18 512 512 4,096 8,192
NTRU (df = 113) [HHHW09] 401 2048 112 < 2
−112 401 636 4,401 4,401
NTRU (df = 49) [HHHW09] 541 2048 112 < 2
−112 541 858 5,951 5,951
NTRU (df = 38) [HHHW09] 659 2048 112 < 2
−112 659 1045 7,249 7,249
R-LWEEnc [GFS+12] 256 7681 106 ≈ 2−7 256 1,504 3,304 6,608
R-LWEEnc [GFS+12] 512 12289 157 ≈ 2−7 512 3,062 6,956 13,912
Table 8.1.: Proposed Parameter Sets for R-BinLWEEnc. Hardness Result for LWE taken from [LN13]
8.3. Instantiation and Results
are classical reductions [BLP+13] and worst case results for LWE with uniformly
distributed error [MP13], for LWE instances with leaky secret [GKPV10], and for
Ring-LWE [LPR10].
Two of the above reductions can in principle be applied for LWE with binary error
or secret. Goldwasser et al. [GKPV10] gave a reduction from LWE with binary (and
possibly leaky) secret to LWE with uniform secret. However, these results are solely
valid for LWE with Gaussian error and therefore not applicable to Ring-BLWE.
Micciancio and Peikert [MP13] showed the worst-case hardness of LWE with uniform
error distribution if the number of samples is restricted. Unfortunately, their worst
case result for binary errors requires a strong restriction on the number of samples
and furthermore does not transfer to the ring setting.
Consequently, R-BinLWEEnc is not worst-case secure, but only based on the
average-case hardness of Ring-BLWE. Other examples of the common practice to
base the security on average-case problems are the signature schemes by Lyuba-
shevsky et al. [GLP12, DDLL13] and the NTRU encryption scheme [HPS98]. Like-
wise, the parameter sets proposed by Lindner and Peikert for their encryption
scheme [LP11] have not been shown to provide worst-case security.
Attacks on Ring-BLWE
Despite several algorithms dedicated to problems in ideal lattices [LS14, EHL14],
there is still no breakthrough result that can break schemes based on ideal lattices
considerably faster. In the lattice challenges [LRBN], the current record for solving
the shortest integer solution problem in standard lattices is dimension 140, while
the record for SVP in ideal lattices is dimension 128. In particular it has not been
shown that any known attack considerably profits from the additional structure of
Ring-LWE. Hence, according to current knowledge, Ring-LWE is assumed to be not
easier than LWE.
The hardness of BLWE was recently studied by Buchmann et al. [BGPW16].
The authors present a new attack, and compare it with existing approaches like the
distinguishing attack [MR09, LP11], the embedding approach [Kan87], the decoding
attack [LP11], and the meet-in-the-middle attack [APS15]. Additionally, they argue
that algebraic attacks like the Arora-Ge algorithm [AG11, ACF+14] or the BKW
approach [BKW03, ACF+14] can not be applied to Ring-BLWE instances with few
samples.
Applying the methods presented in [BGPW16] leads to the hardness estimations
given in Table 8.1. For all instances, the hybrid approach [BGPW16] performed
best.
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Figure 8.2.: Comparison of memory consumption and speed of AVR implemen-
tations. Implementation [GPW+04]* is a point multiplication on an
elliptic curve. Implementation [POG15]† gives no separate data about
memory consumption for encryption and decryption.
8.3. Instantiation and Results
To evaluate the performance of R-BinLWEEnc on typical IoT devices, Buchmann et
al. implemented the scheme on an 8-bit Atmel AVR ATXmega128A1 microcontroller
using AVR-GCC 4.7 with optimization flag -Os and on the ARM Cortex-M0 using
armcc V5.06 with optimization flag -O3.
Results for the C implementation are given in Table 5.1. Our ARM implementa-
tion includes assembly optimization of the multiplication. For the AVR implementa-
tion, an assembly implementation did not provide significant savings due to the very
simple nature of the polynomial multiplication algorithm and the straightforward
mapping of polynomial coefficients to the uint8 t data type. Due to the higher
level of optimization, as described in the work by Buchman et al., the ARM imple-
mentation runs faster than the AVR implementation. Storing two key coefficients
in one 32-bit data word instead of one coefficient in an 8-bit data word also doubles
the memory requirement for the key storage.
The trade-off between memory consumption and speed for various ATXmega im-
plementations is given in Figure 8.2. The points correspond to the implementation
by Buchmann et al., two implementations of an instantiation of Ring-LWE with
Gaussian error (n = 256, q = 7681, [LSR+15, POG15]), an RSA-1024 implementa-
tion and an elliptic-curve point-multiplication [GPW+04]. Table 5.1 also contains an
implementation of a code-based scheme [HvMG13], which was omitted in the figure
since it is several orders of magnitude less space efficient than the other imple-
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mentations. For the same reason, we omitted the RSA decryption implementation.
Figure 8.2 highlights the extremely small memory footprint of our implementation.
In [LSR+15] two different optimization goals are given. The high-speed imple-
mentation outperforms the new implementation on the same platform by a factor
of 2.5. But this comes to no surprise since our main design goal is a low memory
footprint and their high-speed implementation includes large precomputed tables for
the number-theoretic transform. Their memory-efficient implementation performs
comparable the new implementation (1,532,823 / 673,489 cycles for encryption /
decryption) but is still much larger than our implementation (8,5 / 6,0 kBytes for
encryption/decryption). The implementation of [POG15] is 1.8 times faster for en-
cryption than the new one (and 3.4 times faster for decryption) but also applies the
number-theoretic transform with precomputed twiddle factors and therefore requires
much more memory.
Translating the implementation results for RSA and ECC given in [GPW+04]
to cycle counts, it turns out that an ECC secp160r1 operation requires 6.5 million
cycles. RSA-1024 encryption with public key e = 216 + 1 is the only implemen-
tation that outperforms ours in terms of memory consumption, but instead only
provides two times slower encryption and nearly 120 times slower decryption with
Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). Compared to an implementation of a code-
based scheme [HvMG13] Buchmann et al. also achieve a much better performance
and require less flash memory.
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9 A Double Secure Encryption Scheme
Many modern public-key cryptographic schemes come with a security proof that
ensures that the ability to break the scheme implies the ability to solve an instance
of an underlying problem. This can be seen as a way to define the attack surface
for the scheme: in order to break the scheme, it is necessary to solve the problem
instance. Unfortunately, typically the opposite is true, too: breaking the assumption
is enough to break the scheme. This is clearly unfavorable, since we can not prove
that any problem used for public-key cryptography is in fact hard.
On the one hand, this is particularly problematic for rather young security as-
sumptions like LWE. In fact, the missing trust in the hardness of LWE is one of the
main problems that prohibited a wide-spread application of LWE-based schemes so
far. On the other hand, the hardness of well-established problems like factoring
or discrete logarithms is threatened by the possibility of quantum computers. Until
know, everybody had to select either a rather young (but potentially post-quantum)
hardness assumption, or a well-established, but not quantum-resistant one.
In this chapter, we introduce a new way do address this problem: we show that
it is possible to combine the LWE problem with a number theoretic problem (the
representation problem, RP) to obtain a new computational problem called Learning
With Errors in the Exponent (LWEE). We proof that this problem remains hard as
long as either LWE or RP is hard. Additionally, we show the usability of the new
assumption by constructing a public-key encryption scheme whose security can be
reduced to the hardness of LWEE.
The new scheme allows a very flexible parameter selection. We show that it is
possible to select parameters such that the scheme is based on the number-theoretic
assumption only (the classical way), on LWE only (the post-quantum way), or on
bot assumptions (the double-secure way). While the parameter selection for the
post-quantum instantiation can be done similar to the selection in Chapter 8, the
double-secure instantiation requires a different approach. This is due to the fact
the scheme needs an exponential gap between the error size and the modulus. Such
LWE instances are typically not used for standard LWE encryption, but are very
common in advanced schemes like fully homomorphic encryption. Consequently,
89
9. A Double Secure Encryption Scheme
we use techniques proposed to instantiate one such scheme to identify appropriate
parameters for the double-secure instantiation.
The second difference between this chapter and Chapter 8 is that the results
here are mainly of theoretical interest. We take this into consideration by giving
asymptotic parameters instead of focusing parameters optimized for efficient imple-
mentation.
Organization Section 9.1 introduces the the representation problem, the second
problem our scheme will be based on. Afterwards, Section 9.2 defines the new
LWEE assumption and proves reductions from LWE and RP. The remaining parts
of the chapter deal with the new encryption scheme. First, Section 9.3 presents
the scheme and gives the reduction from LWEE. Second, Section 9.4 explains the
parameter selection, including the hardness estimation used for the LWE instances.
This chapter is based on a publication on a publication on ICISC 2015 [DGG15].
9.1. The Representation Problem
In this section, we introduce the well-established search representation problem, and
give the first decisional variant. We also introduced the rank hiding problem, that
is used to show that the rank hiding problem is hard, even when several samples are
given.
9.1.1. Definition and Properties
The representation problem in a group G assumes that given l random group el-
ements g1, . . . , gl ∈ G and h ∈ G it is hard to find a representation x ∈ Z`q such
that h =
∏`
i=1 g
xi
i holds. Brands shows an electronic cash system based on the
problem. Recently, the assumption was extensively applied to show leakage re-
siliency [KV09, ADVW13, DV14].
We now state a more general version of the search representation problem where
vector x
$← χ` is sampled from a distribution χ with (at least) min-entropy and
where an adversary is given m ≥ 1 samples instead of a single one.
Definition 5 (Search Representation Problem). Let χ be a distribution over Zq,
and `,m be integers. Sample M
$← Zm×`q and x $← χ`. The Search Representation
Problem (SRPG,χ,`,m) is (t, )-hard if any algorithm A, running in time t, upon input
(g, gM, gx, gMx), outputs x′ ∈ Z`q such that gMx′ = gMx with probability at most
. If χ is the uniform distribution, we sometimes skip χ in the index and say that
SRPG,`,m is (t, )-hard.
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Brands proves the equivalence of the representation problem and the discrete
logarithm problem for uniform χ and m = 1. It is easy to verify that the reduction
holds for every distribution for which the discrete logarithm problem holds.
To establish relations to the learning with errors in the exponent problem (cf.
Section 9.2.2), we need a decisional variant of the representation problem. To our
surprise, the decisional version has not been defined before, although the assumption
is a natural generalization of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem to `-tuples (sim-
ilar in spirit as the `-linear problem in G [Sha07]). Given ` random group elements
g1, . . . , g` ∈ G together with h ∈ G and gx1 , . . . , gx` ∈ G where x1, . . . , x` $← Z∗q, it is
hard to decide if h =
∏`
i=1 g
xi
i or h is a random group element in G. Our definition
below generalizes this problem to the case, where m ≥ 1 samples are given to an
adversary and x1, . . . , x` are sampled from any min-entropy distribution χ.
Definition 6 (Decisional Representation Problem). Let χ be a distribution over Z∗q,
and `,m be integers. Sample M
$← Zm×`q , h $← Zmq , and x $← χ`. The Decisional
Representation (DRPG,χ,`,m) problem is (t, )-hard if
(g, gM, gx, gMx) ≈(t,) (g, gM, gx, gh) .
If χ is the uniform distribution over Z∗q, we say DRPG,`,m is (t, )-hard.
Remark 2. DRPG,χ,`,m can be stated in the framework of the Matrix-DDH assump-
tion recently introduced by Escala et al. [EHK+13] and thus we put another class of
hardness problems to the arsenal of their expressive framework.
We now give evidence that the family of DRPG,χ,`,m problems is a class of progres-
sively harder problems (with increasing `).
Proposition 1. If DRPG,χ,`,m is (t, )-hard, then for any `,m ≥ 1 with t′ ≈ t and
distribution χ with min-entropy DRPG,χ,`+1,m is (t
′, )-hard.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A which solves the DRPG,χ,`+1,m problem
in time t with probability . We show that in this case, there exists an adversary B
with black-box access to A which solves the DRPG,χ,`,m problem with probability .
Adversary B is given as challenge the tuple (g, gM, gx, gh) ∈ G×Gm×`×G`×Gm.
She invokes adversary A with input the group G and its generator g. Adversary A
expects as challenge a tuple (g, gM, gx, gh) ∈ G×Gm×`+1×G`+1×Gm. To this end,
B samples x`+1 according distribution χ, and a = (a1, . . . , am) uniformly from Zmq .
Adversary B provides A with the challenge (g, gM′ , gx′ , gh′) where gM′ = (gM′ , ga),
gx
′
= (gx, gx`+1), and gh
′
i = ghi · gaix`+1 for i ∈ [m]. Note that gx`+1 is distributed
as expected as we choose x`+1
$← χ. Moreover, ga is uniformly distributed in Gm.
If the DRPG,χ,`,m tuples are such that g
h =
∏`
i=1 g
xi
i , then g
h′ in the DRPG,χ,`+1,m
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distribution is computed correctly. This follows from the fact that for all i ∈ [m] we
have
gh
′
= gh · (ga)x`+1 = gMx · (ga)x`+1 = gM′x′
given gh = gMx. In case gh is a random group element, so is gh
′
, since a, x`+1 are
sampled independently of h. Hence, B outputs in her game what A guesses, and
wins with A’s advantage . The running time of B is essentially the same as A
merely adding the time to sample O(m) uniform group elements.
Remark 3. DRPG,χ,1,1-problem with χ being the uniform distribution over Zq co-
incides with the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem. Hence, we obtain the
corollary that for uniform distributions χ, the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem
implies the representation problem DRPG,χ,`,1 for ` ≥ 1. In fact, Proposition 1 sug-
gests a stronger argument. Assuming the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem holds
for well-spread and min-entropy distributions χ, then the DRPG,χ,`,1 holds for χ and
` ≥ 1.
While Proposition 1 shows that the DRP problem progressively increases with
`, the following proposition states that the problem remains hard with increasing
number of samples m. More precisely, we show that DRPG,χ,`,m+1 is hard as long
as DRPG,χ,`,m and the Rank Hiding problem RHG,m,m+1,m+1,2`+1 (cf. Definition 7)
is hard. RH was introduced by Naor and Segev [NS09] (and later extended by
Agrawal et al. [ADVW13]).1 and proven to be equivalent to the DDHG,χ assumption
for groups of prime order and uniform χ [NS09].
Definition 7 (Rank Hiding). Let G be a group of order q with generator g, and
i, j, n,m ∈ N satisfying i 6= j and i, j ≥ 1. The Rank Hiding problem (RHG,i,j,m,n) is
(t, )-hard if
{(G, q, g, gM) : M $← Rki(Zm×nq )} ≈(t,) {(G, q, g, gM) : M $← Rkj(Zm×nq )}
where Rkk(Zm×nq ) returns an m× n matrix uniformly random from Zn×mq with rank
k ≤ min(n,m).
Proposition 2. If RHG,m,m+1,m+1,2`+1 is (t, )-hard and DRPG,χ,`,m is (t
′, ′)-hard in
a cyclic group G of order q, then for any distribution χe and any m > 0 with t′ ≈ t
and ′′ ≤ (1− )−1′ DRPG,χ,`,m+1 is (t, ′′)-hard.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. We assume that RHG,m,m+1,m+1,2`+1 is (t, )-hard
and DRPG,χ,`,m is (t
′, ′)-hard. However, we assume that there is an algorithm A
which solves DRPG,χ,`,m+1 in time t with probability 
′′ > (1− )−1′.
1The assumption was first introduced by Boneh et al. [BHHO08] under the Matrix DDH assump-
tion.
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We then build an algorithm B with black-box access to A which solves the
DRPG,χ,`,m problem in time t
′ ≈ t with probability larger than ′ as follows. The
algorithm B is given a DRP instance (g, gM, gx, gh) for uniform matrix M $← Zm×`q
and has to decide whether gh equals gMx or was chosen uniformly from Gm. Algo-
rithm B now prepares a DRP instance for A by adding a row to the matrix gM and
vector gh as follows. It chooses a random index 0 ≤ i ≤ m and samples a random
coefficient vector y ∈ Zmq . Let u = gy>M = gy1m1 · . . . · gymmm and v = g〈hi,y〉.
Create the matrix gM
′ ∈ G(m+1)×` by inserting u before the ith column of gM, and
h′ ∈ Gm+1 by inserting v before the ith entry of h. Now, B invokes A upon input
(g, gM
′
, gx, gh
′
).
At this point, we stress that A will accept the input and work properly even if
(g, gM
′
, gx, gh
′
) is of different rank. In fact, an honestly generated DRP instance for
the DRPG,χ,`,m+1 problem will have a rank min(`,m+ 1) matrix (with overwhelming
probability), while our input matrix has rank min(`,m) (with overwhelming prob-
ability). Since by assumption there is no algorithm that can distinguish those two
inputs (matrices) in time t with a probability greater than , algorithm A, which
also runs in time t, must work for the given input with probability greater than
(1− ). Algorithm A returns a guess b ∈ {0, 1} for its challenge which in turn con-
stitutes the guess of B for its challenge instance (g, gM, gx, gh). Since A successfully
wins its challenge in time t with probability ′′, we have constructed an algorithm
B which breaks DRPG,χ,`,m in time t′ ≈ t with probability (1− )′′ > ′. This leads
to a contradiction to DRPG,χ,`,m being (t
′, ′)-hard. Hence, DRPG,χ,`,m+1 must be
(t′, (1− )−1′)-hard.
9.2. Learning with Errors in the Exponent
This section deals with the new problem LWEE and its hardness. After the formal
definition of LWEE, we give reductions from RP and LWE. The last part gives
heuristic evidence that LWEE is computationally harder than each of the underlying
problems.
9.2.1. Definition
For self-containment, the assumption is stated both as a search and decision problem
over a group G of order q, and exponents sampled from distributions χe, χs over Z.
We demonstrate the versatility and general utility of the decisional version in Section
9.3.
Definition 8 (Learning with Errors in the Exponent). Let G be a group of order
q where g is a generator of G. Let n,m, q be integers and χe, χs be distributions
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over Z. For any fixed vector s ∈ Znq , define the LWEE distribution LLWEEG,n,q,χe to be the
distribution over Gn×G obtained such that one first draws vector a $← Znq uniformly,
e
$← χe and returns (ga, gb) ∈ Gn × G with b = 〈a, s〉 + e. Let (gai , gbi) be samples
from LLWEEG,n,q,χe and ci be uniformly sampled from Z
∗
q for 0 ≤ i < m = poly(κ).
• The Search Learning With Errors in the Exponent (SLWEEG,n,m,q,χe(χs)) problem
is (t, )-hard if any algorithm A, running in time t, upon input (gai , gbi)i∈[m],
outputs s with probability at most .
• The Decision Learning With Errors in the Exponent (DLWEEG,n,m,q,χe(χs)) prob-
lem is (t, )-hard if (gai , gbi)i∈[m] ≈(t,) (gai , gci)i∈[m] for a random secret s $←
χns . If χs is the uniform distribution over Zq, we write DLWEEG,n,m,q,χe.
We let AdvDLWEE/SLWEEG,n,m,q,χe,χs(t) denote a bound on the value  for which the decisional/search
LWEE problem is (t, )-hard.
One may interpret learning with errors in the exponent in two ways. One way is
to implant an error term from a distribution χe into the Diffie-Hellman exponent.
Another way to look at LWEE is as compressing an LWE instance within some group
G of order q.
9.2.2. Relations to Group and Lattice Problems
We connect the representation and learning with errors problem to learning with er-
rors in the exponent. The essence is that there exist tight reductions from the search
(resp. decision) learning with errors in the exponent problem to either the search
(resp. decision) representation problem and the search (resp. decision) learning
with errors problem. This has several interesting property preserving implications.
As a corollary we infer that for appropriate parameter choices LWEE preserves the
hardness and robustness properties of the representation and/or learning with er-
rors problem. Essentially then LWEE boils down to the security of either of the two
underlying problems. This way, the cryptosystem can be instantiated to leverage
leakage resistance and post-quantum hardness thanks LWE [GKPV10, Reg05]. On
the flip side, the cryptosystem may offer short instance sizes through the underlying
RP problem (when instantiated on elliptic curves). Of particular interest for many
emerging applications is the partnering of the two hardness assumptions. One may
choose parameters such that both RP and LWE hold. We call the case double-hard,
which appeals to provide in some sense hedged security.
Following four propositions summarize our main results.
Proposition 3. If SRPG,χs,`,m is (t, )-hard in a cyclic group G of order q, then
for any distribution χe and any number of samples m > 0 SLWEEG,`,m,q,χe(χs) is
(t′, )-hard with t′ ≈ t.
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Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A which solves the SLWEEG,`,m,q,χe(χs)
problem in time t with probability . We show that in this case, there exists an
adversary B with black-box access to A which solves the SRPG,χs,`,m problem in
time ≈ t with probability .
Adversary B is given as challenge a SRP instance (g, gM, gx, gMx) and is asked
for a vector x ∈ Z`q such that gMx′ = gMx. Adversary B invokes A with input
the group G and its generator g. Whenever A asks for the i-th sample from the
LLWEEG,`,m,χe distribution, adversary B returns the i-th row of gM and the i-th element
of gMx with some noise ei ← χe, i.e., gai := gM[i] and gbi := g(Mx)i · gei . Note
that (gai , gbi) as such corresponds to the LLWEEG,`,m,χe distribution. The vector g
ai is
uniformly distributed as the input gM for SRP is uniformly distributed. Moreover,
we have
gbi = g(Mx)i · gei = g〈M[i],x〉+ei .
Note that B can provide A enough samples since both algorithms get m samples
from their respective distributions.
Eventually, adversary A will output an element s ∈ Z`q such that for all i ∈
{1, . . . ,m} it holds g〈ai,s〉+e′i = gbi where e′i $← χe. Now, since there can exist only
a single vector s which can fulfill the equation g〈ai,s〉+e
′
i = gbi for errors e′ $← χe, we
must have s = x = (x1, . . . , x`). Hence, B outputs s as the solution vector for her
instance.
The running time of B is almost identical to A, and the success probability is
equal, too. The proposition follows accordingly.
Proposition 4. If SLWEn,m,q,χe(χs) is (t, )-hard, then for any cyclic group G of or-
der q with known (or efficiently computable) generator SLWEEG,n,m,q,χe(χs) is (t
′, )-
hard with t′ ≈ t.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A which solves the SLWEEG,n,m,χe(χs)
problem in time t with probability . We show that in this case, there exists an
adversary B with black-box access to A which solves the SLWEn,m,q,χe(χs) problem
in time ≈ t with probability .
Adversary B is allowed to ask for samples (ai, bi) which are distributed either
according to the LLWEn,m,q,χe distribution or distributed uniformly in (G
n × G). Ad-
versary B invokes adversary A with input G (the group of order q) and samples a
random generator g for that group. When A asks for i-th sample (gai , gbi), B asks
for samples (ai, bi) in his own game and returns to A the tuple (gai , gbi).
Eventually, A outputs the secret s, which B forwards to his own game as output.
Time complexity of B is the time required by A plus taking exponentiations, which
is a negligible cost.
Proposition 5. If DRPG,χs,`,m is (t, )-hard in a cyclic group G of order q, then
for any distribution χe and any number of samples m > 0 DLWEEG,`,m,χe(χs) is
(t′, )-hard with t′ ≈ t.
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Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A which solves the DLWEEG,`,m,χe(χs)
problem in time t with probability . We show that in this case, there exists an
adversary B with black-box access to A which solves the DRPG,χs,`,m problem in
time ≈ t with probability .
Adversary B is given as challenge a DRP instance (g, gM, gx, gh) and has to decide
whether h equals Mx or was chosen uniformly at random from Zmq . Adversary B
invokes A with input the group G. Whenever A asks for the i-th sample from the
LLWEEG,`,m,χe distribution, adversary B returns the i-th row of gM and the i-th element of
gh with some noise ei ← χe, i.e., gai := gM[i] and gbi := ghi ·gei . Note that (gai , gbi) as
such corresponds to the LLWEEG,`,m,χe distribution. The vector g
ai is uniformly distributed
as the input gM for DRP is uniformly distributed. Moreover, we have
gbi = ghi · gei = g(Mx)i · gei = g〈M[i],x〉+ei
if gh = gMx. Otherwise, gbi is distributed uniformly in G since h is. Note that
B can provide A enough samples since both algorithms get m samples from their
respective distributions.
Hence, when adversary A outputs a bit d, adversary B outputs d in her decisional
representation problem. If A guessed correctly, so does B. The running time of B
is almost identical to A, and the success probability is equal, too. The proposition
follows accordingly.
Proposition 6. If DLWEn,m,q,χe(χs) is (t, )-hard, then for any cyclic group G of
order q with known (or efficiently computable) generator DLWEEG,n,m,χe(χs) is (t
′, )-
hard with t′ ≈ t.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A which solves the DLWEEG,n,m,χe(χs)
problem in time t with probability . We show that in this case, there exists an
adversary B with black-box access to A which solves the LWEn,m,q,χe(χs) problem in
time ≈ t with probability .
Adversary B is allowed to ask for samples (ai, bi) which are distributed either
according to the LLWEn,m,q,χe distribution or distributed uniformly in (G
n × G). Ad-
versary B invokes adversary A with input G (the group of order q) and samples a
random generator g for that group. When A asks for i-th sample (gai , gbi), B asks
for samples (ai, bi) in his own game and returns to A the tuple (gai , gbi).
Eventually, A outputs a bit b, which B forwards to his own game as output. It is
easy to verify that the samples (ai, bi) are distributed according to L
LWE
n,m,q,χe if and
only if the samples (gai , gbi) are distributed according to LLWEEG,n,m,χe . Hence, B wins
whenever A does while having approximately the same running time ≈ t.
96
9.3. Public Key Encryption from LWEE
9.2.3. On the Generic Hardness of LWEE
With Proposition 3-6 in our toolbox we conjecture LWEE to be harder than either of
the underlying RP or LWE problems. The argument is heuristic and based on what
is known about the hardness of each intractability problem.
Fix parameters such that RP and LWE problem instances give κ bits security. The
only obvious known approach today to solve the LWEE instance is to first compute
the discrete logarithm of samples (gai , gbi) and then solve the LWE problem for
samples (ai, bi). Note that an adversary must solve n
2 +n many discrete logarithms
because the secret vector s is information-theoretically hidden, if less than n samples
of LWE are known. Solving N := n2 + n discrete logarithms in generic groups of
order q takes time
√
2Nq while computing a single discrete logarithm takes time√
piq/2 [KS01, HMCD04].2 In fact, this bound is proven to be optimal in the generic
group model [Yun14]. Note, parameters for LWEE are chosen such that computing a
single discrete logarithm takes time 2κ. Hence, in order to solve the LWEE instance
for N = O(κ2), one requires time 2√
pi
√
N · 2κ + 2κ > 2κ+2 log(κ). This shows that
generically the concrete instance of LWEE is logarithmically harder in the security
parameter κ.
9.3. Public Key Encryption from LWEE
This section introduces the new encryption scheme based on LWEE. We begin with
some intuition on the ideas that are the foundation of the scheme, before we give
the formal definition of our scheme. Afterwards, we show correctness and security
of the scheme.
9.3.1. The High-Level Idea
The idea behind our scheme is reminiscent of Regev’s public-key encryption scheme.
In a nutshell, the public key is an LWEE instance (gA, gAs+x) ∈ Gn×n×Gn. Similarly
to [LPS10, LP11] and as opposed to Regev [Reg05], for efficiency reason we avoid
the use of the leftover hash lemma –instead we impose one further LWEE instance–
and make use of a square matrix A. Ciphertexts consist of two LWEE instances
C = (c0, c1) where c0 = g
Ar+e0 encapsulates a random key r ∈ Znq and c1 =
g〈b,r〉+e1 · gαµ encrypts the message µ (we discuss the exact value of α below). The
tricky part is the decryption algorithm. All known LWE-based encryption schemes
require some technique to deal with the noise terms. Otherwise, decryption is prone
to err. Regev’s technique ensures small error terms. One simply rounds c1 − c0s to
2Solving N -many discrete logarithms is easier than applying N times a DL solver for a single
instance.
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some reference value cb indicating the encryption of bit b. While rounding splendidly
works on integers, the technique fails in our setting.
Our approach explores a considerably different path. Instead of rounding, we
synthesize the pesky error terms. To this end, we adapt the trapdoor technique of
Joye and Libert [JL13] and recover partial bits of the discrete logarithm (by making
use of the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [PH78]). The main idea is to tweak the modulus
in a smart way. Given composite modulus N = pq with p′, q′, such that p = 2kp′+ 1
and q = 2kq′ + 1 are prime, there exists an efficient algorithm for recovering the k
least significant bits of the discrete logarithm. We choose the parameters so that
the sum of all error terms in the exponent is (with high probability) at most 2k−`.
This leads to a “gap” between error bits and those bits covert by the discrete log
instance. We plant the message in this gap by shifting it to the 2k−`’s bit, where `
is the size of the message we want to decrypt. Hence, we choose α = 2k−` in our
construction to shift the message bits accordingly. We leave it as an interesting open
problem to instantiate the scheme in prime order groups.
9.3.2. Our Construction
The scheme is parameterized by positive integers n, k, ` < k and Gaussian parame-
ters σs, σe.
KeyGen: Sample prime numbers p′ and q′, such that p = 2kp′ + 1 and q = 2kq′ + 1
are prime. Set N = pq and M = 2kp′q′. Sample s $← Dnσs , A
$← Zn×nM and
x
$← Dnσe and compute b = A>s+ x. Sample g ∈ JN \ RRN of order M . The
public key consists of pk = (g, gA, gb, N), and the secret key of sk = (p, s).
Encrypt(pk, µ): To encrypt ` bits µ ∈ {0, 1, . . . 2` − 1} given public key pk choose
r
$← Dnσs , e0
$← Dnσe and e1
$← Dσe . Use gA, r and e0 to compute gAr+e0 , and
gb, r and e1 to compute g
〈b,r〉+e1 . The ciphertext is c0, c1 with
c0 = g
Ar+e0 , c1 = g
〈b,r〉+e1 · g2k−`µ .
Decrypt(sk, (c0, c1)): To decrypt the ciphertext (c0, c1) given secret key sk = (p, s),
first compute g〈s,Ar+e0〉 and then h = c1/g〈s,Ar+e0〉. Run Algorithm 6 to syn-
thesize v = logg(h) mod 2
k and return
⌊
v
2k−`−1
⌉
.
9.3.3. Correctness
To show correctness of our construction we build upon two facts. First, Algorithm 6
synthesizes the k least significant bits of a discrete logarithm. The algorithm’s
correctness for a modulus being a multiple of 2k is proven in [JL13, Section 3.2].
Second, noise in the exponent does not overlap with the message. To this end, we
bound the size of the noise with following lemma.
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Algorithm 6:
Input: Generator g of a group with order p− 1 = 2kp′, p and k
Output: k least significant bits of logg(h)
begin
a = 0, B = 1;
for i ∈ {1, . . . , k} do
z ← L(h, p)2i mod p;
t← L(g, p)a2i mod p;
if z 6= t then
a← a+B;
end
B ← 2B;
end
return a
end
Lemma 6 (adapted from [LP11, Lemma 3.1]). Let c, T be positive integers such
that
σs · σe ≤ pi
c
T√
n ln(2/δ)
and
(
c · exp(1− c
2
2
)
)2n
≤ 2−40 .
For x, s
$← Dnσe , r, r0
$← Dnσe , e1
$← Dσe, we have |〈x, r〉 − 〈s, e0〉+ e1| < T with
probability at least 1− δ − 2−40.
We are now ready to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Let c, T be as in Lemma 6. Then, the decryption is correct with
probability at least 1− δ − 2−40.
9.3.4. Ciphertext Indistinguishability
Theorem 6. Let X = {Xκ}κ∈N and Y = {Yκ}κ∈N be two distribution ensem-
bles. We say X and Y are (t, )-computationally indistinguishable if for every
PPT distinguisher A with running time t, there exists a function (κ) such that
|Pr[A(X) = 1]−Pr[A(Y ) = 1]| ≤ (κ) (and we write X ≈(t,) Y ). If A is PPT and
(κ) is negligible, we simply say X and Y are (computationally) indistinguishable
(and we write X ≈ Y ).
Let G = 〈g〉 be the cyclic group of composite order generated by g. If the decisional
LWEE problem DLWEEG,n,n+1,q,Dσe (Dσs) is (t, )-hard, then the above cryptosystem
is (t, 2)-indistinguishable against chosen plaintext attacks.
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Proof. In a high level, our proof works as follows. Instead of showing IND-CPA
security via a direct argument we show that the distribution (pk, c0, c1) is indistin-
guishable from the uniform distribution over (Gn×n ×G2n+1). That is, a ciphertext
(c0, c1) under public key pk appears completely random to an adversary. This holds,
in particular, in the IND-CPA experiment when the adversary chooses the under-
lying plaintext. We prove the theorem via a series of hybrid arguments, Hybrid0 to
Hybrid2, where in each consecutive argument we make some slight changes with the
provision that the adversary notices the changes with negligible probability only. In
the following, we use the abbreviations u = Ar+ e0 and v = 〈b, r〉+ e1 + 2k−`µ.
Hybrid0: In this hybrid we consider the original distribution of the tuple
(pk, (c0, c1)) = (g
A, gb, gu, gv).
Hybrid1: In this hybrid we modify the distribution and claim
(gA, gb, gu, gv) ≈c (gA′ , gb′ , gA′r+e0 , g〈b′·r〉+e1 · g2k−`µ)
for a uniformly sampled elements gA
′
, gb
′ ∈ Gn×n × Gn. We argue that any
successful algorithm distinguishing between Hybrid0 and Hybrid1 can be easily
turned into a successful distinguisher B in the DLWEEG,n,n,q,Dσe (Dσs) problem.
The DLWEE-adversary B is given as challenge the tuple (gA, gb) and is asked
to decide whether there exist vectors s
$← Dσs , x $← Dnσe such that gb = gA
>s+x
or gb was sampled uniformly from Gn.
Let Pr[Hybridi(t)] denote the probability of any algorithm with runtime t to
win the IND-CPA experiment in hybrid i. Then, we have
Pr[Hybrid0(t)] ≤ Pr[Hybrid1(t)] + AdvDLWEEG,n,n,q,Dσe ,Dσs (t) .
Hybrid2: In this hybrid we modify the distribution and claim
(gA
′
, gb
′
, gA
′r+e0 , g〈b
′·r〉+e1 · g2k−1µ) ≈c (gA′′ , gb′′ , gu′ , gv′ · g2k−1µ)
for a uniformly sampled elements gA
′′
, gb
′′
, gu
′
, gv
′ · gµ ∈ G(n+1)×n ×Gn+1. We
argue that any successful algorithm distinguishing between Hybrid1 and Hybrid2
can be easily turned into a successful distinguisher B against the
DLWEEG,n,n+1,q,Dσe (Dσs) problem. Note that g
b′ , g〈b
′·r〉+e1 is an additional sam-
ple from the LWEE distribution from which gA
′
, gA
′r+e0 is sampled.
We have
Pr[Hybrid1(t)] ≤ Pr[Hybrid2(t)] + AdvDLWEEG,n,n+1,q,Dσe ,Dσs (t) .
Note that now all exponents are uniformly distributed, and, in particular,
independent of µ and thus, independent of b in the IND-CPA game. Hence,
any algorithm has in Hybrid2 exactly a success probability of 1/2.
This completes the proof of semantic security.
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9.4. Parameter Selection
Here, we review the decisional representation and learning with errors problem.
Our aim is to give empirical arguments of the hardness of learning with errors in
the exponent and justify the parameter choices in the main paper.
9.4.1. Hardness of the Decisional Representation Problem
Little is known about the decisional representation problem. Proposition 1 (main
paper) shows that (`+ 1)-DRP for any ` is generically at least as hard as the `-DRP
problem. As `-DRP for ` = 1 coincides with DDH, we lay our argumentation on the
well-studied decisional Diffie-Hellman problem.
Decisional Diffie-Hellman. We start by recalling groups in which the DDH prob-
lem is believed to be instractable. Boneh gives several examples in [Bon98]. Among
them are the following ones:
1. In the cyclic subgroup QR(p) ⊂ Z∗p of quadratic residues in Z∗p, where p =
2p′ + 1 with p and p′ both prime, DDH is believed to be intractable.
2. Let N = pq for primes p, q, (p−1)
2
, (q−1)
2
. The cyclic subgroup T in Z∗N of non-
prime order (p − 1)(q − 1)/2 is believed to be a DDH-hard group. The same
is claimed for subgroup QRN ⊂ Z∗N of order (p − 1)(q − 1)/4, which even
holds if p, q is known, and thus, the hardness of DDH is independent of the
factorization [KY05].
3. The elliptic curve Ea,b/Fp where |Ea,b| and p are prime is believed to resist
against DDH attacks.
Note that one might believe that the multiplicative group Z∗p with prime p is a
safe choice. However, this group has an even order which is also publicly known.
Hence, one can evaluate the Legendre symbol on ga and gb and compare the result
with the given challenge gc. This gives a significant non-negligible advantage to a
distinguisher. Moreover, the group of signed quadratic residues QR+N := {|x| : x ∈
QRN}, introduced in [FS97] and revisited in [HK09] is publicly recognizable and
thus non DDH-hard.
Trapdoor Decisional Diffie-Hellman. While many cryptographic applications can
be instantiated in the above groups, our encryption scheme requires a special DDH-
hard group where DDH is easy given a secret trapdoor. The requirement is remi-
niscent of trapdoor decisional Diffie-Hellman (TDDH) groups, introduced by Dent
and Galbraith [DG06] and studied further by Seurin [Seu13]. Informally, TDDH
groups satisfy two properties: (i) the DDH problem is assumed to be hard without
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a trapdoor, (ii) DDH becomes easy but CDH remains hard given a trapdoor. Thus,
anyone in possession of the trapdoor is able to efficiently solve the DDH problem.
We remark that for our construction groups satisfying property (i) suffice, and we
do not necessarily require hardness of CDH.
Looking at TDDH groups, there are several candidates:
1. Dent and Galbraith [DG06] gave two constructions based on hidden pairings.
Here, the trapdoor permits to compute pairings on a specific elliptic curve what
is assumed to be infeasible without the trapdoor. One such construction of a
TDDH is as follows. Let N = pq be an Blum integer, i.e., the product of two
primes p ≡ q ≡ 3 mod 4, where there exists two large primes p′ and q′ such
that p′|(p+1) and q′|(q+1). The order of an elliptic curve E : y2 = x3 +x over
the ring ZN is |E(ZN)| = (p+ 1)(q+ 1). The group E(ZN) with the generator
point P = (xP , yP ) ∈ E(ZN) of order p′q′ is assumed DDH-hard. However, if
one is given the trapdoor τ = (p, p′, q, q′), one can solve the DDH problem by
the Chinese Remainder Theorem. A tuple (A,B,C) ∈ E(ZN)3 is a true DDH
tuple iff the elements reduce modulo p and q to valid tuples in the subcurve
E(Fp) and E(Fq). Those two checks can be performed with the knowledge
of the trapdoor using Weil or Tate pairing [MOV93, FMR99]. In fact, given
the trapdoor one can also efficiently test subgroup memberships. Dent and
Galbraith [DG06] also consider an elliptic curve E over F2mn with mn being
odd. Again, a hidden pairing allows one to solve DDH with the knowledge of
a trapdoor.
2. Seurin [Seu13] continues the study and identifies additional trapdoor groups.
Let N = pq where p, q are safe primes, i.e., p and q are of the form p = 2p′+ 1
and q = 2q′ + 1 where p′, q′ are prime. The DDH problem in the group
QRN2 of quadratic residues modulo N2 is hard given the description of Z∗N if
factoring N is hard. The use of a trapdoor τ = (p, q) which is the factorization
of N enables to solve the DDH efficiently. QRN2 is a cyclic group of order
ord(QRN2) = Np′q′.
3. Let N be as before. The subgroup JN of Z∗N consists of all elements x ∈ Z∗N
such that J(x,N) = 1. This subgroup has order ord(JN) = φ(N)/2 = 2p′q′.
Moreover, JN is cyclic because all prime factors of φ(N)/4 = p′q′ are (pairwise)
distinct [HK09]. Given the description of JN with generator g ∈ JN , it is
assumed one cannot solve the DDH problem in JN without knowledge of the
factorization of N . The trapdoor here is thus defined as τ = (p, q) or τ =
ord(JN). The assumption known as the quadratic residues problem appeared
first in the security proof of the Goldwasser and Micali cryptosystem [GM82].
Joye and Libert [JL13] generalize the Goldwasser-Micali encryption scheme to
groups JN where p and q are k-quasi-safe-primes. That is, p (resp. q) are
of the form p = 2kp′ + 1 (resp. q = 2kq′ + 1) where p, p′, q, q′ are all prime.
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Security / Ea,b/Fp QR(p) ⊂ Z∗p JN ⊂ Z∗N JN ⊂ Z∗N
Group a, b
$← Fp p safe prime p, q safe primes p, q k-safe-primes
80-bit log p ≈ 160 log p ≈ 1130 logN = 1130 logN = 1130 with k < 202
log p ≈ log q ≥ 160 log p ≈ log q ≥ 565
128-bit log p ≈ 256 log p ≈ 3000 logN = 3000 logN = 3000 with k < 622
log p ≈ log q ≥ 256 log p ≈ log q ≥ 1500
256-bit log p ≈ 512 log p ≈ 15000 logN = 15000 logN = 15000 with k < 3494
log p ≈ log q ≥ 512 log p ≈ log q ≥ 7500
Table 9.1.: Example instantiation of some DDH-hard groups for different security
levels
They assume that without knowing the factorization of N , random elements of
QRN are computationally indistinguishable from elements in JN/QRN . This
assumption is believed to hold for the group even when the distinguisher is
given k.
Parameters. For all the above groups, there exists no specialized DDH distin-
guisher. In fact, the best algorithms to solve the DDH problem is to solve the DL
problem in that group. Some groups above are assumed to be hard only if also
factoring a composite number N = pq of two large primes is hard or the quadratic
residue assumption holds.
In Table 9.1 we give instantiations for four of the above groups for different security
levels. We select
(a) the elliptic curve Ea,b/Fp where |Ea,b| and p are prime,
(b) the subgroup QR(p) of quadratic residues in Z∗p, where p = 2p′+ 1 with p and
p′ both prime,
(c) the subgroup JN of Z∗N defined as {x ∈ Z∗N | J(x,N) = 1} where N = pq and
p, q being safe primes, and
(d) the subgroup JN of Z∗N defined as {x ∈ Z∗N | J(x,N) = 1} where N = pq and
p, q being k-quasi-safe-primes,
where the latter subgroup is particularly important for the instantiation of our
encryption scheme. Note that the remaining groups are appealing to instantiate
LWEE in other applications.
When instantiating the group in finite fields or in elliptic curves, one chooses the
Number Field Sieve (NFS) algorithm (for finite fields such as in (b)) or the Pohlig-
Hellman [PH78] (and resp. Pollard-Rho [Pol78]) algorithm (in a generic group such
as in (a)). For the groups (c) and (d) we use the results from [Mil75, Bac84].
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Bach [Bac84] and Miller [Mil75] show that if there exists a PPT algorithm A solving
the DL problem for a composite modulus on all inputs, then a PPT algorithm exists
which solves the Factoring problem with arbitrarily high probability. Hence, we
demand that factoring is hard for which the best algorithm is NFS, too. If we
consider the computation of discrete logarithms in subgroups T (of order p) of a
multiplicative group G (of order q), DL in T is hard if the NFS attack in G and
the generic Pollard-Rho attack for groups of order |T | = p is hard. Moreover,
in the group JN in (d) we have that (p − 1) and (q − 1) share common factors,
namely 2k, for which one can apply McKee and Pinch’s algorithm [MP98], factoring
N = pq in essentially O(N1/4/2k) operations. This is also observed in [Gir91, LL95,
JL13]. Furthermore, the Coppersmith algorithm [Cop96, Cop97] (based on LLL)
factors N efficiently if k > 1
2
min(log2 p, log2 q). For this reason we pick primes
p, q of similar bit length and hinder both attack algorithms. NFS [CS06] has the
running time Lp[1/3,
3
√
64/9] for modulus p where the complexity function Lp[t, s] is
defined by Lp[t, s] = e
s(1+o(1))(ln p)t(ln ln p)1−t . The Pohlig-Hellman [PH78] and Pollard-
Rho [Pol78] algorithms take time roughly
√
p for computing individual discrete
logarithms.
When estimating security parameters we take previously known attacks and tim-
ings into account by saying that if computing discrete logarithms in groups of order
p takes time t, then we expect that computing DLs in groups of order p′ takes time
roughly t′ ≈ tLp′ [1/3,
3
√
64/9]
Lp[1/3,
3
√
64/9]
. If the difference between p′ and p is not too large, the
term o(1) goes to zero. A similar strategy has been recommended in [LV00].
We take as reference the 2009 factorization of a 768-bit modulus, which offers
roughly 66 security bits (t ≈ 266). We stress that the parameters suggested in
Table 9.1 should be handled with care. If one selects parameters for cryptographic
constructions based on the hardness of DRP or LWEE, respectively, then the tightness
of security reduction to the underlying problem takes an important role. Assume
the security reduction says that if an adversary A breaks the security of the crypto-
graphic scheme in time t with probability , then one can solve the DRPG,` problem
in time t′ with probability ′. In order that the scheme offers κ security bits, the pa-
rameters have to be chosen such that (t′)/(t) ≤ 2κ. Thus, one has to compensate
a non-tight reduction by strengthening the underlying hardness assumption.
9.4.2. Hardness of the Learning with Errors Problem
Determining the hardness of lattice-based problems is a delicate issue. There are
several reasons for this. First, lattice problem instances typically are defined over
multiple parameters. Thus, solvers rather depend on the particular configuration
of the problem instance. Second, there are merely a few theoretical results known
about the behavior and running time of lattice algorithms, and those predictions
are not close to practical running times.
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There are several approaches to solve the LWE problem. Not all of them are
directly related to lattices. We start by explaining the “non-lattice-related” solvers.
Arora and Ge [AG11] introduced an algebraic attack which, unfortunately, requires
way too many samples to be applied in practice. Recently, Albrecht et al. [ACF+14]
gave an improved version using Groebner basis techniques that can be applied
to LWE with fewer samples, but it is still much slower than other known algo-
rithms. Another non-lattice approach is the attack by Blum, Kalai and Wasser-
man [BKW03]. While it may be the asymptotically fastest approach for LWE, it
requires subexponentially many samples and can therefore not be applied here.
The most basic lattice-based approach is the distinguishing approach [LP11].
However, Lindner and Peikert [LP11] showed that it is outperformed by a direct
decoding attack. There are several variants of this attack, ranging from the basis
nearest-plane algorithm by Babai [Bab86] to the latest enumeration variant using
known techniques from SVP solvers by Liu and Nguyen [LN13]. The third approach
is to use the so-called embedding technique to reduce LWE to an instance of the
unique-shortest vector problem [AFG13, BG14b].
So far, there is not one single attack performing best for all scenarios. Since
our scheme is based on a very limited number of samples, we focus on lattice at-
tacks, specifically on the decoding attack and the embedding technique. Albrecht et
al. [APS15] evaluate the attacks for concrete LWE instances. It turns out that the
embedding technique outperforms the decoding attack only in very few cases (and
the advantage in those rare cases is not big). We consequently concentrate on the
decoding attack in this work.
Nearest-Plane Approach. Linder-Peikert’s attack [LP11] is a generalized Babai’s
nearest plane algorithm [Bab86]. It was further improved by Liu and Nguyen [LN13]
by adapting two techniques from known SVP solvers: randomization and (extreme)
pruning. While randomization leads to a significant improvement, the speedup of
pruning is rather small (and the pruned version is much harder to analyze). We
will, therefore, consider in the following the randomized, but none-pruned version.
The attack consists of two steps: (a) a basis reduction to precompute a good basis
of a lattice defined by the matrix A, and (b) a probabilistic search algorithm with
a success probability related to the quality of the basis. Lindner-Peikert’s approach
inherently allows a trade-off between the time spend on the basis reduction and
the search algorithm. That trade-off is controlled by the Hermite factor δ, which
measures the quality of the basis. We say that a basis B = {b0, . . . , bm−1} of an
m-dimensional lattice Λ has Hermite factor δ, if ‖b0‖ = δm det(Λ)1/m. For a given
probability p and Hermite factor δ, one can compute the effort of the search al-
gorithm needed to succeed at least with success p. Lindner and Peikert claim in
[LP11] that it takes about 2−16 seconds to perform one ”search-step” (for readers
familiar with the nearest-plane algorithm: to search one parallelepiped spanned by
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the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalized basis). This allows us to estimate the running
time of the search step, given p and δ. It is folklore that the running time of a
basis reduction depends mainly on the desired Hermite factor of the reduced basis.
The original paper considers the BKZ basis-reduction algorithm [SE94]. There have
however been several improvements to BKZ. Most improvements are summarized in
the remarkable work by Chen and Nguyen [CN11]. The BKZ 2.0 algorithm comes
together with a simulation algorithm that can be used to predict its behavior. Al-
brecht et al. [AFG13] used the results of [LN13] to give an easy formula that roughly
estimates the running time t necessary to compute a basis with given Hermite factor.
They conjecture that the time t can be approximated by log2(t) = 0.009/ log
2
2 δ0−27 .
Parameters. Since we are now able to estimate the total running time of the
attack, given the desired success probability and Hermite factor, we can use a nu-
merical method to obtain the best parameters and thereby the expected running
time necessary to break the LWE instance. Given that the computers used for these
experiments execute about 210 operations per second, this can be used to estimate
the bit security of LWE instances. Table 9.2 summarizes the results.
Security / Parameters n modulus σ
80-bit 240 327680 33.98
128-bit 320 327680 32.01
256-bit 550 327680 28.55
Table 9.2.: Example instantiation of LWE for different security levels
Exponential Gap Between Error and Modulus. For our double hardness instan-
tiation, we have to estimate the security of LWE instances with an exponential gap
between the error size and the modulus. The hardness of LWE with exponentially
small gap between error and modulus is not well understood today. Brakerski and
Vaikuntanathan [BV11] say that if the error is a 1/2n
ε
fraction of the modulus N ,
the best known algorithm runs in time approximately 2n
1−ε
. With the methodology,
we can perform a binary search for the smallest dimension that suits our needs.
Table 9.3 gives LWE instances that are suitable for double hardness instantiation of
our scheme.
9.4.3. Candidate Instantiations of our Encryption Scheme
We give three possible instantiations to derive a system with short key sizes, post-
quantum security or double hardness. Throughout this section we instantiate our
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Security / Parameters n log(modulus) log(σ)
80-bit 67000 927 97
128-bit 270000 2378 306
256-bit 2500000 11506 1741
Table 9.3.: Example instantiation of LWE for different security levels
scheme such that the encryption scheme from Section 9.3.2 encrypts only a single
bit. Nonetheless, parameters can easily be upscaled to many bits.
Table 9.4.: Key sizes in kilobytes (kB) for our encryption scheme basing security on
DRP or LWE, respectively.
Sizes DRP-based instantiation LWE-based instantiation
/ Security 80-bit 128-bit 256-bit 80-bit 128-bit 256-bit
public-key size 0.565 kB 1.500 kB 7.500 kB 235 kB 417 kB 1233 kB
secret-key size 0.212 kB 0.563 kB 2.813 kB 0.976 kB 1.302 kB 2.237 kB
ciphertext size 0.283 kB 0.750 kB 3.750 kB 0.980 kB 1.306 kB 2.241 kB
The Classical Way. Here, we instantiate our encryption scheme such that the
underlying DRP is intractable, and neglecting the hardness of the underlying LWE.
In Section 9.4.1, we recall some groups where we believe DRP is hard to solve. Our
encryption scheme works in the group JN := {x ∈ ZN : J(x,N) = 1} for N = pq
with p, q being k-safe primes. In fact, we can even take safe primes p, q (i.e., k = 1)
since we do not need any noise in the exponent if we neglect the underlying LWE
hardness. Thus, we embed the message to the least significant bit in the exponent.
For this reason, we can sample g
$← JN/QRN where 〈g〉 has order 2p′q′. Since the
LWE instance within LWEE is not an issue here we select n = m = 1, σs = ∞ and
σe = 0.
We obtain 80-bit security for the underlying DRP problem if we choose safe primes
p and q such that log p = log q = 565 (see Table 9.1 for more details). Table 9.4 lists
possible key sizes for our encryption scheme. Recall that the public key consists of
pk = (g, gA, gb, k,N) (i.e., 4 group elements if we fix k = 1) and the secret key of
sk = (p, s).
The Post-Quantum Way. Here we give example instantiations of our encryption
scheme when it is based on a presumably quantum-resistant LWEE assumption. That
is, we select parameters such that the underlying LWE assumption is intractable
without relying on the hardness of DRP. For this, we modify the scheme slightly
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by choosing fixed values for p′ and q′ instead of sampling. A good choice is k = 15,
since it allows to choose p′ = 2 and q′ = 5, which are very small prime numbers
such that 2kp′ + 1 and 2kq′ + 1 are prime. For the LWE modulus, this leads to
M = 2kp′q′ = 327680. Like Lindner and Peikert [LP11], we choose the Gaussian
parameter such that the probability of decoding errors is bounded by 1%. We choose
furthermore the same parameter for error and secret distribution (i.e. σs = σe = σ),
since a standard argument reduces LWE with arbitrary secret to LWE with secret
chosen according to the error distribution. For this choice of k, p′ and q′, we obtain
80-bit security by choosing n = 240 and σ = 33.98. Table 9.4 lists the key sizes
when our encryption scheme is instantiated such that its security is based on LWE
only (see Table 9.2 for more information about the concrete hardness of LWE).
The Hardest Way (Double-Hardness). The most secure instantiation of our en-
cryption is such that even if one of the problems DRP or LWE is efficiently solvable
at some point, our encryption scheme remains semantically secure. Selecting pa-
rameters for double hardness, however, is non-trivial.
To select appropriate parameters for the case of double hardness, we apply the
following approach: For a given security level (say κ = 80), we select N such that
the Number Field Sieve needs at least 2κ operations to factor N . A possible choice
is logN = 1130 (See Table 9.1). Since factoring N must also be hard for McKee-
Pinch’s algorithm, which works well when (p− 1) and (q− 1) share common factor,
k must be chosen such that N1/42−k ≥ 2κ, i.e. k ≤ log(N)
4
−κ. This leads to k = 203.
Given N and k, we can calculate the sizes of the primes log(p′) ≈ log(q′) ≈ 362 and
log(p) ≈ log(q) ≈ 565 and the LWE modulus log(M) ≈ 927. Taking n = 67000 and
σ = 297, Lemma 6 shows that the algorithm decrypts correctly with high probability.
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In this work, we introduced new methods to select parameters for LWE-based
schemes. We showed that parameter selection is a challenging, but rewarding task.
Concerning the challenges, our results show that cautious parameter selection is
necessary, especially if the underlying security assumption is modified to achieve
additional speed-up. We also showed that it is crucial to take modern hardware
architecture into consideration. Of course, new developments of LWE cryptanalysis
is a group effort that requires contributions of a bigger community. Consequently,
we introduced the LWE challenge that allows to bunch and monitor the progress.
On the other hand, a careful parameter selection can lead to significant effi-
ciency improvements. We showed that LWE instances used for typical cryptographic
schemes do not provide enough samples for many attacks. In addition, even the at-
tacks that can succeed with the limited number of samples suffer from the limitation,
which results in increased run times. Taking this into consideration leads to signifi-
cant higher attack runtimes, which we used to give improved hardness estimations
for LWE.
Furthermore, we used the new hardness results to construct and instantiate im-
proved cryptographic schemes. The schemes may be of independent interest and
cover both main aspects of efficiency (speed and memory consumption), and in
addition show that advanced security properties are possible.
The first important aspect of efficiency is the speed of the algorithms. Our im-
provement of the signature scheme by Bai and Galbraith’s lattice-based signature
scheme [BG14b] can compete with the best alternatives in terms of speed, despite
the fact that it is based on standard lattices. Building on our results, Bindel et al.
invented TESLA [ABBD15] and ring-TESLA [ABB+16], that are among the most
promising candidates for lattice-based signature schemes.
The second aspect of efficiency is memory consumption. In order to show that
LWE-based encryption schemes can have an extremely small memory footprint,
we introduced a new encryption scheme based on the proposal by Lindner and
Peikert [LP11]. Our new scheme only requires about one kByte of ROM, which is
at least comparable to all existing alternatives (see Figure 8.2). With more than 20
encryptions and decryptions per seconds on low-cost microcontrollers, it is also fast
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enough for most use-cases and a good candidate for public-key encryption in the
internet of things.
Future work As mentioned in the introduction, an important future work is to
investigate potential speed ups by Grover’s search algorithm. A good starting point
is to take a closer look at parallel attacks, since it is a good rule-of-thumb that those
attacks can benefit from Grover. In particular, this is true for the parallel decoding
attack presented in Chapter 4. However, Section 4.3 shows that a speed up in this
area would not lead to a significant overall improvement.
More promising attempts try to speed up basis reduction algorithms, in particular
BKZ. They are used as subroutines in many attacks (see Sections 2.3.2, 2.3.3, 2.3.4,
2.3.5, and Chapter 5), and have significant influence on the overall runtime for
most of them. Since the only exponential-runtime part of BKZ is an SVP solver for
projected sublattices, research focuses on those at the moment. A second application
of SVP solvers are the embedding attacks (see Section 2.3.4 and 2.3.5).
At the moment, two different types of SVP solvers are used: Enumeration and
sieving algorithms. Despite significant speed ups for sieving algorithms (see [Laa15,
BL16]), enumeration still seems to be preferable in practice. However, no significant
progress was made concerning improved enumeration on quantum computers so far.
In contrast to this, sieving algorithms can benefit from Grover. An early result was
presented by Laarhofen et al. [LMvdP13], and new estimates where recently used
to estimate the hardness of the “new hope protocol” [ADPS16], an LWE-based key
exchange protocol based on the proposal by Ding [Din12].
Algebraic attacks on LWE like BKW could also benefit from Grover’s algorithm.
In fact, BKW looks like a perfect candidate at first sight, since a big part of it consists
of finding collisions in LWE samples. Indeed, Grover-like algorithms can speed
up collision finding from O(√2n) to O( 3√2n). Unfortunately, this is not directly
applicable to BKW, since BKW requires exponentially many collisions, and the
speed up of Grover collision finding vanishes in this case.
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